Track The Planet: A Web-Scale Analysis Of How Online Behavioral Advertising Violates Social Norms by Libert, Timothy Patrick
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 
2017 
Track The Planet: A Web-Scale Analysis Of How Online Behavioral 
Advertising Violates Social Norms 
Timothy Patrick Libert 
University of Pennsylvania, public@timlibert.me 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations 
 Part of the Communication Commons, Computer Sciences Commons, and the Public Policy 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Libert, Timothy Patrick, "Track The Planet: A Web-Scale Analysis Of How Online Behavioral Advertising 
Violates Social Norms" (2017). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2714. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2714 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2714 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Track The Planet: A Web-Scale Analysis Of How Online Behavioral Advertising 
Violates Social Norms 
Abstract 
Various forms of media have long been supported by advertising as part of a broader social agreement in 
which the public gains access to monetarily free or subsidized content in exchange for paying attention to 
advertising. In print- and broadcast-oriented media distribution systems, advertisers relied on broad 
audience demographics of various publications and programs in order to target their offers to the 
appropriate groups of people. The shift to distributing media on the World Wide Web has vastly altered 
the underlying dynamic by which advertisements are targeted. Rather than rely on imprecise 
demographics, the online behavioral advertising (OBA) industry has developed a system by which 
individuals’ web browsing histories are covertly surveilled in order that their product preferences may be 
deduced from their online behavior. Due to a failure of regulation, Internet users have virtually no means 
to control such surveillance, and it contravenes a host of well-established social norms. 
This dissertation explores the ways in which the recent emergence of OBA has come into conflict with 
these societal norms. Rather than a mere process for targeting messages, OBA represents a profound 
shift in the underlying balance of power within society. This power balance is embedded in an information 
asymmetry which gives corporations and governments significantly more knowledge of, and power over, 
citizens than vice-versa. Companies do not provide the public with an accounting of their techniques or 
the scale at which they operate. 
In order to shed light on corporate behavior in the OBA sector, two new tools were developed for this 
dissertation: webXray and policyXray. webXray is the most powerful tool available for attributing the flow 
of user data on websites to the companies which receive and process it. policyXray is the first, and 
currently only, tool capable of auditing website privacy policies in order to evaluate disclosure of data 
transfers to specific parties. Both tools are highly resource efficient, allowing them to analyze millions of 
data flows and operate at a scale which is normally reserved for the companies collecting data. In short, 
these tools rectify the existing information asymmetry between the OBA industry and the public by 
leveraging the tools of mass surveillance for socially-beneficial ends. 
The research presented herein allows many specific existing social-normative concerns to be explored 
using empirical data in a way which was not previously possible. The impact of OBA on three main areas 
is investigated: regulatory norms, medical privacy norms, and norms related to the utility of the press. 
Through an examination of data flows on one million websites, and policies on 200,000 more, it is found 
in the area of regulatory norms that well-established Fair Information Practice Principles are severely 
undermined by the self-regulatory “notice and choice” paradigm. In the area of informational norms 
related to personal health, an analysis of data flows on 80,000 pages related to 2,000 medical conditions 
reveals that user health concerns are shared with a number of commercial parties, virtually no policies 
exist to restrict or regulate the practice, and users are at risk of embarrassment and discrimination. 
Finally, an analysis of 250,000 pages drawn from 5,000 U.S.-based media outlets demonstrates that core 
values of an independent and trustworthy press are undermined by commercial surveillance and 
centralized revenue systems. This surveillance may also transfer data to government entities, potentially 
resulting in chilling effects which compromise the ability of the press to serve as a check on power. 
The findings of this dissertation make it clear that current approaches to regulating OBA based on “notice 
and choice” have failed. The underlying “choice” of OBA is to sacrifice core social values in favor of 
increased profitability for primarily U.S.-based advertising firms. Therefore, new regulatory approaches 
based on mass surveillance of corporate, rather than user, behaviors must be pursued. Only by resolving 
the information asymmetry between the public, private corporations, and the state may social norms be 
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an environment which was always brutally honest, but never mean-spirited. Prof.
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TRACK THE PLANET: A WEB-SCALE ANALYSIS OF HOW ONLINE
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING VIOLATES SOCIAL NORMS
Timothy Libert
Dr. Victor Pickard
Various forms of media have long been supported by advertising as part of a
broader social agreement in which the public gains access to monetarily free or
subsidized content in exchange for paying attention to advertising. In print- and
broadcast-oriented media distribution systems, advertisers relied on broad audience
demographics of various publications and programs in order to target their offers
to the appropriate groups of people. The shift to distributing media on the World
Wide Web has vastly altered the underlying dynamic by which advertisements are
targeted. Rather than rely on imprecise demographics, the online behavioral adver-
tising (OBA) industry has developed a system by which individuals’ web browsing
histories are covertly surveilled in order that their product preferences may be de-
duced from their online behavior. Due to a failure of regulation, Internet users
have virtually no means to control such surveillance, and it contravenes a host of
well-established social norms.
This dissertation explores the ways in which the recent emergence of OBA has
come into conflict with these societal norms. Rather than a mere process for tar-
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geting messages, OBA represents a profound shift in the underlying balance of
power within society. This power balance is embedded in an information asymme-
try which gives corporations and governments significantly more knowledge of, and
power over, citizens than vice-versa. Companies do not provide the public with an
accounting of their techniques or the scale at which they operate.
In order to shed light on corporate behavior in the OBA sector, two new tools
were developed for this dissertation: webXray and policyXray. webXray is the
most powerful tool available for attributing the flow of user data on websites to the
companies which receive and process it. policyXray is the first, and currently only,
tool capable of auditing website privacy policies in order to evaluate disclosure of
data transfers to specific parties. Both tools are highly resource efficient, allowing
them to analyze millions of data flows and operate at a scale which is normally
reserved for the companies collecting data. In short, these tools rectify the existing
information asymmetry between the OBA industry and the public by leveraging
the tools of mass surveillance for socially-beneficial ends.
The research presented herein allows many specific existing social-normative
concerns to be explored using empirical data in a way which was not previously
possible. The impact of OBA on three main areas is investigated: regulatory norms,
medical privacy norms, and norms related to the utility of the press. Through an
examination of data flows on one million websites, and policies on 200,000 more, it
is found in the area of regulatory norms that well-established Fair Information Prac-
x
tice Principles are severely undermined by the self-regulatory “notice and choice”
paradigm. In the area of informational norms related to personal health, an anal-
ysis of data flows on 80,000 pages related to 2,000 medical conditions reveals that
user health concerns are shared with a number of commercial parties, virtually
no policies exist to restrict or regulate the practice, and users are at risk of em-
barrassment and discrimination. Finally, an analysis of 250,000 pages drawn from
5,000 U.S.-based media outlets demonstrates that core values of an independent
and trustworthy press are undermined by commercial surveillance and centralized
revenue systems. This surveillance may also transfer data to government entities,
potentially resulting in chilling effects which compromise the ability of the press to
serve as a check on power.
The findings of this dissertation make it clear that current approaches to regu-
lating OBA based on “notice and choice” have failed. The underlying “choice” of
OBA is to sacrifice core social values in favor of increased profitability for primarily
U.S.-based advertising firms. Therefore, new regulatory approaches based on mass
surveillance of corporate, rather than user, behaviors must be pursued. Only by
resolving the information asymmetry between the public, private corporations, and
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“A wonderful fact to reflect upon, that every human creature is consti-
tuted to be that profound secret and mystery to every other. A solemn
consideration, when I enter a great city by night, that every one of those
darkly clustered houses encloses its own secret; that every room in ev-
ery one of them encloses its own secret; that every beating heart in the
hundreds of thousands of breasts there, is, in some of its imaginings, a
secret to the heart nearest it!” (Dickens, 1859)
In the passage above, a traveller in Charles Dickens’ 1859 classic A Tale of Two
Cities reflects on the “wonderful fact” that all people are in some way an enigma
unto themselves, unknown even to those closest to them. It is impossible for the
traveller to peer into the “darkly clustered houses”, and the lives of the inhabitants
are forever a mystery to him. However, the “beating hearts of hundreds of thousands
1
of breasts” are now laid bare before the billions of websites which permeate all
sectors of society and the economy. These websites harbor a massive surveillance
infrastructure which has denuded the landscape of secrets and undermined a wide
range of privacy norms which predate Dicken’s novel by millennia.
When a bedroom door is closed today, the occupant may be physically alone,
but she or he is often connected to vast swaths of humanity via the World Wide
Web. In its short history, the web has rapidly evolved from an interactive hypertext
media into a container media which has become the primary conduit for the delivery
of not only text, but images, music, television, film, games, as well as augmented
and virtual realities. While the rise of mobile devices is sometimes viewed as a turn
away from the web, in reality the most popular applications contain web browser
functionality and are often built on web infrastructure. The web has become so
ubiquitous that any distinctions between the “offline” and “online” worlds have
become essentially meaningless as nearly all media and communication is subsumed
into Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic.
As traditional forms of media have moved to the web, they have adapted to new
technological and economic dynamics, the biggest of which is a fundamental shift
in the relationship between publishers and media consumers. Whereas broadcast
and print media operated primarily as a means for one-way communication, the
web offers a means for audiences to communicate with each other and with media
providers. Some of these communications are visible, as when a user shares a social
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media post with friends or posts a comment on a newspaper article. However, the
vast majority of user communications take the form of low-level network traffic
which is typically hidden from view. Such traffic reveals the IP addresses, browser
information, and cookies of a user visiting a website, allowing them to be identified
and tracked. Whereas the operator of a radio or television station has no means
of verifying who, if anybody, is listening or watching, the owner of a website may
know exactly who is visiting.
Traditional media have depended on advertising revenue for much of their his-
tory. In the one-to-many communication model, advertisements are tailored for
specific audiences only to the degree that certain publications or programs are
know to be popular with certain groups, such as young men, sports fans, or re-
tirees. The best means of measuring the potential impact of such advertisements is
sales volume and brand awareness. While there are a host of substantive objections
to the commercialization of media, there are few, if any, major privacy objections.
Dicken’s vision of rooms enclosing secrets is not radically changed if the rooms
contain traditional television sets.
In contrast, because the web facilitates monitoring the actions of specific users,
advertisers are no longer forced to pitch the merits of their wares to roughly-
clustered, faceless masses. Rather, by leveraging the hidden communications con-
tained in network request traffic, they are able to isolate specific users. They are
able to monitor these users as they traverse the web, developing deep and rich pro-
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files of the user’s interests and behaviors. Leveraging this data they are able to
“target” users for “tailored” advertisements and determine if they have interacted
with the advertisement and made a purchase. Due to increased network speeds,
the proliferation of mobile devices, and plummeting costs of data storage, both the
volume of information ingested and the time it is retained are virtually limitless.
This new approach, called online behavioral advertising (OBA), is a fundamental
departure from all that came before it.
OBA has become such a dominant force on the web that wherever the web
goes, for-profit surveillance follows. Spheres of life which were previously far from
the commercial realm are now subject to an omnipresent surveillance apparatus
designed to monitor visits to one website in order to target an advertisement on
another. Social contexts with well-developed informational norms, such as those
related to medical issues, have been grossly violated by OBA. Users may be dis-
criminated against in the marketplace based on their web browsing histories. Most
troublesome, government spy agencies have been able to repurpose commercial
surveillance tools in order to conduct mass warrantless surveillance. Thus, while
advertisements are frequently viewed as tolerable annoyances, the techniques by
which they are delivered today ultimately have a fundamental impact on relation-
ships among citizens, corporations, and the state.
This dissertation explores the ways in which the recent emergence of OBA has
come into conflict with long-established and closely held societal norms. Rather
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than a mere process for “tailoring” messages, OBA represents a profound shift in
the underlying balance of power within society. This power balance is embedded in
an information asymmetry which gives corporations and governments significantly
more knowledge of, and power over, citizens than vice-versa. Companies do not
provide the public with an accounting of their techniques or the scale at which they
operate.
In order to shed light on corporate behavior in the OBA sector, two new tools
were developed for this dissertation: webXray and policyXray. webXray is the
most powerful tool available for attributing the flow of user data on websites to the
companies which receive and process it. policyXray is the first, and currently only,
tool capable of auditing website privacy policies in order to evaluate disclosure of
data transfers to specific parties. Both tools are highly resource efficient, allowing
them to analyze millions of data flows and operate at a scale which is normally
reserved for the companies collecting data. In short, these tools rectify the existing
information asymmetry between the OBA industry and the public by leveraging
the tools of mass surveillance for socially-beneficial ends.
In the same way that inventing a telescope allows one to ask new questions of the
heavens, the development of these tools has facilitated the pursuit of understanding
the social impact of OBA in a way which would otherwise be impossible. The
research presented herein allows many specific existing social-normative concerns
to be explored using empirical data in a way which was not previously possible.
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The impact of OBA on three main areas is investigated: regulatory norms, medical
privacy norms, and norms related to the utility of the press. These investigations
reveal that the problem of OBA is not mere invasive advertising, it is the erosion
of well-founded social norms.
The findings of this dissertation make it clear that current approaches to reg-
ulating OBA based on “notice and choice” have failed. Given the huge volume of
surveillance mechanisms on the web today it is technically infeasible for users to
be properly notified. Likewise, the underlying “choice” of OBA is to sacrifice core
social values in favor of increased profitability for primarily U.S.-based advertising
firms. Therefore, new regulatory approaches grounded in social norms must be pur-
sued. These approaches must be enforced using technological tools which monitor
the behavior of companies in the OBA space as rigorously and relentless as such
companies monitor users. It is time to turn the power of OBA against itself.
This chapter will first provide further background on OBA. Second, the extant
state of research will be briefly discussed with attention paid to current gaps in
understanding and methodology. Third, the technical underpinnings of OBA are
detailed in order that the significant methodological advancements used for this
dissertation may be contextualized. Finally, the chapter concludes with a preview
of the findings of several case studies.
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Online Behavioral Advertising
For many people the cost of accessing the web is largely limited to purchasing
a computing device and paying for network access. Nearly unlimited volumes of
webpages are freely available without registration or payment due to the fact that
otherwise free content is largely subsidized by advertising. As noted above, the
provision of content in exchange for viewing advertisements is nothing new: the
practice is well-established in mass-media such as newspapers, magazines, radio,
and television. The key difference in the online space is that advertisements are
often not directed at mass audiences. Rather, advertisements are tailored to the
interests of specific individuals based on their behavior. This model is known as
online behavioral advertising (OBA) and represents a profoundly radical departure
from historically accepted commercial practices.
OBA is premised on the fact that showing users advertisements related to traits
inferred from online behavior (e.g. websites visited, topics “liked” on social media,
etc.) increases the likelihood a given user will choose to follow a web link to a
specific advertisement. For example, a user looking up information on infant nutri-
tion may be shown an advertisement for baby food, and a dog owner who “likes” a
veterinarian may see advertisements for flea collars. The goal of delivering adver-
tisements targeted in this way is rooted both in satisfying the needs of advertisers
and optimizing the use of advertising space by content providers.
The act of clicking on an advertisement is the core action by which money
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changes hands in the OBA paradigm. In this “pay-per-click” (PPC) model, adver-
tisers only pay when a user engages directly with their advertisements.1 On the
side of advertisers, a click means a user is choosing to learn more about a product,
thus generating a sales lead - this is often the only time an advertisers will pay for
the advertisement. In theory, this action is measurable and traceable in a way that
mass-media advertising is not, demonstrating the value of “ad-spend” to a client.
On the publisher side, there is a limited amount of space for advertisements on each
page, using an OBA approach, the advertisements on any given page are those most
suited for the specific visitor - thereby ensuring that a limited resource is used in
the most efficient way possible.
While OBA provides clear commercial benefits, such benefits come at a signif-
icant cost to personal privacy. In order to continually refine the effectiveness of
ad targeting, vast volumes of data are ingested by OBA companies so that they
can fine-tune their behavioral targeting. Large OBA companies such as Google,
Facebook, and Twitter process information on user interests gleaned from search
terms, private messages, and social media posts. However, there are many online
advertising companies who lack large product portfolios from which to gain insights
into user behavior. These companies often rely on monitoring the websites users
are visiting in order to gain behavioral insights, a technique also used by the major
companies mentioned above.
1There is also a “pay by mille” (PPM) model by which advertisers pay for the number of people
who see an advertisement regardless of clicks, but it is less popular online.
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Monitoring the pages users visit is often accomplished by inserting computer
code into web pages which allows users to be “tracked” as they traverse the web.
This process is called “third-party web tracking” and is reliant on a number of
features of web pages which were developed for increased functionality, but have
since been re-appropriated in service of the surveillance of user habits. Publishers
may be paid to place such code on websites, use it for free audience metrics (e.g.
Google Analytics), or to add social media sharing functionality. Regardless of the
motivation, when users load a given website they are often interacting with many
unseen parties.
The broader societal impacts of OBA are not yet understood and there is an ex-
tensive academic literature which address issues of privacy broadly, and on the web
specifically. Due to a variety of unsettled policy questions regarding the practices
involved in OBA, the literature is often directly engaged with public debates.
Extant Literature
There are two main schools of research on privacy and online behavioral advertising
(OBA). The first school draws primarily from the social sciences and is rooted in
normative evaluations of the legal and ethical impacts of OBA along with docu-
mentation of how the practice is viewed by the public. The second school is rooted
in computer science and is most focused on documenting the evolving mechanisms
employed in OBA and how widespread such mechanisms are. While there is ob-
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vious thematic overlap between the two schools, methodological boundaries have
prevented deeper integration between social-normative and technical approaches.
Within the social sciences, there are a number of influential theories regarding
the role of privacy in normatively-defined contexts (Nissenbaum, 2004; Turow and
Hennessy, 2007; Nissenbaum, 2010), democratic contexts (Westin, 1967, 2003), and
legal contexts (Solove, 2006, 2012). Ample survey research has shown privacy con-
cerns are not limited to social theorists: it is now well established that online privacy
represents an area of significant and sustained concern for the public (Ackerman
et al., 1999; Turow, 2003; Acquisti and Gross, 2006; Turow et al., 2009; Hoofnagle
et al., 2012; Madden et al., 2012; Fox and Duggan, 2013; Turow et al., 2014; Mad-
den, 2014). Furthermore, there is a large body of social science literature which has
documented the endemic failure of so-called “privacy policies” to inform the public
of the extent and nature of data collection techniques used in online behavioral
advertising (Graber et al., 2002; Blanke, 2006; Milne et al., 2006; McDonald and
Cranor, 2008; Barocas and Nissenbaum, 2009; McDonald et al., 2009; Solove, 2012;
Barocas and Nissenbaum, 2014; Reidenberg et al., 2014). Overall, this literature
identifies normative issues, documents these issues are recognized by the public,
and reveals how extant policy and governance mechanisms fail to meet normative
goals.
Within the computer science literature, focus has been given to the technical
means by which user data is transferred to third parties and sustained research has
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documented the programming techniques by which users’ computers may be ma-
nipulated into facilitating “tracking” within and between browsing sessions (Felten
and Schneider, 2000; Jackson et al., 2006; Eckersley, 2010; Jang et al., 2010; Yen
et al., 2012; Acar et al., 2013). A related strand of research has conducted censuses
to determine how widespread such techniques are across the web (Krishnamurthy
and Wills, 2006, 2009; Krishnamurthy et al., 2011; Roesner et al., 2012; Mayer and
Mitchell, 2012; Castelluccia et al., 2013; Acar et al., 2013; Libert, 2015a). While
the census literature frequently includes sub-analysis of sector-specific populations
of web pages, there are relatively few studies which place significant emphasis on
any particular socially-defined context.
While both approaches detailed above have produced a wealth of valuable find-
ings, there remains scant accounting of the actual reach, impact, and policies of the
actors collecting the bulk of user data in the OBA space. The companies which
collect the vast volumes of data used for OBA know the deepest secrets of billions
of users, but extant research approaches have insufficiently linked the normative
dimensions of privacy values to the observed practices of specific companies. This
situation has generated an information asymmetry by which companies know vastly
more about the behavior of individuals than these individuals knows about the com-
panies’ behavior. Likewise, regulators and advocates acting on behalf of the public
lack the data and computational resources enjoyed by companies in the OBA sector.
The only means to bridge the gap in literature and resolve the information
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asymmetry between the public and the OBA industry is to employ methods which
allow for grounding technical discovery within well-defined social-normative con-
texts. Such an approach facilitates linking the observed activities of companies in
the OBA sector with the underlying social values which they potentially violate.
Given the truly staggering reach of OBA, successful methods must also operate at
a scale which is capable of fully documenting the behavior of billion-dollar data
harvesting operations. As noted above, one of the primary contributions of this dis-
sertation is the development of new tools which equalize the information differential
between the public and the OBA industry, allowing new questions to be asked.
Methods: webXray and policyXray
Beyond the material contained in this text, an underlying contribution of this disser-
tation is the development of two new software tools. The first, webXray, facilitates
massive-scale monitoring of data flows on the web and linking such flows to the com-
panies which harvest user data. The second tool, policyXray, builds on webXray
to provide automated auditing of privacy policies to determine if discovered data
flows are appropriately disclosed to users. Prior to detailing the approaches used by
these tools, it is necessary to briefly detail the technical mechanisms which power
the online behavioral advertising (OBA) process.
A real-world example is the best way to understand how user information is
leaked to third-parties on a typical web page. When a user searches online for “HIV”
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one of the top results is for the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) page with the address “http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/”2. Clicking on this result
initiates what is known as a “first-party” Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)





This request is sent to the CDC webserver (“Host: www.cdc.gov”) and is an
instruction to return (“GET”) the page with the address “/hiv/”. This request also
includes “User-Agent” information which tells the server what kind of browser and
computer the user has. In this case, the user employs the Mozilla Firefox browser on
a Macintosh computer. Such information is helpful when loading specially optimized
pages for smartphones among other tasks.
Once this request has been made, the CDC webserver sends the user an HTML
file. This file contains the text of the page as well as a set of instructions that tells
the web browser how to download and style additional elements such as images. In
order to get the CDC logo, the following HTTP request is made:
GET /TemplatePackage/images/cdcHeaderLogo.gif
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This request introduces a new piece of information called the “Referer” (a word
which is misspelled in the original technical document and is in continuing use).
The “Referer” contains the address of the page the user is currently viewing. The
CDC web server may keep records of all HTTP requests in order to determine what
pages and content are being requested most often.
Because the “Host” for both requests is identical (www.cdc.gov), the user is only
interacting with a single party and such requests are called “first-party requests”.
The only two parties who know that the user is looking up information about
HIV are the user and the CDC. However, the HTML file also contains code which
makes requests to outside parties. These types of “third-party requests” typically
download “third-party elements” such as images and Javascript.3 This process
happens in the background without user input, and the term “invisible web” is
sometimes used to describe it.
On the CDC’s HIV page, third-party requests are made to the servers of Face-
book, Pinterest, Twitter, and Google. In the case of the first three companies,
the requested elements are all social media buttons which allow for the sharing of
3Javascript is a programing language which, among other things, may be used to write programs
which run inside a user’s web browser.
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content via the “Recommend”, “Tweet”, or “Pin It” icons. It is unlikely that many
users would understand that the presence of these buttons indicates that their data
is sent to these companies. In contrast, the Google elements on the page are en-
tirely invisible and there is no Google logo present. One of these requests is sent to





Again, the “Referer” field reveals that the user is visiting a page about HIV.
By pairing information about the User-Agent, Referer, and user’s IP address, it
is possible for companies like Google and Facebook to identify people who are
concerned with HIV (Yen et al., 2012). In all likelihood those visiting this page are
unaware of this fact, and would not be happy to find out their personal data had
been transferred without their consent.
Companies which are able to insert their elements into a given page may build
behavioral profiles of users, thus a main goal of online advertisers is to get their
elements on as many pages as possible. In many cases, advertisers pay to have their
elements put on the page via revenue sharing arrangements, and this the dominant
model in the publishing industry (Turow, 2012). Another way to get elements onto
a page is to provide “free” services to web masters such as traffic analytics and social
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media sharing buttons, as in the case in the CDC example. This is how Google,
Facebook, and Twitter are able to amass huge volumes of information about users’
habits once they leave their respective platforms and venture out onto the larger
web - even on sites which do not rely on advertising revenue.
While many of the major OBA companies provide public accounting of their
profits, and in some cases government requests for data, none of them provide any
means to get a list of all the web pages from which they collect users’ behavioral
data. They provide virtually no public disclosure of the degree to which they collect
data in sensitive contexts, and if they do, how it is treated. They provide limited
means, at best, for users to discover tracking is taking place on the pages they are
currently viewing. The structural disadvantages which allow companies to construct
behavioral profiles of users while masking their own activities are rooted in the
technical processes described above. Revealing these processes requires independent
auditing of data flows.
webXray is a software platform developed to audit flows of user data on the web
and to attribute such flows to the companies which collect user data. webXray is
the most powerful tool of its kind and is capable of collecting data on a mass scale.
Deployment of webXray has two primary components: choosing a population of web
pages to analyze, and capturing data flows on such web pages in order to attribute
web tracking behavior to the companies which practice it.
The studies contained herein use several methods for establishing relevant pop-
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ulations of pages. In some cases, it is possible to model the pages a user would visit
by utilizing search engines to produce pages related to specific terms, such as the
name of a given disease. In other cases, lists of popular pages in a given category,
such as newspapers, may be harvested. Finally, in cases where broad trends are of
interest, popular site lists may be used to establish base-line populations.
Once a page population has been defined, the list of pages may be processed by
webXray. The program uses a “headless” web browser (meaning it has no graphical
user interface) to load pages, execute Javascript, set cookies, and record all network
requests made for both first- and third-party elements. Once such data is gathered
for each page, a database is constructed which contains all of the domains to which
a user visiting the pages in the population would transmit data. An examination
of these domains allows all requested elements to be classified as either first- or
third-party, and reveals the underlying technical contours of data flows.
The collection of raw traffic data alone does not reveal the companies which re-
ceive user data, and by extension, the larger social forces at play. While it is possible
to programmatically detect requests to third-party domains, it is not always clear
who the requested domains belong to. However, by examining domain registration
records, it is possible to pair seemingly-obscure domain names (e.g. “2mdn.net”,
“fbcdn.net”) with their corporate owners (e.g. Google, Facebook). Over several
years, webXray has incorporated an extensive library which links hundreds of do-
mains to over 180 companies. By linking the domains which receive user data to
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their corporate parents, it is possible to use network traffic as a means to reveal
and interrogate the social relationships between users and companies. Quite often
users are unaware of these relationships.
As noted above, the technical features of websites make it very difficult for users
to know if, and when, their data is being transferred to third parties. webXray can
reveal such connections, providing the basis for further inquiry. One type of such
inquiry is determining if the privacy policy of a given page fully discloses the data
flows to which users are subjected. This type of analysis has not been done before
and policyXray is designed to accomplish this task.
When webXray loads a page it attempts to find a link to the site’s privacy
policy. Once webXray analysis is completed, policyXray may follow the link in
order to extract the policy text. Once the policy is extracted, the names of the
companies found in the webXray analysis are searched for in the policy text in order
to determine if they are disclosed. In this way, it may be empirically determined
at significant scale if users have reasonable means of being informed of their loss of
their privacy, thus providing a comprehensive view of social, technical, and policy
implications of data flows which drive the focus of this dissertation.
Structure and Chapters
This dissertation contains a review of the existing literature in privacy and online
behavioral advertising, an extensive methods section, and three case studies. Each
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of the case studies in grounded in specific social-normative contexts which provide
a basis from which to both frame and explore technical findings.
The literature review chapter discusses larger theoretical approaches within the
privacy studies field and then focuses on several broad areas of research: surveys
which document public opinion towards privacy issues, qualitative work which sheds
light on industry motivations, technical research which documents the methods and
extent of online tracking mechanisms, and policy-oriented research. These branches
of research all shed light on various aspects of the online behavioral advertising
(OBA) phenomena from a range of methodological and theoretical viewpoints. The
underlying contribution of this dissertation is highlighted by examining how extant
social-normative, technical, and policy research issues have been addressed in a
fractured, rather than holistic, means.
The methods chapter goes into great detail as to the novel and innovative de-
sign considerations taken with building socially-grounded populations of webpages,
webXray, and policyXray. In regards to the page populations, several techniques
are discussed which move the studies in this volume beyond the extant approach of
looking at topic-related hubs to generating rich and expansive populations of web
pages which reflect the complexity and nuance of social life online. The underlying
architecture of webXray is discussed in-depth, along with coverage of how webXray’s
approach to focusing on attribution of data flows to specific corporations represents
a significant advancement over existing methodology. Furthermore, the flexibility
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of webXray’s design is used to highlight how additional data sources related to mal-
ware analyses may be used. Finally, the methods used by policyXray to audit the
disclosure of data flows, heretofore unattempted in the literature, are detailed.
The first case study, On the Impossibility of Accepting the Unknown: A Web-
Scale Analysis of the Failure of Notice and Choice, traces the history of the Fair
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) to present day and provides the largest
analysis to date of privacy policies online. The FIPPs are a set of normative prin-
ciples originally conceived in 1973 which set out a basis from which to apply a
rights-based approach to the governance of automated systems which process data
on individuals. These principles expanded over time and have had profound impact
on regulation around the globe. However, the online behavioral advertising indus-
try has co-opted and weakened the FIPPs in order to construct a self-regulatory
regime which fails to meet the original normative goals of the principles. The nature
of the self-regulatory approach is a subject of significant controversy in academic
literature, regulatory practice, and the public dialogue.
With this background and history in mind, the main methodological and sub-
stantive contribution of the study is an analysis of over 90 million data flows cap-
tured on one million websites, the privacy policies of over 200,000 sites, and the
extended policies of the top 25 of 183 identified companies which receive user data.
It is determined that not only are the self-regulatory principles promoted by in-
dustry a perversion of social norms, they are not followed in any meaningful way.
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It is found that users are tracked by a huge array of companies, the majority of
which do not provide consumer-oriented services, and are thus likely unknown by
the vast majority of users. Likewise, an automated examination of the policies for
over 200,000 sites demonstrates that only 10.7% of data flows are disclosed in site
policies. The policies of web sites and the major collectors of user data are nearly
impossible to understand based on the application of widely used readability met-
rics. Furthermore, industry policies ignore or reject user choices in data collection,
and fail to provide minimum baseline security protections for data transfers. Over-
all, it is shown that the normative values embedded in Fair Information Practice
Principles are being violated on a mass scale and the OBA industry’s claims of
self-regulation are proven to be a fiction.
The second case study, Privacy Implications of Health Information Seeking on
the Web, grounds the failure of effective regulation in the OBA space within the
universally recognized norms governing medical privacy. As with the prior case
study, this one draws on social norms which predate OBA to highlight the prob-
lems associated with its use. Despite claims that privacy is a “modern” invention,
the Hippocratic Oath, dating from the 5th Century B.C., has an explicit privacy
clause and requires physicians to swear that Whatever I see or hear in the lives of
my patients...I will keep secret, as considering all such things to be private (National
Institutes of Health, History of Medicine Division, 2002). Today, regulations such
as HIPAA uphold similar protections. The reasons for both the ancient and modern
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commitments to medical privacy is that disclosure of patient information may lead
to public embarrassment and discrimination. The impact of these harms is pro-
found: patients who are scared of public disclosure of their medical conditions are
less likely to seek care. Patients who do not seek care may spread disease and even
die. While the impacts of losing medical privacy are profound, online advertisers
take no oaths to protect patient privacy and collect vast volumes of medical-related
data online.
One of the primary methodological contributions of the case study on medical
privacy online is that it grounds the larger social context of medical privacy within
a narrowly defined population of websites. While prior studies have analyzed a
handful on topic-focused “hubs” of medical information, the Pew research center has
found that the majority of Americans not only go online to seek health information
but do so by using search engines instead of hubs (Fox and Duggan, 2013). The
population of pages in this chapter is created by assembling a list of 2,000 common
diseases, and using them as search terms in order to create a full population of over
80,000 pages related to health concerns. This population reflects the full variety
of sources of online medical information ranging from newspaper articles, online
support forums, hospitals, to non-profit and government entities.
An analysis of these pages reveals that users visiting them have their personal
browsing habits subjected to third-party interception in over 90% of pages. Further-
more, in 70% of these cases, the precise name of a condition, symptom, or treatment
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is revealed. An investigation of industry self-regulatory guidelines demonstrates
that patient privacy is not protected by industry. More troubling, an evaluation of
extant federal regulations and policies reveals that regulators are poorly equipped
to defend users. Once again, it is shown that social norms are undermined by OBA
and regulations are failing to rein in undesirable practices. OBA also threatens the
health of democracies.
The third and final case study, Watch Dog or Watch Tower? Privacy, Trust,
and Security Implications of Behavioral Advertising on News Websites, investigates
the epicenter of the OBA phenomena: the online news sector. One of the primary
sources of revenue for U.S. news media has long been advertising, and as news
media have moved online, they have embraced OBA. However, in the transition from
anonymous print advertising to the personalized targeting and surveillance of the
OBA paradigm, the democratic function of the press has been deeply undermined.
The normative foundation of the American system of governance rests on a
separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. The
reason for this division is that each branch acts as a check on the others, preventing
the emergence of tyranny. In addition to these three formal branches of government,
the U.S. Constitution provides broad press freedoms in order that news media may
act as an additional check on power; the press is often referred to as “the fourth
estate” for this reason.
While reality often differs from the ideal, the press is viewed as able to act as a
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check on power for several reasons. First, the press is able to function due to the
trust they have earned from citizens in being transparent and fair in their report-
ing. Second, the press operates from a position of independence and is ultimately
beholden to the needs of citizens. Third, and most important, the press represents
the locus of information and public deliberation about matters of governance; the
ultimate check on power is an informed citizenry.
Online behavioral advertising compromises the above functions in several ways.
First, the press is unable to function without the trust of citizens. However, the
essential nature of OBA is premised on extracting user data in covert ways which
survey data has demonstrated are rejected by the public. Furthermore, poor over-
sight of OBA facilitates the spread of criminal malware. Both covert data collection
and the presence of malware undermine any basis of trust. Second, while press out-
lets require independence to operate without influence, OBA fosters a centralization
of both revenue and content-delivery infrastructure, which gives a handful of OBA
firms massive unseen leverage over the press. Finally, the free and open airing of
facts and ideas which the press fosters is threatened by OBA as OBA provides
a means for the government to surveil individuals, which may result in a chilling
effect.
In order to explore the extent of OBA in the U.S. news media, a population of
250,000 pages drawn from over 5,000 news outlets has been assembled and analyzed
with webXray and policyXray. The practices of OBA are widespread: nearly 98%
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of news pages transfer user data to an average of 41.43 external domains, rates
which far exceed what is normal for non-news websites. This transfer of user data
is carried out using methods specifically designed to be hard to detect. An analysis
of privacy policies shows that they are written in a manner which is unclear and
only disclose 3.58% of data transfers taking place. Furthermore, news websites are
not transparent in regard to the risks of OBA and 80.82% of pages expose users to
domains which have delivered criminal malware. In both cases, there is little basis
for trust in news websites.
In terms of press independence, a small group of companies control the underly-
ing infrastructure which drives OBA on news websites, putting revenue in the hands
of powerful forces outside the control of publishers. This centralization of revenue
means that the interests of the OBA industry may come before allegiance to the
public. Furthermore, an analysis of underlying data flows reveals that publishers
increasingly lack the ability to host their own websites without the help of OBA
firms; this dynamic reduces independent publishers to mere content providers.
Finally, not only has the spread of OBA eliminated any semblance of privacy,
an analysis of leaked N.S.A. documents reveals that the presence of OBA on news
websites may allow the government to monitor citizens as they read the news. This
raises the potential that individuals may be fearful of expressing controversial ideas
or seeking out information. Such an impact could result in a chilling effect of the
democratic participation. The intrusion of government surveillance inverts the fun-
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damental role of the press as a check on, rather than facilitator of, power. Overall,
the impact of OBA is to weaken the ability of the press to fulfill its democratic
function.
The final chapter ties together the findings of the three case studies in order
to advance a larger argument of how OBA represents a fundamentally socially
corrosive practice which undermines norms, violates personal dignity, and poses an
existential threat to the future of free societies. It further addresses questions of
how the situation may be fixed.
The issue of self-regulation is explored in order to create a portrait of what
exactly an effective program of “notice and choice” would look like. Based on the
huge volumes of data analyzed in the three case studies, it is found that following
a true notice and choice system would result in such a deluge of notifications that
it would render the web unusable. Furthermore, an investigation of the normative
characteristics of both medical privacy and the value of the press illustrate that in
many cases a “choice” in favor of OBA is in fact a choice to sacrifice vital social
norms which benefit all of society in favor of a revenue model which favors a handful
of technology executives.
The evidence presented herein provides proof that self-regulation is failing, real
social harms are occurring, and it is time to rapidly adopt a regulatory stance which
is rooted in social norms. For regulatory approaches to be successful, they must
adopt the type of advanced technological methods used in this study. While the
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overall findings of this dissertation raise cause for concern, by pairing normative
concerns and large-scale data analysis it is possible to contain and regulate the
OBA sector. Both the normative framings and technological tools needed for this




Given the increasingly outsized role the web, mobile applications, and other In-
ternet services have in the essential organization of social life, there is widespread
concern over how information about users of these services is collected, stored, and
processed. Scholars from a number of academic disciplines have addressed the issue
of online data transfer and shed light on a variety of factors impacting user privacy.
Given that this dissertation focuses on the topic of privacy on websites, the relevant
literature is firmly tied to this specific aspect of online data transfer.
Despite the fact that the topic area itself is fairly well defined, the literature
remains diffuse and poorly organized. Existing disciplinary boundaries have created
several intellectual ghettos between computer science, communications research,
law, and public opinion research. Although there are many examples of impressive
cross-disciplinary projects, such research tends to be the exception rather than the
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rule. A major purpose of this dissertation is therefore to weave together these many
strands of scholarship in order to promote a holistic understanding of online privacy.
This is done by developing new computational methods specifically designed to
address social, rather than purely technical, questions.
This chapter details some of the most notable literature in the areas of theory,
public opinion, qualitative industry research, and computer science. Additional
chapters contain topic-specific reviews related to privacy regulation, medical pri-
vacy, and normative concerns related to the press.
Theoretical Foundations: Moving Beyond Dichotomy
Privacy is often treated as a zero-sum game between two opposing poles: the “pri-
vate” and the “public”. In this conception, information often originates in a form
only known to a single or closed group of persons, at which point it is “private”.
Then, through some compromise or negotiation, the information becomes known
to outsiders and is thus rendered “public”. The interests of individuals and society
are thus situated between two opposing poles.
This polar approach has been used with success to frame many issues. For
example, Alan Westin has demonstrated that privacy may be understood as a means
to explicate differences between democratic and non-democratic societies (Westin,
1967). However, as with any dichotomous system, nuance can be lost. Helen
Nissenbuam’s theory of “Contextual Integrity” demonstrates how using theories
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which move beyond dichotomy allows for deeper interrogation of the subject matter
(Nissenbaum, 2004, 2010).
If, as it seemed, the new technology was on a collision course with the values of
personal privacy and human dignity, could the collision be averted? Could a system
be devised to identify and permit beneficial uses of the new technology and yet, at
the same time, preclude those uses that most men would deem intolerable?
- Alan Westin, 1967
Written in the early days of large-scale computerized databases, Alan Westin’s
1967 book, Privacy and Freedom, provides a prescient view on the relationship
between privacy and democratic norms and personal freedom. At the most basic
level, Westin defines privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others” (Westin, 1967). Within the broader social context,
“privacy is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from the general
society through physical or psychological means” (Westin, 1967). Thus, in Westin’s
formulation, privacy is positioned as a barrier between the individual and the group.
Altering the privacy barrier has drastic effects upon systems of governance. On
one extreme, the denial of privacy to individuals is a mark of non-democratic,
authoritarian regimes. According to Westin, “The modern totalitarian state relies
on secrecy for the regime, but high surveillance and disclosure for all other groups”
(Westin, 1967). In this view, the government which most strongly opposes privacy
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protections for citizens does so “to foster a sense of loneliness and isolation”, which
results in “identification with the state” (Westin, 1967). Westin makes a strong
argument that a repressive government may gain strength by limiting privacy.
On the other extreme is the egalitarian democratic society, in which the protec-
tion of privacy, rather than the prohibition on it, provides institutional strength.
Westin asserts that “The democratic society relies on publicity as a control over gov-
ernment, and on privacy as a shield for group and individual life” (Westin, 1967).
One aspect of this is to defend the right of individuals to have group associations
as groups “provide opportunities for sociability, expression of independent ideas,
resolution of community conflicts, criticism of government, and formation of a con-
sensus on public policy” (Westin, 1967). Likewise, in the realm of personal life, the
ultimate expression of democratic participation is the vote, which as Westin notes,
is performed by secret ballot. In this way, privacy of the group and the citizen
strengthen both the maintenance and expression of democracies.
While Westin’s approach has great value, advances in consumer computing tech-
nologies have vastly complicated the fundamental framing of his theory as privacy
as a barrier between personal and political life. This can be seen most clearly in
the ongoing debate over government surveillance. Whereas Westin’s theory is based
on a dichotomous separation of citizen and government, intelligence agencies now
rely on private corporations to function as an intermediary layer in a “surveillant
assemblage”(Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). This shift illustrates the limitations of
32
dichotomous approaches.
To overcome the limitations of the public/private dichotomy, Helen Nissenbuam
has proposed a theoretical framework she calls “Contextual Integrity”. This frame-
work treats privacy not as a static concept related to the individual, but as a
dynamic concept in which structured social relationships among various actors de-
termine how information should be transferred. The value of contextual integrity is
that it “ties adequate protection for privacy to norms of specific contexts, demand-
ing that information gathering and dissemination be appropriate to that context
and obey the governing norms of distribution within it” (Nissenbaum, 2004).
Prior to delving into the specifics of Nissenbaum’s theory, it is instructive to
consider three traditional privacy framings which she has determined to be inade-
quate. The first is “Protecting Privacy of Individuals Against Intrusive Government
Agents” (Nissenbaum, 2004). This framing draws from Westin’s conception in which
privacy serves as a means to achieve parity between the individual and the state.
The second privacy principle is “Restricting Access to Intimate, Sensitive, or Con-
fidential Information”, which is a means to protect classes of information which are
posited to have intrinsically privacy-sensitive content; Nissenbuam provides exam-
ples of regulations specific to health, education, and finance (Nissenbaum, 2004).
The third and final principle, “Curtailing Intrusions into Spaces or Spheres Deemed
Private or Personal”, is a reformulation of the classic “castle doctrine” in which a
person’s property and home are considered the barrier between the private and the
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public spheres (Nissenbaum, 2004).
While the preceding three principles cover much ground in the privacy debates,
they all promote a dichotomous zero-sum conception. One area where this is most
limiting is to be found in what Nissenbaum calls “public surveillance”. In this case
small pieces of otherwise public information, such as a person’s location as observed
by strangers on the street, may be aggregated to reveal “private” issues, such as a
visit to a doctor’s office, place or worship, or engagement in activities which may
be frowned upon by prevailing social norms. 1
Nissenbaum points out that public surveillance is not sufficiently captured by any
of the three traditional privacy principles in that it “does not involve government
agents...collection or disclosure of sensitive, confidential, or personal information;
or intrusion into spaces or spheres normally judged to be private or personal” (Nis-
senbaum, 2004). Likewise, when records of visits to public websites are aggregated,
many pieces of seemingly anonymous information may be combined into a sensitive
whole.
Nissenbaum’s solution to the problem of dichotomy is to focus on contexts, which
she defines as “structured social settings characterized by canonical activities, roles,
relationships, power structures, norms (or rules), and internal values (goals, ends,
purposes)” (Nissenbaum, 2010). The transfer of information within and between
contexts is termed a “flow” and Nissenbuam asserts that “there are no arenas of
1Supreme Court Justice Sonya Sotomayer’s concurring opinion provides an excellent discussion
of issues related to location data in US v. Jones (Supreme Court, 2011)
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life not governed by norms of information flow, no information or spheres of life
for which “anything goes” (Nissenbaum, 2004).2 Combining these two concepts,
it may be seen that the core focus of the framework is to develop and interrogate
“context-relative informational norms” (Nissenbaum, 2010).
Informational norms are constituted by two factors, termed “appropriateness”
and “flow”. Nissenbaum suggests that violations of contextual integrity are found
when either of these norms are contravened (Nissenbaum, 2004). According to
the framework, “norms of appropriateness dictate what information about persons
is appropriate, or fitting, to reveal in a particular context” (Nissenbaum, 2004).
An example of “appropriateness” is found in how detailed information about one’s
health is appropriate to discuss at a doctor’s office, but it may be illegal for a
potential employer to inquire on such matters.
Norms of “flow” may generally be understood as the process by which infor-
mation from one context enters another via a means of information distribution
conducted by actors other than the subject. An example of an unacceptable infor-
mation flow would be if a doctor authored a Facebook post revealing the condition
of a patient to numerous outside actors.
Context-relative information norms emerge from four dimensions which Nis-
senbuam calls “contexts, actors, attributes, and transmission principles” (Nissenbaum,
2010). Contexts are socially defined; Actors are defined as “senders of information,
2Emphasis in original.
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recipients of information, and information subjects” (Nissenbaum, 2010); Data At-
tributes are the type of information which is being exchanged; the Transmission
Principle dimension is another term for “policy” and is defined as “a constraint
on the flow (distribution, dissemination, transmission) of information from party to
party in a context” (Nissenbaum, 2010).
Survey and Qualitative Literature
In the context of web browsing there are generally two broad sets of actors whose
lives are impacted by information flows. The first is comprised of the general public
who use the Internet. There is a broad and deep public opinion literature detailing
public concerns with online information flows. The second group of actors are
those receiving the data: online advertising companies. Qualitative and interview
research gives the best insights into the motivations of the advertising industry.
Within a democratic context, the opinions and attitudes of informed citizens
on topics of governance should provide guidance to policy makers; likewise, the
feelings and values of those subjected to data collection should inform transmission
principles. Given that in the United States, privacy regulation is constituted as a
mix of government and industry efforts3, democratic-normative approaches towards
privacy research seek to quantify public opinion as it relates to both generalized
privacy values as well as specific data collection practices. There is a large volume
3“Effort” on industry side often being an effort against effective regulation.
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of high-quality public opinion research on the topic stretching back to the earliest
days of the web.
Concerns about privacy on the web have been documented for nearly two decades.
A 1999 survey determined that “respondents registered a high level of concern about
privacy in general and on the Internet” (Ackerman et al., 1999). Likewise, a 2003
study found that “a clear majority of Americans express worry about their per-
sonal information on the web” (Turow, 2003). Giving credence to the theory that
public opinion reflects democratic-normative goals, a 2006 study found that pri-
vacy policies were “considered a highly important issue in the public debate by our
respondents” (Acquisti and Gross, 2006).
A 2009 survey found that “69% of American adults fe[lt] there should be a
law that gives people the right to know everything that a website knows about
them” (Turow et al., 2009). Similar work in 2012 showed that 60% of respondents
would like the proposed “Do Not Track” (DNT) standard to prevent websites from
collecting personal information (Hoofnagle et al., 2012). In a 2014 study, the Pew
Research Center discovered that 70% of respondents felt records of the websites
they had visited constituted “very” or “somewhat” sensitive information (Madden,
2014). The general trend established by these surveys is not just that most users
value privacy, but that the current state of privacy online represents an area of
significant anxiety.
The studies mentioned above are all high-quality empirical academic works; how-
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ever, it is important to note that within the literature of privacy and public opinion
there is a large volume of deceptive studies. Such studies are usually produced by
industry groups who misuse survey methodology in order to falsely generate “evi-
dence” in support of industry positions. To see how this works, first consider two
different survey questions: “If companies give me a discount, it is a fair exchange
for them to collect information about me without my knowing it.”, and “Which of
the following would you prefer: an Internet where there are no ads, but you would
pay for most content like blogs, entertainment sites, video contact and social media,
or today’s Internet model in which there are ads, but most content is free?”. Each
of these questions was administered in survey form.
Ostensibly both questions are framing core aspects of contemporary online ad-
vertising practices (whereby “free” content is given as a result of hidden data trans-
fers), yet each question produces very different conclusions. The first question,
administered by academic researchers, yielded the conclusion that “a large pool of
Americans feel resigned to the inevitability of surveillance and the power of mar-
keters to harvest their data” (Turow et al., 2015), whereas the second survey, ad-
ministered by industry group Digital Advertising Alliance, found that “Americans
place great value on the availability of free Internet content, and appreciate Internet
advertising that is tailored to their specific interests” (Digital Advertising Alliance,
2013). Not coincidentally, the conclusion of the second survey supports an industry
position. Sadly, this is not an isolated example, but part of a pattern which the
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industry has used to misrepresent public opinion in their favor. This practice has
been well documented by Gandy who states that “In the past 25 years, references
to public opinion have been used to frame the public as...willing to negotiate their
privacy demands” (Gandy, 2003).
In sum, there is a rich literature of valuable public opinion research conducted
in an academically rigorous and empirically valid manner. This literature has con-
sistently supported the conclusion that privacy is highly valued in the abstract, and
specific data collection practices are widely reviled. However, when utilizing public
opinion research it is important to maintain awareness of literature which is of poor
quality and performed for duplicitous ends.
While survey work is indispensable for public opinion research, survey instru-
ments are an awkward fit for understanding the motivations and values of the second
set of “actors” present in web privacy: the online advertising industry. An approach
to gain insights into this world is to employ observational methods, taking cues from
the fields of anthropology and sociology. Such observation may be carried out both
by close reading of primary source documents such as trade publications, as well
as through in-person interviews. Such an approach allows for scholars to develope
nuanced portraits of those on the receiving end of online data flows.
In Niche Envy and The Daily You, Joseph Turow investigates the data broker
and online advertising industries and seeks to address the question “What is the
social significance of executives’ newfound insistence that consumers are morally
39
obligated to pay attention to advertisements in return for the free or discounted
media material they receive?” (Turow, 2008). Left out of this question, but a major
focus of both books, is the question of how the data broker industry justifies prac-
tices which survey research demonstrates consumers find objectionable. To answer
this question, Turow relies on a close reading of the trade press and interviews with
industry insiders.4
According to Turow, trade press “literature has helped to shape [his] under-
standing of the basic contours of the media-and-marketing system” (Turow, 2008).
The pages of the trade press give a window into decades of anxiety over topics such
as online comparison shopping and the role of advertising and the family. Likewise,
Turow has attended industry events to see debates from the trade press taking
place in person. Demonstrating that listening to the language used by industry
gives deep insights into the social values of companies, he has discovered that the
industry uses callous terms such as “target” and “waste” to describe the difference
between desirable and undesirable consumers (Turow, 2012).
Overall, qualitative methods allow researchers to tell the story of a particular set
of actors in such a way that their value system and motivations may be understood
by outsiders. The next layer of literature moves from the motivations of these actors
to documenting their actions.
4In this context, “trade press” is primarily periodicals such as Advertising Age which are written
for a narrow audience of practicing marketing professionals.
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Technical Literature
As noted in the previous chapter, OBA has fostered a massively profitable industry
which invests significant resources into collecting as much data as possible about
user behavior using constantly evolving techniques. For this reason, detecting the
technical mechanisms powering OBA is of significant and sustained interest to to
a wide array of computer security researchers. These researchers have produced a
rich strand of literature devoted to understanding the technical underpinnings and
privacy threats posed by OBA.
The technical literature regarding OBA and data attributes is largely broken up
along two major themes: analyzing the functioning of specific types of computer
code delivered to users’ computers (called the “client-side”) and censuses of the
reach of online advertising networks.
Much of the activities powering OBA, such as creating mathematical models
which predict a user’s propensity to click a given advertisement, take place on
the servers of advertisers, are protected as intellectual property, and are exceed-
ingly difficult to study.5 However, in many cases, online advertisers deliver code
to users’ computers which manipulates the computer to deliver extra information
about users’ behavior, allowing users to be more easily “tracked”. Thus, researchers
may both investigate the characteristics of clients which allow them to be exploited
5Despite these difficulties, there are some early promising efforts (Sweeney, 2013; Lécuyer et al.,
2014)
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as well as parties which are leveraging such exploits.
Research into novel client-side tracking techniques is an ongoing project, with
one early paper, “Timing Attacks on Web Privacy” by Felten and Schneider, appear-
ing in 2000. In this paper, the authors describe a means of exploiting the caching
properties of web browsers in order to determine if a user has previously visited a
given website. With foresight, they further observe that such an attack could be
enacted if “A Web advertising agency could add measurement code to the banner
ads it distributes” (Felten and Schneider, 2000).6 This research was followed up by
Jackson et al. in 2006, with the finding that “a variety of means, including...browser
cache methods and inspecting the color of a visited hyper- links...can be exploited
to track users against their wishes” (Jackson et al., 2006).
One of the most innovative and well-known studies, “How Unique Is Your Web
Browser?” by Peter Eckersley, begins with the observation that “The most common
way to track web browsers...is via HTTP cookies, often set by...3rd party analyt-
ics and advertising domains” (Eckersley, 2010). However, the paper identifies a
more invasive, and durable form of tracking: browsing fingerprinting. As with the
physical variety, browser fingerprints are generated from combinations of otherwise
innocuous factors which when combined create a unique identifier. While a detec-
tive may use the collection of loops and whorls on a finger, a browser fingerprinting
6As a testament to the age of Felten and Scheider’s study, they performed their study on a
“Netscape Navigator 4.5 browser on a Windows NT 4.0 (Service Pack 4) PC with a 350 MHz
Pentium II processor and 256 Megabytes of RAM”.
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algorithm may use the combination of User-Agent, Screen resolution, timezone,
browser plugins, and system fonts to uniquely identify a given browser (Eckersley,
2010). Indeed, Acar et al. created “a framework for the detection and analysis of
web-based fingerprinters” called “FPDetective” (Acar et al., 2013), Nikiforakis et
al. discovered evidence that companies have employed “the circumvention of HTTP
proxies to discover a user’s real IP address” (Nikiforakis et al., 2013), and Jang et
al. have investigated various uses of malicious Javascript in the wild (Jang et al.,
2010).
As noted above, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to determine what happens
to fingerprints gathered on the client-side when they are processed on the servers
of advertising networks. However, a study by Yen et al., “Host Fingerprinting and
Tracking on the Web: Privacy and Security Implications”, had access to data from
the Microsoft corporation which included information on “millions of hosts across
the global IP address space” (Yen et al., 2012). In this rare glimpse behind the
curtain of web tracking, the researchers revealed that solely relying on data found
in basic HTTP requests (User-Agent and IP addresses) they were able to identify
unique browsers with 80% accuracy, which is in par with cookies (Yen et al., 2012).
This important study suggests that even without robust browsing fingerprinting
mechanisms, simple HTTP requests are sufficient to track users with high accuracy.
The second general area of technical research focus has been in censuses. In this
case, the interest of researchers is in selecting a population of websites and con-
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ducting a count of various forms of tracking mechanisms, third-party requests, and
data flows. Much of the pioneering work in this area has been conducted by Krish-
namurthy and Wills. In 2006 they advanced the concept of the “privacy footprint”
which they describe as a means to analyze the “diffusion of information about a
user’s actions by measuring the number of associations between visible nodes via one
or more common hidden nodes” (Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2006). What Krishna-
murthy and Wills describe as “hidden nodes”, may be more widely included under
the umbrella of third-party HTTP requests. This work was followed up several
years later with additional longitudinal studies (Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2009;
Krishnamurthy et al., 2011).
While Krishnamurthy and Wills have done an excellent job in the area of mea-
surement, they are not the only researchers exploring the topic. Castelluccia and
colleagues have recently analyzed “the flows of personal data at a global level”
(Castelluccia et al., 2013), and found intriguing differences in the nature, scope,
and ownership of tracking mechanisms around the world. Other researchers have
developed desktop browser add-ons (Roesner et al., 2012; Mayer and Mitchell, 2012)
which they have used to detect the presence of a variety of tracking mechanisms.
Some of the most recent measurement literature focuses on fingerprinting specif-
ically (Acar et al., 2013). Additional research has revealed extensive tracking on
websites containing health information (Libert, 2015b) as well as large-scale analy-
sis of the both tracking and policies on the top one million Alexa websites (Libert,
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2015a; Englehardt and Narayanan, 2016).
A common theme among all measurement research is that the amount of tracking
on the web is increasing, and shows no signs of abating. However, this literature
often provides a weak basis for tying technical findings back to the social norms
which are being contravened.
Conclusion
While there is a fair amount of cross-pollination between the bodies of literature
cited above, underlying disciplinary and methodological considerations have re-
sulted in lost opportunities to create a holistic understanding of privacy concerns
on the web. Largely this is because quantitative technical research has been poorly
connected to social-normative foundations and vice-versa.
Researchers grounded in social norms often lose opportunities to strengthen their
arguments through the use of empirical data, primarily operating in the abstract.
Conversely, technical researchers focusing on client-side techniques have established
a trend by which they discover the new technique-du-jour of the OBA industry with-
out shedding much light on the larger trajectory and social meaning of the practices
observed. Lastly, and most important to this dissertation, sensitive contexts of on-
line data transfer are poorly defined in the web privacy measurement literature,
pushing much research back into the trap of the decontextualized public/private
dichotomy.
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The major contribution to the field of privacy research made by this dissertation
is that the new tools developed for the studies contained herein draw from the
strengths of computer science in order to provide a much deeper insights into the
questions raised by normative theorists. This approach allows social-normative
contexts to be defined in a way which is consonant with the theories of Nissenbaum
and tied to specific web pages. It allows data flows to be examined using technical
methods which are capable of operating at scale equivalent with the collectors of
data. Finally, by providing clarity as to how observed practices violate social norms,




As noted in Chapter 1, the purpose of this dissertation is investigate how the use
of online behavioral advertising (OBA) has produced negative outcomes in specific
social contexts. No methods existed for conducting this type of study, thus new
methods were developed for the task and are described in this chapter. These
methods must meet several goals concurrently. First, the very presence of third-
party data collection on the web must be empirically proven. This involves three
elements: selecting populations of web pages to analyze, detecting flows of user
information on these pages, and tying these information flows to the companies
receiving data. Second, specific social norms, policies, and regulations must be
identified in order to ground the empirical findings in social-normative contexts.
Third, a convincing link must be drawn between data flows on the web, violations
of established social norms, and the policy failures which allowed them to happen.
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This chapter first provides background on novel techniques for building con-
textually focused populations of web pages. This is followed by a description of a
software platform, webXray, which has been purpose-built to collect data on third-
party data flows at the network level and provide analysis of the parties receiving
data. A related software tool, policyXray, has been developed to perform the pre-
viously unattempted task of auditing website privacy policies at large scale and is
also described. Additionally, methods for evaluating malware exposure and gener-
ating relative measures between page populations are described. The limitations of
these tools are discussed as well.
Context on the Web: Building Page Populations
As noted above, the purpose of this dissertation is to ground OBA practices in
established social norms. In the technological context of the web, the types of
pages a user is visiting is directly reflective of, and therefore determines, social
context and norms.
If one considers the act of browsing the web to be a de facto private context,
all web pages in the world would present a universal relevance to the investigation
of privacy. However, such an open-ended approach fails to direct attention to the
most vital social issues. It is more helpful to consider that within the totality of web
pages, some have more privacy salience than others, and this salience is determined
by how the pages connect to social norms which are external to the act of web
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browsing.
In order to map web pages to external social contexts, specific areas of interest
and populations of relevant pages must be defined. Once a population of pages
is built on a solid theoretical and normative base, data flows may be interrogated
and understood. There are two main ways to build these populations: the first is
modeling the types of pages a user would view if searching for information related
to a given topic, and the second is using available classifications of pages as the
basis for examination.
While topic-based “portals” and “hubs” were common ways to start a search
for information in the early days of the web, search engines have taken primacy.
For example, on the topic of health, the Pew Research Center has determined
that among the 72% of adult Internet users who went online to learn about health
conditions, 77% skipped portals and instead “began at a search engine such as
Google, Bing, or Yahoo”(Fox and Duggan, 2013). In order to construct a population
of pages which is tied to a given context, it is helpful to replicate user interaction
with a search engine by selecting pages based on search results. This requires two
steps: first, selecting terms related to a context, and second, harvesting search
results.
When using a search-based approach to building a page population, the selection
of search terms is of vital importance: they need to be broad enough to capture
a range of web pages a user would visit, but also narrow enough as to exclude ir-
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relevant pages. It is important to acknowledge that a real part of lived experience
on the web is to visit some irrelevant pages in search for the information the user
desires, thus the standard of relevance is not topic-relevance per se, but relevance
to what pages a user may visit. Likewise, depending on topic, pages relevant to
a specific topic may be found on sites which are not ostensibly topic-related. For
example, on a discussion forum of a close-knit community of gardening enthusi-
asts, it is possible to find threads in a “general discussion” sub-forum dealing with
unrelated issues, such as health conditions.
The chapter on health privacy in this dissertation illustrates a search-based
approach. A list of 2,000 common health conditions was harvested from the Centers
for Disease Control, the Mayo Clinic, and Wikipedia. If a patient is given a specific
diagnosis from a doctor, it is highly likely she or he will search for specific health-
related terms and visit the top results which are returned from a search engine, likely
going several pages deep into the results. For the health chapter it was determined
that the first 50 search results for each term (corresponding to five pages of results),
would be appropriate.
Once search terms are specified, the remainder of the task is purely technical.
Given that Google is the world’s most popular search engine, it would appear that
submitting search terms to Google would be most effective. Unfortunately, Google
does not offer programmatic API access to their search results and prohibits scrap-
ing, making the task difficult.1
1It is also worth noting that because Google tailors search results based on inferred attributes
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The second place search engine, Microsoft’s Bing, is amenable to research tasks.2
While Bing’s share of web search is a fraction of Google’s, due to corporate part-
nerships, Bing results are found in Yahoo! Search, DuckDuckGo, and Apple’s Siri
virtual assistant (Yahoo!, 2015; DuckDuckGo, 2016; Apple, 2013). Microsoft offers
an Application Programming Interface (API) by which Bing data may be retrieved
by computer programs.3 Furthermore, the API returns results based on a specified
language and region, ensuring that results are simultaneously more generalizable as
well as more targeted.4
For the chapters in this dissertation using a search-based approach to construct-
ing page populations, a simple Python program is used to send search terms to the
Bing API and retrive results. This approach generates list of pages which may come
from the same site; thus it is important to underscore that under this approach ag-
gregate measures are on a per-page rather than per-site basis. For example, if 20%
of pages in a search-based population feature a given third-party element this may
be due to the fact that a single site uses that tracker on many pages, even if other
sites do not use it.
While search-based populations are very good at reflecting the experiences of




4For example, to get English results for the U.S. the API call may be appended with the string
“Market=en-US”)
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web users as they search for information, they are not always an optimal way of
establishing context. For example, if a relevant context is culturally or nationally
defined, it is often helpful to study the most popular websites in that context -
regardless of their relationship to specific search terms. Likewise, in the context of
news seeking in the United States, the top 50 Bing results for the term “newspaper”
would fail to generate a page population which reflected the specified contextual
attributes. In these situations, indices of sites sorted by topic and ranked by pop-
ularity are most useful. The Amazon subsidiary Alexa provides such lists.
Alexa offers three main types of indices according to global rankings, country
rankings, and category rankings. These rankings are based on “a sample of millions
of Internet users using one of over 25,000 different browser extensions” and “direct
sources in the form of sites that have chosen to install the Alexa script on their
site and certify their metrics”.5 The list of global ranks (which contains one million
websites) “is a measure of how a website is doing relative to all other sites on the web
over the past 3 months”; the list of country-specific rankings is “is a measurement
of how a website ranks in a particular country relative to other sites over the past
month”.6
In terms of scientific validity, Alexa’s methodology leaves much to be desired
as it may be plagued by sample bias. However, considering that traffic data is




established source for academic research (Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2006; Krishna-
murthy et al., 2011; Roesner et al., 2012; Libert, 2015a; Englehardt and Narayanan,
2016).
Alexa also provides site ranking data according to category. The top-level cate-
gories supplied by Alexa closely mirror those of the now-struggling DMOZ project
which claims to be “the largest, most comprehensive human-edited directory of the
Web...historically known as the Open Directory Project (ODP)”7.8 In cases where
a specified privacy context lines up with Alexa’s available categories, constructing
a population is as simple as harvesting links on a per-category basis.
It is also possible to search for relevant pages within indexes of category-specific
sites. For the chapter covering political information on U.S.-based newspapers, the
term “politics” was searched for within the set of sites in the “News - Newspapers -
Regional - United States” category in Alexa and DMOZ. This provides a population
of pages which is both targeted and circumscribed by sector.
As noted at the start of this section, matching a population of pages to a given
social context is the vital first step which grounds technical findings in a social-
theoretical framework. However, in order to explore where violations of social norms
are in play, it is necessary discover the invisible data flows which reveal user actions
to external actors.
7http://www.dmoz.org/docs/en/about.html
8DMOZ in turn was based on USENET.
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Third-Party HTTP Request Collection and Anal-
ysis with webXray
There are two main steps which must occur once a page population has been defined:
detecting information flows at the network level, and analyzing these flows in order
to situate them in a social-normative context.
A primary goal of this dissertation is to investigate data flows on the web which
expose users to third-parties of whom they may not be aware. On the web such
data flows may be measured by examining Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
network requests. Simply put, when a page is loaded in a web browser, it contains
instructions which tell the browser to make HTTP requests to download various
types of content ranging from images and videos to fonts and Javascript code.
Some HTTP requests are made to the same address which the web page is hosted
on, called the first-party. A user may often visit the privacy policy of the page she
or he is visiting with relative ease. However, additional requests may be made to
actors external to website being visited, these are known as “third-party HTTP
requests”. Due to the fact that users may often be unaware of third-parties, and
are often not exposed to their privacy policies directly, such requests may negatively
impact privacy.
In order to investigate data flows it is first necessary to capture all HTTP re-
quests made when loading a web page and separate first- and third-party requests.
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One way to solve this problem is to simply evaluate the source code of the page.
However, there are two key problems with this approach. First, elements such as
“iframe” may include additional source code which would generate more requests,
and this may be missed. Second, it is quite common for element addresses to be
intentionally obfuscated in Javascript source code, making it impossible to parse
them with standard libraries9.10
Considering that parsing HTML is not sufficient to solve the problem, the only
viable route is to execute the code in a web browser. The major advantage of using
a browser is that all elements may be fully loaded, embedded Javascript code may
be run, and the network traffic will reflect real-world conditions. One common way
to perform this type of analysis is to use a browser automation tool such as Selenium
to load pages, and then use a network proxy or browser add-on to catalogue HTTP
requests.11 One such add-on is “FourthParty”; however, at time of writing it is not
compatible with the current version of Firefox and has not been updated in nearly
a year (FourthParty, 2013).
Despite the lack of updates for FourthParty, the OpenWPM project uses this ap-
9The most common technique is to manipulate the Javascript “document.write” method to
insert more Javascript.
10While sometimes benign, obfuscation techniques may also be used to complicate detection.
Arthur C. Clarke famously said “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from




proach in order to drive a full version of Firefox with Selenium12 A major drawback
is that this approach requires running a graphical user interface (GUI), which has
material cost in the form of higher computing power. Furthermore, neither Fourth-
Party nor OpenWPM correctly attributes network traffic to the actors which receive
user data, providing an incomplete and decontextualized view of the data.
Having established parsing HMTL is insufficient, and leveraging a full web
browser is fraught with complication, a third approach to the problem has been
found: headless automation. In this context, “headless” refers to a web browser
which does not require a GUI, but instead runs in a text-based command line
environment. One of the earliest, and most well-known, headless browsers is Phan-
tomJS. According to the official website, “PhantomJS is a headless WebKit script-
able [browser] with a Javascript API” and is an “optimal solution” for network
monitoring (PhantomJS, 2016).13 PhantomJS uses the WebKit engine which cur-
rently powers Apple’s Safari browser and is the progenitor of Google’s Chrome
browser. Thus, while PhantomJS is not identical to using a Selenium-driven desk-
top browser, the underlying rendering engine is an effective replacement for major
browsers.
12https://github.com/citp/OpenWPM
13As a testament to the influence of PhantomJS, newer headless browsers such as SlimerJS
and trifleJS implement the PhantomJS API to run on top of the Firefox and Internet Explorer
browser engines. PhantomJS has also inspired a small cottage industry of open-source projects
with supernaturally-themed names: CasperJS, SlimerJS, ZombieJS, Ghost Driver, Poltergeist,
SpookyJS, and more.
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The most important aspect of PhantomJS is that it is a “scriptable”, meaning
short computer programs may be written which control the browser via an Appli-
cation Programming Interface (API). The PhantomJS API has numerous features
which may be used for development tasks. Most useful for this project are the fea-
tures which allow for monitoring network traffic, thereby revealing the actors users
are exposed to when loading a given page.
Now that the means to construct context-relevant page populations and extract
HTTP requests have been established, it is time to describe a system for automating
the process of collecting and analyzing data flows in a specified population: this
system is called webXray.
webXray is written primarily in Python and uses a modular object-oriented
architecture which provides strong separation between the browser engine, collection
mechanism, database, and analysis mechanism. While only a single browser engine
(PhantomJS) and database engine (MySQL) are supported at present, due to the
engine-specific code being segregated in appropriate classes (PhantomDriver and
MySQLDriver), it is fairly easy to adopt new browser and database engines as
desired.14
The centerpiece of the program is a command-line interactive program which
manages the selection and verification of page addresses and generation of reports.
Database functions and management are purposefully hidden from the user in order
14Exploratory tests with replacing the PhantomJS engine with the Firefox-based SlimerJS en-
gine were successful but require greater testing.
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to facilitate ease-of-use. The program has command-line flags and may be run in
an interactive mode (“-i”), unattended modes for collecting (“-c”) and analyzing
(“-a”) large amounts of data, as well as a “single” option (“-s”) which facilitates a














Figure 3.1: webXray Architecture
Figure 3 illustrates the basic workflow of a webXray collection sequence. First,
a list of page addresses is passed to the program. This list of addresses is scanned
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to ensure integrity and that they do not correspond to common binary files (e.g.
Microsoft Office, PDF, etc). Next, page addresses are passed to PhantomJS using
the Python “subprocess” module.
A small program manages loading the page address with PhantomJS. First, the
program clears the cookie cache so that new cookies may be stored and analyzed.
Second, it attempts to load the specified address, following redirects as necessary. In
order to cope with pages delivered based on a specific user-agent string, the program
randomly reports one of ten common user-agents to the page at load time. After
possible redirects, the final address the browser is redirected to is recorded, this
allows for the detection of sites which force browsers to use encrypted connections.
Due to the fact that many pages have a significant number of redirects and
embedded elements which may be slow to download, the program waits for thirty
seconds before closing the connection. Given that this waiting period makes it very
difficult to analyze large volumes of sites in a reasonable amount of time, the Python
“multiprocessing” module is used to instantiate many instances of PhantomJS in
parallel. The number of instances scales linearly with available computer memory:
doubling the memory results in twice the number of instances, and therefore doubles
the speed.
As PhantomJS loads the page, HTTP network events are recorded using the “on-
ResourceRequested” and “onResourceReceived” API calls. “onResourceRequested”
indicates that the page has triggered a request to download an element. “onRe-
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sourceReceived” provides information on if the requested data was returned, how
long it took to download, and the size of the element measured in bytes.
One reason it is important to detect if a request returned data is that if content is
being dropped at a network level it may indicate intentional blocking of the element.
Measures of load time and element size are important in determining the impact of
third-party requests on user experience in terms of time spent downloading a page
as well as the costs of data transfer. This data is relied upon in the chapter which
investigates news websites.
After PhantomJS has completed loading the page, data on requests, cookies,
URL redirects, page title, and meta description are formatted as Javascript Object
Notation (JSON)15 data and passed back to the calling Python script for further
processing. In cases where the page is unable to be loaded, errors are passed back
and logged. The final step shown in the diagram is data being processed and stored
in the database.
Collecting HTTP requests in bulk is a difficult process, and making sense of the
data is no less complicated. Once data is returned from PhantomJS several steps
must be taken. First, requested data must be analyzed to detect third-parties and
stored. Second, mappings of third-party domains to their owners must be built.
When webXray processes the JSON data received from PhantomJS, cookies
and element requests stored and linked to the pages which initiated their request.
15JSON is a means to store and transmit data, for details see: http://json.org
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All cookies are stored as unique, and no further processing is done. Elements are
evaluated as unique according to the full URL which they are downloaded from, and
only the first instance of a given URL is stored in the database so that additional
instances may reference the first. However, oftentimes a URL will be appear unique
based on trailing arguments alone, most often this is the result of site identifiers
being added to a common element URL.16
For example, the following unique URLs, “example.com/tracker.png?site=1234”
and “example.com/tracker.png?site=5678”, actually refer to the same file: “exam-
ple.com/tracker.png”. To cope with this, URLs are parsed to remove arguments
and the element URL is stored separately for purposes of comparison. In order to
facilitate in-depth analysis, file identifiers such as “png” and “js” are parsed so that
that reports may be generated on the most popular images, Javascript files, and
the like.
Cookies and elements are linked to the pages they correspond to in junction
tables. These tables have a field for the page identifier, the cookie or element iden-
tifier, as well as a field which specifies if they are a result of a third-party requests.
This system detects cases where an element may exist as a first-party on one site
and a third-party on another. In order to determine what party classification is to
be made, the domain of the page and the domain of the element are compared to see
if they match, those which do not are third-parties and are marked appropriately.
16It is also a common technique to evade the browser cache by appending meaningless data to
the end of a URL.
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Parsing and comparing domains is not a trivial task. According to Mozilla,
there is “no algorithmic method of finding the highest level at which a domain
may be registered for a particular top-level domain [TLD] (the policies differ with
each registry), the only method is to create a list”.17 Thankfully, Mozilla provides
such a “Public Suffix List”. This list is used by several major browsers to manage
cookie settings (Firefox, Chrome, Opera, and Internet Explorer), and is also used
by webXray to parse and compare domains between pages, cookies, and elements.
Once parsed, domains are stored in the “domain” table. This table includes
fields for the Public Suffix so that pages and elements may be analyzed based
on the country-code top-level domain (ccTLD), allowing for basic comparison of
tracking between countries. This is an imperfect proxy however, as “com” is one of
many popular TLDs used around the world.
Thus far, a system has been described for determining at a network level what
information is flowing between two or more parties when loading webpages. Who
these parties are, what they do with the data, and their motivations for collecting it
(either intentionally or incidentally), are not revealed by a purely technical analysis.
It is therefore necessary to determine what parties own given third-party domains,
which is the core feature of webXray.
The first step in the process is to select which domains will be investigated. On
small-sized analyses, such as 500 pages, the number of unique third-party domains
17https://publicsuffix.org/learn/
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will be such that it is possible to investigate all of them. On larger analyses, of
several hundred thousand or more pages, it is sufficient to select the 100 most
frequently occurring domains for investigation. For any given analysis, the number
of domains may be made fairly manageable.
Once domains are selected, they may be manually examined to determine own-
ership. The whois protocol specifies a means to “provide information services to
Internet users”, such as the ownership of a given domain.18 The UNIX utility
whois may be used to query the database in order to determine the party that has
registered, and therefore owns, a given domain. For example, a whois query for
“2mdn.net” reveals the “Registrant Organization” is “Google Inc.” - thus, users
who download elements from “2mdn.net” have their data sent to Google.
In cases where the organization name is unfamiliar (e.g. a niche advertising
network) it is worth looking up further information on the company. This may
reveal that the organization is actually a subsidiary of another company. It is also
helpful to consult “Crunchbase”, which is a database of technology companies and
acquisitions. Crunchbase’s motto is it allows one to “Discover innovative companies
and the people behind them” - for the purposes of tracking data flows, it is certainly
the case.19
The whois database does not always provide answers as it is possible hide own-




a given domain in a web browser and be directed to the company which owns the
domain. Yet, sometimes the domain in question will not have a web page. In those
cases one may ping the domain to find the IP address, and then attempt to find
the owner of that address.20 It is also possible to find information using in-depth
detective work; in one case the owner of a domain was revealed by reading obscure
API documentation which revealed the address in question.
As many companies receiving data go to great lengths to keep their activities
hidden, it is a laborious process to track down all of the entities who receive data.
In order to reduce duplicated effort, domain ownership data is stored in a small
JSON-formatted database and is part of the core webXray distribution.
Once data flows and domain ownership has been established, webXray gener-
ates a variety of reports which reveal the companies which receive data, the most
frequent types of third-party elements, how many companies and elements users
are exposed to on average, as well as variations between sites hosted on different
top level domains. These reports may then be extended to further explore the
implications of findings.
20‘Ping’ is a standard UNIX utility which sends a network request to a given address to read
a reply which indicates the machine is available (machines can also ignore ‘pings’). By sending a
‘ping’ to a given domain, the IP address of the reply may be discovered in the response.
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Extensibility, policyXray, & Malware Analysis
One of the strengths of the webXray data model is it allows for the addition of
new types of data which may be easily joined to the page, element, or domain
tables. The basic process for this is to export the relevant data needed to query
outside data sources, gather the new data, add a table to the webXray database
for the specific type of data and use a Python program to insert the new records
with the appropriate record ids. Once this is performed, customized reports may
be generated using the new data sources. This capability has been employed to
audit privacy policies and detect the presence of known malware-associated domain
names with pages.
The webXray data model is a relational database schema designed to allow for
efficient storage as well as easy extensibility. The basic approach is to segregate
information on pages, cookies, and elements into their own tables. The element
and cookie tables each have a boolean field “is 3p” which allows queries to easily
discriminate between first- and third-party requests. Likewise, the “domain” table
segregates information so it may be joined to the “org” table where domain owner-
ship is determined. The domain table may be linked to ancillary programs to query
outside datasources in order to provide further depth to findings. Figure 3 lays out





















































































Figure 3.2: webXray Data Model
66
A second module for webXray, policyXray, highlights the value of the relational
approach. The purpose of policyXray is to download, process, and analyze privacy
policies to determine if the companies detected by webXray are mentioned in the
policy. This is performed by extracting the policy text and determining if the
companies receiving user data on the page are mentioned in the policy. It is a
deceptively simple approach which requires a complex implementation.
When webXray is monitoring HTTP request traffic, it also analyzes the links on
a page in order to find the associated privacy policy. This is performed by finding
the first link with the English-language text “privacy policy”, if this fails, the first
link with the text “privacy” is stored. webXray does not analyze privacy policies
at the time of collection due to increased processing and network overhead, instead
policyXray may be run upon completion as a separate process. Like webXray,
policyXray is designed to run many instances in parallel, facilitating large-scale
collection.
While downloading policy pages is fairly straight-forward, policy text must be
isolated from the larger HTML document before it may be analyzed. The reason it
is insufficient to search the full HTML document is illustrated when looking for a
mention of a social media company such as Facebook. It is possible that a mention
of “Facebook” in the HTML is in reference to a “Like us on Facebook” link, rather
than a specific policy disclosure.
Extracting article content from a web page is a known difficult problem in the
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field of natural language processing, however the “Readability.js” Javascript library
provides an automated method for weighting various page elements to determine
what parts of the page are article content (e.g. by excluding sections of the page
likely to contain navigational elements). The Safari and Firefox browsers both use
this library, and Mozilla hosts the library on GitHub.21 For policyXray, a Python
port of Readability.js is used to extract policy content from the page.
Once policyXray has downloaded the HTML document and extracted the pol-
icy text, a sanity check is run to determine if the text appears to be a privacy policy.
This is done by checking for the terms “privacy” and “cookie” in both the policy
text and the page title, if these terms are both missing, the policy is discarded. In
cases where Readability.js is unable to parse the page, it is also discarded.
In order to verify if detected data flows are disclosed in a given privacy policy,
policyXray searches the text to find either the name of the parent company which
has been identified by webXray or, if the company has subsidiaries, if the subsidiaries
are mentioned. Due to the complexity of ownership patterns and business acquisi-
tions in the OBA sector, this is a non-trivial undertaking. After running this final
process, policyXray is able to determine the percentage of data flows disclosed on
a per-page as well as population-level basis. Other analyses may be be performed
as well.
Given that webXray is able to produce reports of which advertising network
21https://github.com/mozilla/readability
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domains are connected to a given population of pages, it is possible to take domains
and determine if they have been recently used for delivering malware. While there
are numerous normative objections to surveillance-based advertising, advertisers
may make reasonable arguments they contribute to online commerce. However,
there is no argument which may be made in favor of facilitating cybercrime. Thus,
using webXray data to reveal malware exposure provides a strong argument that
self-regulation is failing. Furthermore, any data flows resulting in criminals gaining
access to users’ computers is a de facto violation of privacy.
To determine the presence of malware within a webXray dataset, data from
VirusTotal is used. The company is a Google subsidiary and provides a “free online
service that analyzes files and URLs enabling the identification of viruses, worms,
trojans and other kinds of malicious content detected by antivirus engines and web-
site scanners” using aggregated data from “different antivirus engines, website scan-
ners, file and URL analysis tools and user contributions”.22 The company provides
free public API access to this service (though with a very slow 4 requests/minute
limit).23 The public API provides access to a number of reports, the one most useful
for enhancing webXray data is the domain report API which aggregates data from
over 60 anti-virus databases.
The VirusTotal domain report returns several fields of data, the most important




database. For any domains in the database, a collection of URLs which have been
scanned is returned in the “detected urls” field. For each URL in the collection
the number of scans across anti-virus services is given along with the number of
positive matches for malware. This makes it possible to say if a given domain has
been associated with malware by any anti-virus report. However, a single match
may be the result of a mistake by a given source, thus it is also necessary to calculate
the number of URLs which have been identified as having malware by two or more
sources, which greatly reduces the likelihood a domain was associated with malware
in error. Finally, the API has a field “categories” which ranges from innocuous
classifications such as “educational institutions” to alarming titles such as “known
infection source”. While VirusTotal is a good resource to measure malware exposure
on a given page population, it alone does not reveal if a given population is worse
than average.
Indeed, when examining a given page population, it is helpful to know if third-
party data flows within the specified context are in some way “normal”, or if they
constitute a particular aberration. However, it is difficult to define what is the
“normal” amount of data flows on the web as there is no canonical source which
reveals the average amount of tracking on all websites. Thus, to gain such measures,
a population of commonly visited websites must be constructed and analyzed.
As noted above, the Alexa company provides a list of the one million most
popular websites globally; this list is the best available means to determine what a
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“normal” amount of tracking across highly traffic sites. However, the list is highly
variable as a “long tail” of websites changes quite frequently and web masters are
constantly trying to improve their global rank through questionable means. Despite
this, the top 100,000 sites in the list are more stable, and form a better population
from which to draw global averages.
Speed, Cost, and Limitations
The webXray method has many strengths in terms of speed and cost, as well as
several limitations. A key consideration in the design of webXray was to maximize
efficiency in order that cheap “cloud” based virtual machines could be used to
perform analyses. Based on current prices for cloud servers, one may analyze the
top one million websites identified by Alexa in 30 hours for roughly $32, which is
a fraction of the time and cost of using similar tools (Englehardt and Narayanan,
2016).24 The benefit of this approach is that companies which expend billions of
dollars to covertly track users across the web may be revealed for a comparatively
minuscule sum.
webXray has numerous limitations. It should first be stated that the main
limitations all have the outcome of potentially undercounting the amount of data
flows taking place - but in no case should a data flow which is not present be
recorded. That said, data flows can be missed for a variety of reasons. First, given
24Pricing estimate generated on May 31, 2016.
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the rapid rate of website ingestion, it is entirely possible that the IP address being
used in a given analysis would be blacklisted25 - in this case the number of requests
would go down as a result of Javascript or iFrame elements which spawn additional
requests not loading.26 However, some indication of this would be found in lower
rates of requests being received.
Second, PhantomJS does not support a variety of browser plug-ins such as Adobe
Flash, Microsoft Silverlight, or Java Applets. Given that none of these plug-ins are
supported on popular mobile browsers, their market share is rapidly decreasing:
nonetheless it would be preferable to capture them. The trade-off in this case is
utilizing a full browser with plug-in support adds significant cost, complexity, and
time.
Finally, advertising companies expend tremendous effort and resources on mak-
ing their tracking mechanisms difficult to detect and circumvent; thus, there is a
high probability the methods used by webXray simply are not sufficient to cope
with intentional blocking designed to hide various tracking activities from analysts.
Another less malevolent reason for advertisers to block automated browsers is to
cope with “click fraud”, a technique by which criminals manipulate ad networks to
25“Blacklisted” in this context meaning servers getting requests from the specified IP address
would ignore them.
26iFrames are a means by which one HTML page may be inserted into another, thus a single
browser window may actually be displaying content from several HTML files, all of which may be
initiating additional HTTP requests.
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gain unearned payment. Indeed, there exists some suggestion that PhantomJS may
be intentionally blocked by some ad networks (Englehardt and Narayanan, 2016);
however, user-agent randomization appears to alleviate much of this blocking.
Additional limitations are to be found in measures of time and data size. Mea-
sures of how long elements take to download are dependent on the speed of the
network connection, congestion, and other factors. Thus, in no way should the time
taken to download an element be taken to have any absolute meaning - it may
only be used as a relative measure between two or more network events during the
same analysis - and in that case only with the caveat that comparisons are roughly
approximate. Second, given the manner in which PhantomJS loads elements and
reports sizes, it is possible there is some skew in the actual size of the elements,
thus the measures should be used as approximations.
Measures of page load times are complicated by the fact that many pages con-
tinue to initiate requests for additional content in the background as the user scrolls
down a page - thus, when a given page is “finished” loading is a somewhat imprecise
concept, and one that is poorly reflected by the available measure which is based
upon the time delta between the first request event and the final receive event.
Also, given the thirty second timeout, pages that take longer than this time are not
accurately measured.
Finally, policyXray is severely limited by the fact that only English-language
links to privacy policies may be followed. On large page populations which include
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many languages, this results in incomplete coverage. Furthermore, while Readabil-
ity.js performs well, it is not always able to cope with the structure of a given page
and is unable to work flawlessly. Furthermore, in some cases pages have been found
which encode text in a manner which makes it exceedingly difficult to extract and
these pages are often discarded by the sanity check.
Conclusion
This chapter has described newly-developed methodologies used to construct page
populations which reflect social contexts, investigate pages for data flows which
violate social norms, and auditing the policies of web sites and potential malware
exposure. These methodologies facilitate pursuing the answers to the complex social
questions asked in the following chapters.
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Chapter 4
On the Impossibility of Accepting
the Unknown: A Web-Scale
Analysis of the Failure of Notice
and Choice
“The [Network Advertising Initiative] Code of Conduct, is a set of self-
regulatory principles which all NAI member companies must agree to
uphold in order to be members. The Code requires notice and choice
with respect to Interest-Based Advertising, limits the types of data that
member companies can use for advertising purposes, and imposes a host
of substantive restrictions on member companies’ collection, use, and
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transfer of data used for Interest-Based Advertising.”
Network Advertising Initiative, Code and Enforcement1
Advertisers collect information about users in order to show users advertise-
ments more “tailored” to their interests using the techniques of Online Behavioral
Advertising (OBA). In exchange, advertising revenue subsidizes the vast volumes
of media content which users expect to receive for free. The above quotation from
the industry group Network Advertising Initiative suggests that the exchange of
personal behavioral data for media content is premised on an implicit agreement
referred to as “notice and choice”. In this model, users are notified that personal
data is used for advertising and are given a choice to halt such use (often known
as an “opt-out”). The common industry picture is that users are knowingly, and
happily, giving up personal information in exchange for information goods.
While OBA is fairly new phenomena, the concept of notice and choice is drawn
from a much older source. The Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) are an
established set of guidelines for the processing of personal information by comput-
erized systems. The FIPPs are over forty years old and the underlying principles
have been adapted and modified in regulations around the globe. Nissenbuam has
observed that the original FIPPs functioned “like a bill of rights” which was de-
signed to protect “private individuals (data subjects) against large government and
private sector institutional actors” (Nissenbaum, 2004).
1http://www.networkadvertising.org/code-enforcement
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FIPPs have evolved over time, starting with five broad principles, and subse-
quently growing to as many as nine in later adaptations. The OBA industry, how-
ever, has chosen just two FIPPs-like principles, “notice and choice”, to form the
primary basis of their self-regulatory regimes. This has drawn wide rebuke from
privacy scholars and advocates who feel that industry self-regulatory efforts neither
embody the normative spirit of FIPPs, nor protect privacy in any meaningful way.
The literature is full of historical, legal, and philosophical objections to the “notice
and choice” paradigm.
Despite the large volume of academic literature on the topic, surprisingly little
has been done to identify the actual companies which receive data through online
tracking and verifying that the vaunted “notice” component of self-regulation is
in fact occurring as promised. Likewise, while much has been written about ef-
forts such as the “Do Not Track” standard for signaling a user’s “choice” in data
preferences, there is little information available on the degree to which websites
and advertisers follow or reject the standard. Overall, disputes over legal minutiae
have kept focus on the question if “notice and choice” is acceptable, rather than if
it is being practiced in a way which respects even the most basic formulations of
meaningful norms.
Some of the blame for this situation is an overabundance of versions of FIPPs,
and complex language which has led to confusion over what exactly constitutes
“notice”, let alone “choice”. For this study, a common sense approach has been
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taken and simple questions are asked. First, and foremost, who are the companies
receiving user data and are they known to most users? Second, if a diligent user were
to read the privacy policy of a given website, would she or he be able to understand
the text of the policy and learn the names of the companies receiving data? Third,
do the companies receiving user data commit to respect the “choice” expressed by
the “Do Not Track” standard? Finally, do the various companies collecting data
utilize basic security practices to protect user data from malicious parties? Only
by investigating these questions directly will we discover if “notice and choice” is
actually being practiced today.
While the questions posed above are fairly simple, the process for answering
them requires significant technical effort and custom tools were developed for this
study. These tools, and the data produced by them, represent a significant method-
ological advancement in the field of online privacy research. In order to provide
clarity on the dominant practices occurring on the web today, this study is rooted
in a large-scale analysis of data flows on one million web sites with a focus on at-
tributing data flows to the specific companies which receive user data. In order to
get to the core of how notice and choice is or is not being practiced, the largest ever
assembled corpus of privacy policies, those corresponding to over 200,00 websites,
has been collected and analyzed. This analysis is the first of its kind conducted at
this scale. Network traffic has further been inspected to determine if minimum secu-
rity precautions are being followed. Finally, rather than treating the industry as an
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undifferentiated whole, focus has been applied to the practices of the 25 companies
which receive the bulk of user data in order to reveal variations in practices.
The underlying normative implication of this study is that if the OBA industry’s
crippled version of the FIPPs guidelines, “notice and choice”, is not functioning in
practice, then the broader normative goals embodied in FIPPs fail as well. Ulti-
mately, the FIPPs goal of placing controls on the behavior of powerful actors to
preserve individual rights is at stake.
This chapter begins with an accounting of the origin and history of FIPPs as
a normative grounding for evaluating data practices. Next, the process by which
industry has manipulated the ideas behind FIPPs to generate self-regulatory frame-
works is explained. This is followed by a summary of the dominant objections to
the “notice and choice” formulation. In order to facilitate a nuanced evaluation,
research questions are refined and population designs are established.
The evaluation demonstrates with a high degree of certainty that “notice and
choice” fails in practice as well as in theory. The industry simply does not regulate
itself in a way which meets the normative goals of FIPPs. These underlying failures
set the stage for subsequent chapters which will further explore how OBA has had
deleterious impacts on the sanctity of personal medical information and the role of
the press in a democratic society.
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Normative and Regulatory Background
There is an oft-made claim made by those in the business of monetizing personal
data that privacy is a somehow modern invention, and one with a limited lifespan
at that. Such a viewpoint is not only ignorant of ancient history where privacy
was valued by the Greeks and Egyptians, but it is also ignorant of recent history.
Decades before the first tracking pixel was a glean in the eye of a marketer, regula-
tors and theorists realized that the proliferation of computerized databases would
have profound impacts upon society. They sought to advance concepts and policies
to protect individuals; however, such efforts have been in constant struggle against
those who seek to profit from the erosion of privacy rights.
In 1973 the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare convened a
committee on “Automated Personal Data Systems” to study the impacts of the
“growing use of automated data systems containing information about individuals”
by both “public and private sector organizations” (Gellman, 2016). The committee
subsequently produced the report “Records, Computers and the Rights of Citi-
zens” which included a set of privacy principles called the Code of Fair Information
Practices (Gellman, 2016). This code contained five guidelines which came to be
known as the Fair Information Practice Principles, or simply “FIPPs”. The code is
reproduced below:
HEW Code of Fair Information Practices
1. There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose very existence is
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secret.
2. There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is
in a record and how it is used.
3. There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him obtained
for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his
consent.
4. There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable
information about himself.
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifi-
able personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and
must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the data.
Aside from the use of the male pronoun, the original FIPPs were incredibly
forward-looking and anticipated many of the social issues raised by the era of “big
data”. Privacy advocate Marc Rotenberg has observed that “more broadly, the
Fair Information Practices set out an approach to the design of information systems
that embeds certain normative political views” (emphasis added) (Rotenberg,
2001). Legal scholar Fred Cate has written that the FIPPs “reflected a wide con-
sensus about the need for broad standards to facilitate both individual privacy and
the promise of information flows in an increasingly technology-dependent, global
society” (Cate, 2006).
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The HEW report led directly to the 1974 U.S. Privacy Act which applied the
FIPPs to the federal government. However, the Privacy Act is but a footnote in
the longer history of the FIPPs which have evolved, expanded, and been applied in
a number of regulatory and cultural contexts.
In 1980, the original five FIPPs were extended to eight by the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development in the document OECD Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. As an international
organization, the OECD guidelines aimed to influence the development of national
privacy laws in countries which did not yet have them. According to Cate, “in
this aspiration they have undoubtedly succeeded because most of the dozens of na-
tional and regional privacy regimes adopted after 1980 claim to reflect the OECD
Guidelines” (Cate, 2006). In many ways the OCED Guidelines became the new
“benchmark for assessing privacy policy and legislation” and included eight prin-
ciples which expanded on the original five: “Collection Limitation; Data Quality;
Purpose Specification; Use Limitation; Security Safeguards; Openness; Individual
Participation; and Accountability” (Rotenberg, 2001).
Throughout the intervening decades, FIPPs and OECD-influenced regulations
spread widely. The 1995 EU Privacy Directive relied on the principles and “ensured
the spread of [FIPPs] throughout Europe” (Gellman, 2016). Canada implemented
a national standard for data protection in 1995 which likewise reflected “the in-
ternational consensus on [FIPPs]” (Gellman, 2016). In 2000, the U.S. Department
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of Health and Human Services “relied upon [FIPPs]” in crafting the medical pri-
vacy rules mandated by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) (Gellman, 2016).2 When the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was
established in 2002, a privacy office was created and given the “responsibility for
assuring compliance with fair information practices” (Gellman, 2016). The Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum expanded the concept of FIPPs to
include nine principles in 2004 as a “conscious effort to build on the OECD Guide-
lines” (Cate, 2006).
It is no stretch to assert that “modern data protection law is built on ‘fair
information practice principles’” (Cate, 2006). Likewise, it is clear that they rep-
resent not only the political norms of the 1970s United States, but norms which
have received adoption and support around the globe. However, these norms, and
the regulations based on them, have themselves been unable to stop the large-scale
erosion of privacy brought about by Online Behavioral Advertising (OBA). The
reason for this is that both U.S. regulators and the OBA industry have promoted
significantly weakened interpretations of FIPPs in the online space.
As noted in the introductory chapter, the emergence of Online Behavioral Ad-
vertising in the mid- to late-1990s represented a foundational shift in the business
and practices surrounding media and advertising. These shifts were directly tied to
the accumulation of personal web browsing data in electronic databases, precisely
2HIPAA is covered further in the next chapter.
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the type of activities which FIPPs and related frameworks anticipated. However,
due to a dilution of FIPPs principles, effective regulation of OBA has proven elusive.
While the original conception of FIPPs included five guidelines, the OECD eight,
and the APEC nine, a 2009 U.S. Federal Trade Commission report titled “Self-
Regulatory Principles For Online Behavioral Advertising” includes only four. This
report was not the first or last word from the FTC on the topic of FIPPs. According
to Gellman, “from 1998 through 2010, the Commission’s description of FIP[P]s has
been consistently inconsistent” (Gellman, 2016). However, the 2009 version may
be the most influential as it is the version which has been favored by industry as a
basis for their own self-regulatory guidelines.
The “Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising” is a docu-
ment jointly developed by the trade groups of the American Association of Ad-
vertising Agencies, Association of National Advertisers, Council of Better Business
Bureaus, Direct Marketing Association, and the Interactive Advertising Bureau.
The document espouses several principles and claims to “correspond with the ‘Self-
Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising’ proposed by the Federal
Trade Commission in February 2009”. The 2009 FTC guidelines favored by industry
are as follows:
FTC 2009 Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising
1. Transparency and Consumer Control: Every website where data is collected
for behavioral advertising should provide a clear, concise, consumer-friendly, and
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prominent statement that (1) data about consumers’ activities online is being col-
lected at the site for use in providing advertising about products and services tai-
lored to individual consumers’ interests, and (2) consumers can choose whether
or not to have their information collected for such purpose. The website should
also provide consumers with a clear, easy-to-use, and accessible method for exer-
cising this option. Where the data collection occurs outside the traditional website
context, companies should develop alternative methods of disclosure and consumer
choice that meet the standards described above (i.e., clear, prominent, easy-to-use,
etc.)
2. Reasonable Security, and Limited Data Retention, for Consumer Data:
Any company that collects and/or stores consumer data for behavioral advertising
should provide reasonable security for that data. Consistent with data security
laws and the FTC’s data security enforcement actions, such protections should be
based on the sensitivity of the data, the nature of a company’s business operations,
the types of risks a company faces, and the reasonable protections available to a
company. Companies should also retain data only as long as is necessary to fulfill
a legitimate business or law enforcement need.
3. Affirmative Express Consent for Material Changes to Existing Privacy
Promises: As the FTC has made clear in its enforcement and outreach efforts, a
company must keep any promises that it makes with respect to how it will handle
or protect consumer data, even if it decides to change its policies at a later date.
Therefore, before a company can use previously collected data in a manner ma-
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terially different from promises the company made when it collected the data, it
should obtain affirmative express consent from affected consumers. This principle
would apply in a corporate merger situation to the extent that the merger creates
material changes in the way the companies collect, use, and share data.
4. Affirmative Express Consent to (or Prohibition Against) Using Sensitive
Data for Behavioral Advertising: Companies should collect sensitive data for
behavioral advertising only after they obtain affirmative express consent from the
consumer to receive such advertising.
A cursory review reveals why industry has embraced the FTC 2009 guidelines.
The first principle calls for a “consumer-friendly”, but otherwise poorly defined,
notice that data will be used for advertising. This principle further specifies that
“consumers” should be able to “choose whether or not to have their information
collected”. Neither aspect of this principle calls for specifics on how the processes
should work in practice. The second principle of security and data retention lacks
specifics of the former, and in regards to the latter allows that data may be held for
“as long as is necessary to fulfill a legitimate business...need”. Given that OBA is
premised on building behavioral profiles of users, “necessary” may reasonably mean
“indefinite” under the principle. The third principle merely states that advertis-
ers shouldn’t change their terms retroactively, which is less an appeal to protect
essential human dignity as it is a means of stating the obvious nature of a contract.
The fourth principle is the shortest and most vague, yet it hints at recognition
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of essential privacy rights insomuch as it provides acknowledgement that certain
types of data may be considered “sensitive”. However, it fails to place specific
types of data off-limits, and to the degree they exist, it merely suggests advertisers
ask before they use them. If this were not lax enough, the industry has interpreted
that guideline as an incredibly narrow set of data applying to information about
children (already regulated by federal statue3) and “financial account numbers,
Social Security numbers, pharmaceutical prescriptions, or medical records”.
The result of the FTC’s weakened interpretations of FIPPs is that a comprehen-
sive set of normative principles have been essentially reduced to two pro-industry
suggestions: that consumers receive notification of data transfers (primarily in the
form of privacy policies), and that they be given an ill-defined choice in what hap-
pens to their data. This forms the basis of the “notice and choice” paradigm
and reflects a decision by the FTC to embrace “a relatively recent creation of the
U.S. marketing industry” which is at odds with internationally accepted versions of
FIPPs (Rotenberg, 2001).
In essence, the FTC has chosen not to regulate privacy practices, but instead
“focused virtually all of its...efforts on getting websites to post privacy policies and
its enforcement efforts on suing website operators when they fail to follow those
policies” (Cate, 2006). This approach has been met with widespread criticism from
privacy scholars and advocates.
3Specifically, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998
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There are numerous objections to the notice and choice paradigm which mainly
have to do with the the fact that the system does not respect the essential privacy
rights envisioned by FIPPs, the limits of what users consent to are often unbounded
and conceptually flawed, and the notices are difficult to understand and therefore
impossible to consent to.
While FIPPs was originally conceived as a normative statement on privacy
rights, the notice and choice interpretation of FIPPs substitutes “maximizing con-
sumer choice for the original goal of protecting privacy while permitting data flows”
(Cate, 2006). The focus on “consumer choice” has resulted in “the energy of data
processors, legislators, and enforcement authorities [being] squandered on notices
and often meaningless consent opportunities, rather than on enhancing privacy”
(Cate, 2006). Furthermore, when compared to other areas of health and safety
where minimum standards are enforced, the notice and choice approach transfers
“the protection of privacy from the legal realm, and from an emphasis on the artic-
ulation of rights and responsibilities, to the marketplace, where consumers would
now be forced to pay for what the law could otherwise provide” (Rotenberg, 2001).
Beyond the erosion of rights in favor of market mechanisms, the notion of con-
sent is problematic as “consent legitimizes nearly any form of collection, use, or
disclosure of personal data” and places few, if any, limits on how companies may
collect or manipulate data, thereby denying users the type of “meaningful control”
which consent implies (Solove, 2012). Furthermore, it is difficult to understand the
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increasingly complex practices detailed in policies. Barocas and Nissenbuam have
observed that “users who are subject to [online tracking] confront not only sig-
nificant hurdles but full-on barriers to achieving meaningful understanding of the
practice and uses to which they are expected to be able to consent” (Barocas and
Nissenbaum, 2009). Likewise, given the proliferation of complex machine learning
techniques, Barocas and Nissenbaum conclude that in the era of big data “when
analysts can draw rules from the data of a small cohort of consenting individuals
that generalize to an entire population, consent loses its practical import” (Barocas
and Nissenbaum, 2014).
Even assuming that notices offer bounded and technically comprehensible limits
on data processing, the application of common readability metrics such as Flesch-
Kincaid reveals that they remain difficult to read. A study from 2002 looked specif-
ically at privacy policies on health websites and determined that “of the 80 Internet
health Web sites studied, 30% (including 23% of the commercial Web sites) had no
privacy policy posted. The average readability level of the remaining sites required
2 years of college level education to comprehend, and no Web site had a privacy
policy that was comprehensible by most English-speaking individuals in the United
States” (Graber et al., 2002). Likewise a more general longitudinal study of privacy
policies in the years 2001 and 2003 found that “based on the Flesch–Kincaid grade
level, the average grade level for 2001 was 11.2...in 2003, the mean grade level in-
creased to 12.3...finally, 54.8% of the privacy notices reflected an increase in grade
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level by .5 from 2001 to 2003.” (Milne et al., 2006). These trends continued to a
2009 study which found that the Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease score for six privacy
policies all fell within the “difficult” range (McDonald et al., 2009).
The impact of the difficulty of reading privacy policies is that it directly un-
dercuts the ability of users to consent to data practices. Reidenberg et al have
argued that “privacy policies may be misleading the general public and that those
policies could be considered legally unfair and deceptive. And, where websites are
not effectively conveying privacy policies to consumers in a way that a ‘reasonable
person’ could, in fact, understand the policies, ‘notice and choice’ fails as a frame-
work” (Reidenberg et al., 2014). Likewise, Blanke has argued that “just because
someone clicks a button, it does not necessarily follow that there is even an objec-
tive intent to enter into a contractual relationship...courts should not find genuine
assent merely because (objectively) a button was clicked” (Blanke, 2006).4 Finally,
privacy policies are often hard to find, which means that “if the notice is never
received by the consumer, the choice it provides is meaningless.”(Cate, 2006)
Overall, critics contend that the notice and choice paradigm “falls well short of”
the standards advocated by FIPPs (Gellman, 2016). However, due to the prolifer-
ation of many versions of FIPPs over the past forty years, and the vast complexity
of the online tracking ecosystem, there is little consensus as to the exact nature and
4Blanke’s argument was specifically in regards to spyware which was downloaded and run on
a user’s computer, the difference with web tracking is primarily an issue of computer architecture
rather than consent-driven.
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mechanisms by which notice and choice fails.
Research Design and Objectives
In absence of a single version of FIPPs, let alone agreement between and among
industry, regulators, and advocates of what privacy protections in the Online Be-
havioral Advertising (OBA) space should look like, there is no accepted metric by
which to judge the privacy practices of either websites or advertising networks. The
closest to consensus is that the OBA industry and US regulators broadly endorse
the “notice and choice” paradigm. However, the definitions and caveats involved in
“notice and choice” render it particularly difficult to use in an empirical manner. In
terms of basing research objectives on specific existing frameworks or policies there
simply is nothing tangible enough to use as a measurement device.
In absence of accepted metrics, it is possible to move beyond legal theorizing
and use a common sense approach. This study grounds fairly straight-forward
questions regarding notice, choice, and security in a large-scale empirical study of
90 million records of data flows drawn from one million websites as well as over
180,000 privacy policies which correspond to over 200,000 websites. This represents
the largest study of its kind, and proceeds in several steps.
The first step in this study is to provide an audit of the current state of personal
data flows on the web. This provides a basis from which to gauge the spread and
nature of OBA on the web, as well as identify the companies which are the primary
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recipients of data. For this the webXray software platform is used to scan the top one
million Alexa websites. webXray identifies data flows which transmit the address
of the current page a user is viewing to any of 183 identified companies, the top
25 of which have been analyzed in depth in their observed practices as well as the
content of their privacy policies.
Once the data pool has been established, the issue of notice comes to the fore.
There are a number of questions in this area. First, it is entirely possible that the
companies collecting user data are ones which users may have pre-existing consumer
relationships and may have already agreed to the terms of their privacy policies. In
that case, “notice” may pre-exist, and users may be aware that data is collected from
external websites. Thus, the first metric is to evaluate of the companies receiving
data, how many have consumer, as opposed to business, services and products?
Given the set of companies examined is likely to include many without consumer
services, the next question is if the user can learn a given company is receiving data
by examining the features of the website they are visiting to find indications of data
flows. One possible indication is the industry-sponsored “AdChoices” icon which is
a small blue triangle sitting in the corner of a targeted advertisement. The icon is
designed to link the user to the entity which placed the advertisement along with
some explanation of how it was targeted. However, researchers have found that “the
purpose of these icons, to provide information to consumers, eluded participants,
even when the icons were shown in context on an advertisement” (Ur et al., 2012).
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Relying on the “AdChoices Icon” is thus a dead end.
The next possible way a user could expect to learn of the companies which
receive user data is reading the privacy policy of a given website. Indeed, this is the
most straight forward approach possible. Locating and reading one million privacy
policies, and searching them for the names of companies is a task which a person,
or a team of people, would find impossible. Thus, findings on company-directed
data flows found using webXray are used as the basis for a policyXray analysis
of policies relating to over 200,000 sites to determine if companies receiving data
are mentioned. This approach provides both a population-level view of trends and
practices in site policies, as well as per-company data which reveals the varying
degrees to which companies are represented in policy texts.
A key logical component of the “notice and choice” paradigm is that notifications
take a form which facilitates users’ understanding of available options and attendant
choices. Again, following a common sense approach, it is clear that notices must
not represent an undue time burden to read and may only facilitate choice if they
are easy to read for an average person. Thus, length and readability metrics for
the policies of the top 25 companies receiving user data are evaluated to determine
if the policies can be read in a reasonable amount of time and understood by an
average reader, thereby facilitating notice.
There is significant debate in what constitutes “choice” in the OBA context. The
industry viewpoint is that users have a choice to not see targeted advertisements, but
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do not have a choice about data collection (though they do not state it so plainly).
Critics roundly reject this formulation, and even the FTC has advanced the idea
of the “Do Not Track” mechanism for users to signal to data collectors that they
wish for their data not to be collected. “Do Not Track” is a feature in all modern
web browsers which sends a message to data collectors that a user is signaling a
choice in data collection practices. It is up to the companies to either respect or
ignore this signal. Thus, in order to verify if an accepted choice mechanism is being
respected, both the full set of policies as well as those from the top data collectors
are evaluated to see if they mention and respect the “Do Not Track” mechanism.
Lastly, while not a component of “notice and choice”, nearly all versions of
FIPPs, as well as industry self-regulations, indicate that data security is a core value.
Therefore, all data transfers are evaluated to determine if user data is protected from
malicious parties using commonly deployed Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption.
Taken together, the various components of this methodology shed light on the
dominant data collection practices on the web today, the companies which receive
data, the degree to which users are reasonably notified, able to make choices about
data collection, and can be confident their data is secured against interception.
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Research Findings
Top-Level Audit of Information Flows
The home pages of the most popular one million websites as determined by Alexa
were analyzed in January, 2017. 95% of sites were successfully analyzed and 5%
failed to load. This failure may be attributed to the top sites lists containing
sites which were not available at the time of analysis or had taken measures to
defeat automated analysis. The pages analyzed yielded a set of 16,809,296 cookies,
11,974,851 (71%) of which were set by third-parties and represent a likely vector
for user tracking and ad delivery. 91,321,943 elements were requested, of these
54% were requested from third-party domains meaning that over half of all network
traffic potentially exposes user behavior to unknown third parties. Finally, 91.17%
of all sites analyzed initiated requests to external parties, which indicates that users
should view the loss of personal privacy as a routine occurrence when browsing the
web.
Additionally, user data is often transferred to many parties in tandem. Further
analysis determined that sites which do make requests to third parties contact 12.8
distinct domains on average - indicating that not only is user data being frequently
shared, but it is often being shared with many parties simultaneously. 70.33% of
sites spawn third-party cookies which may be used to track users using traditional
methods, and 86.69% of sites include third-party Javascript which may represent the
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increasing trend towards fingerprinting and other advanced techniques. It should
be noted that since this study used a specified population rather than a statistical
sample, the confidence for these numbers is 100%, but these results only represent
the Alexa top one million - not the entire web.
In the same way that FIPPs have been adopted around the world, third-party
web tracking is also a global phenomena. In addition to the top level trends, sub-
analyses were conducted on the 10 most common top-level domains (TLDs) in order
to determine how wide-spread tracking was around the world. The top TLDs include
the well-known com, net, and org as well as several country-code top-level domains
(ccTLDs) such as Russia (ru), Germany (de), Japan (jp), United Kingdom (uk),
Brazil (br), India (in), and Iran (ir). Sites ending in a ccTLD have been registered
within a given country - however, popular sites within a given country often include
com and org sites, so this is not a perfect proxy for what a user from a given country
is exposed to (i.e. do not assume Russians only visit ru sites).
When comparing the amount of third-party data flows by country, there was not
much range in the percentage of sites which had at least one third-party element:
Russian sites had the most with 96.26%, and Iranian sites had the least with 82.7%.
However, in regards to the average number of domains contacted, there was a large
spread with Brazilian sites contacting 15.28 on average and Iranian sites less than
half, 6.25. There was also a wide disparity in the percentage of sites spawning
third-party cookies: Russia was again in first place with 92.7% of sites spawning
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cookies, whereas far fewer Iranian sites did so (64.26%). Finally, there was also a
significant difference in the percentage of sites with third-party Javascript: at the
high end were Russian sites with 92.3%, and at the low end were Iranian sites with
64.26%. These findings are presented in greater detail in Table 1.
Table 4.1: Findings Summary
TLD N % Total % W/3PE % W/Cookie % W/JS Ave. Domains Contacted
* 947356 100 91.17 70.33 86.69 12.8
com 468935 49.5 92.48 72.17 88.31 13.78
net 51193 5.4 87.77 67.67 82.11 12.84
ru 48042 5.07 96.26 92.7 92.3 12.1
org 44240 4.67 89.18 62.06 84.19 9.95
de 23518 2.48 89.24 60.04 82.6 10.73
jp 18637 1.97 86.74 56.22 84.25 9.89
uk 14338 1.51 94.09 72.98 91.92 14.31
br 14032 1.48 93.49 75.19 91.31 15.28
in 13620 1.44 82.96 57.37 75.48 11.01
ir 13564 1.43 82.7 53.99 64.26 6.25
Identification of Companies Receiving Data
The broader purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which the OBA in-
dustry is meeting the normative goals embedded in FIPPs by focusing on adherence
to the crippled principles found in self-regulatory guidelines. Even though this ap-
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proach predisposes the analysis to favor industry viewpoints, it merely follows the
normative basis for the guidelines, rather than the deceptive and convoluted defini-
tions of “notice” and “choice” which they promote. Thus, the first step is to figure
out who the prominent companies collecting data are, the type of business model
they represent, and determine if there is a likelihood that users may have knowingly
interacted with them previously and thus be aware of their data collection practices.
The most striking finding of the million site audit is that 82.35% of websites
initiate third-party HTTP requests to a Google-owned domain. While the compet-
itiveness of Google is well known in search, mobile phones, and display advertising,
its reach in the web tracking arena is unparalleled. The next company, Facebook,
is found on a still remarkable 33.71% of sites, followed by Amazon on 17.15% of
sites, Twitter with 13.96%, AppNexus with 12.92%, Aol with 12.17%, and Ora-
cle with 11.00%. The reach of the top 25 companies is detailed in Table 4.2 and
demonstrates that the final company, IPONWEB, collects user data on over 5% of
all sites, itself no small feat given the size of the Alexa population.
The vast majority of the prominent data collectors are online advertisers. As
Table 4.2 details, 20 of the top 25 companies are either involved in advertising
or retail sales. Given that advertising and shopping happens online, all of these
companies are practicing the techniques of OBA, and their data collection practices
raise the entire host of privacy concerns detailed in the introductory chapter.
Three companies, Oracle, Adobe, and Acxiom, all provide some sort of business-
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focused services such as consumer data which may be used for marketing or manag-
ing websites. Adobe is somewhat of an outlier in that their primary product which
collects data from the web, “Marketing Cloud”, is mainly focused on providing data
to site owners and may therefore have a somewhat lower negative impact on user
privacy.
The other prominent data collectors are all involved in hosting website content
for other parties, and data they do collect is most likely used for enhancing such
services rather than profiling users. Amazon Web Services (AWS) is the most
prominent content host, and while Amazon does practice OBA using the amazon-
adsystem.com domain, it appears that AWS data is isolated from such efforts.5
Finally, it is worth noting that Cloudflare is typically viewed as a content host, but
is now offering advertising focused services as well.
Company % Pages Revenue Consumer Services?
Google 82.35 Advertising Yes
Facebook 33.71 Advertising Yes
Amazon 17.15 Hosting, Retail Yes
Twitter 13.96 Advertising Yes
AppNexus 12.92 Advertising No
Aol 12.17 Advertising Yes
Oracle 11.00 Business Services No
Adobe 10.62 Business Services Yes
5Overall, OBA accounts for roughly 3% of Amazon-directed traffic on the Alexa top 100,000
sites.
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Company % Pages Revenue Consumer Services?
The Trade Desk 10.35 Advertising No
Yahoo 10.34 Advertising Yes
StackPath 9.63 Hosting No
Acxiom 9.03 Business Services, Data Broker No
Cloudflare 7.46 Hosting, Advertising No
MediaMath 7.23 Advertising No
Yandex 7.07 Advertising No
Automattic 6.89 Hosting Yes
comScore 6.88 Advertising No
Rubicon Project 6.86 Advertising No
Spot X Change 6.83 Advertising No
Lotame 6.62 Advertising No
Neustar 6.37 Advertising No
OpenX 6.1 Advertising No
Turn 6.69 Advertising No
PubMatic 5.58 Advertising No
IPONWEB 5.33 Advertising No
Table 4.2: Identification of Companies
Returning to the issues of “notice” and “choice”, it is reasonable to assert that
if a company provides consumer services, there is a non-zero probability a user may
accede to the terms of service of a particular company during the process of using
such services and that these terms may reveal third-party tracking. For example, a
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user whose HTTP request data is captured by a Twitter “Share Button” may have
a user account with the social networking site and be familiar with the policy of
“Widget Data” which states that “We may tailor the Services for you based on your
visits to third-party websites that integrate Twitter buttons or widgets”. However,
of the top 25 companies, only seven, Google, Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, Aol,
Adobe, Yahoo, and Automattic (parent and host of Wordpress), have consumer-
facing services. Thus, for the majority of the top data collectors, users are very
unlikely to have heard of the company or have previously acceded to terms of
service. This undercuts the likelihood they have been notified their data may be
collected in the way Twitter notifies users. However, it is entirely possible a user
may learn about data collection in other ways.
Disclosure of Companies in Privacy Policies
The industry solution for notifying users of data collection, the “AdChocies” icon,
has been proven to be ineffective and confusing by prior research. However, a much
more straight-forward means for users to learn about data transfers exist: reading
the privacy policy of the site she or he is visiting.
As noted above, webXray is used by this study to identify the data flows occur-
ring on websites in the Alexa top one million population. This analysis provides a
record of the companies which receive data on the home page of each site. When
webXray analyzes a page it attempts to extract a link to the privacy policy, and
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if such a link is found, it may be used by policyXray to locate and extract the
text of the policy for a given website. Using the tracking attribution analysis from
webXray, policyXray is able to search the text of the policy in order to determine
if the company or its subsidiaries is in any way mentioned in the policy. Further
details of the process may be found in Chapter Three.
For this study, 184,666 unique privacy policies were successfully extracted from
204,412 sites, representing over 20% of all sites investigated. The reason there are
fewer unique policies than sites is that many sites may share a common policy, as is
frequent when a single publisher or corporate parent controls a collection of sites.
There are three reasons why a policy for a given site was not found. First,
downloading and parsing the privacy policy can fail, this happened in 11% of cases
(ie. there were 230,096 attempts made which captured 204,412 site’s policies).
Second, a page may not have a link to a privacy policy, itself a de-facto failure of
“notice”. Third, policyXray is currently limited to crawling English-language links
to “privacy” policies and sites not using English will be missed. There is no way
to differentiate between the second and third conditions; however, given the Alexa
list contains sites from non-English regions, it is possible the language barrier is a
primary cause for missing policies.
The overall impact of the limitations mentioned above is that the findings of this
section of the study should not be viewed as a statistically representative sample
of all privacy policies. Nonetheless, this corpus of policies is the largest collected
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to date, and this is the first study to ever audit policies for disclosure of detecting
tracking mechanisms and provides a sound basis for drawing conclusions about the
nature of privacy policies on the web.
To evaluate if industry promises of “notice” are being practiced as promised, a
common-sense approach of looking at the privacy policies has been taken. Using this
approach, it is amply clear that notice is simply not occurring in the vast majority
of cases. Across all of the policies and data flows attributed to 183 companies
examined, users reading policies will only be notified of data flows in 10.70% of cases.
More troubling, 53 companies are never mentioned in any policies, leaving it unlikely
users will ever discover their data has been transferred to a third-party. While lack
of disclosure is a wide-spread problem, a closer look at the top 25 companies in






























Table 4.3: First Party Disclosure
Google is the company users are most likely to learn about during an evaluation
of a website’s privacy policy, and is disclosed in 33.38% of cases examined. Facebook,
Twitter, Aol, Yahoo, Oracle, Adobe, and Automattic are all mentioned in at least
one percent of cases. It is particularly damning to industry claims of effective
“notice” that with the exception of Oracle, the most disclosed companies all have
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consumer services and users may already be aware of data collection. The companies
they are least likely to know about - those which have no consumer services - are also
least likely to be mentioned in privacy policies. Even if such companies are disclosed,
users may have no idea what the companies do with user data. From a reasonable
standpoint, using a common-sense approach, it is clear that it is impossible for users
to be given sufficient notice of data collection by the majority of companies.
In light of the extraordinarily low rates of disclosure, it is highly unlikely users
will ever gain access to the privacy policies which govern the use of their data.
However, in the rare event they do learn of a given company, they will find the
policies incredibly time consuming and difficult to read.
Length and Readability of Policies
To determine the degree to which meaningful “notice” may be achieved by reading a
given privacy policy for one of the top 25 companies receiving user data, the privacy
policies of the companies were evaluated along length and readability metrics. To
choose the most relevant policy for each company, the home page of the most
prominent service was visited and any link to a privacy policy was followed (see
the footnotes in Table 4.3 for details). The primary policy, and only the primary
policy, was extracted. In some cases companies may have several policies, but it
is unreasonable to expect users to wade though vast volumes of secondary and
tertiary materials, so such policies were not counted. This is for a common-sense
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reason: prior research has estimated that the “national opportunity cost for just
the time to read policies is on the order of $781 billion” (McDonald and Cranor,
2008). Reading several policies for each company could conceivably put the sunken
cost of time spent reading policies into the trillions of dollars.
Once the policies were chosen, three measures were recorded: the number of
words in the policy, the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level, and the Flesch Reading Ease
score. McDonald and Cranor have previously studied the time impact of reading
privacy polices and “assumed an average reading rate of 250 words per minute”; this
study follows their lead in determining the amount of time needed to read a policy
and updates their findings with a focus on the companies receiving the most data.
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level is a score which corresponds to the appropriate level of
education (based on a U.S. K-12 scale) needed to understand the text. While not
anchored to a grade-level, the Flesch Reading Ease scale ranges from 0-100 with 0
being most confusing and 100 being most clear. All of the company policies were
in the English language, which these readability metrics are geared towards.
Of the 25 company policies analyzed, the longest, for Neustar, is 5,952 words
long, would take nearly 24 minutes to read, and is written at a 14.5 grade-level,
which is equivalent to three years of college. The shortest policy, with 282 words, is
an outlier for it belongs to Amazon Web Services and essentially delegates privacy
issues to the entities responsible for the sites rather than Amazon in its role as a
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content host, which is fairly reasonable.6 Of the companies whose primary revenue
stream is derived from advertising, Yahoo has the shortest policy with 1,480 words,
which would take nearly six minutes to read, and require one year of college to
understand.
Company Words Minutes to Read Reading Ease FK Grade
Google 2748 10.99 38.6 13.6
Facebook7 1771 7.08 39.97 13.3
Amazon8 282 1.12 50.53 9.3
Twitter 3676 14.70 36.73 14.6
AppNexus9 3718 14.87 50.77 11.2
Aol 2722 10.88 36.42 14.7
Oracle10 3666 14.66 36.22 12.8
Adobe11 1665 6.66 29.38 15.3
The Trade Desk 5605 26.02 39.47 13.5
6StackPath is likewise a content host with a short policy of 752 words.
7For Facebook used the “complete policy”.
8For Amazon, the AWS policy was used which delegates policy issues to clients: “AWS will
not disclose, move, access or use customer content except as provided in the customer’s agreement
with AWS.”
9For AppNexus the “Platform Policy” was used as opposed to the “Website Policy”.
10For Oracle, the AddThis policy was used, per the site: “AddThis has been acquired by Oracle
and will soon transition to the Oracle Privacy Policy. Click here to view the Oracle Privacy Policy
and read your options for opt out and compliance issues under that policy. Please note that
the provisions of AddThis’s Privacy Policy below will remain active until the policy transition is
complete.”
11For Adobe the Marketing Cloud policy was used.
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Company Words Minutes to Read Reading Ease FK Grade
Yahoo 1480 5.92 40.28 13.2
StackPath 752 3.00 41.19 12.9
Acxiom12 1880 7.52 29.79 15.2
Cloudflare 13 1532 6.12 42.82 12.2
MediaMath 4816 19.26 38.55 13.9
Yandex14 1681 6.72 37.37 16.4
Automattic 1422 5.68 32.73 14.0
comScore15 1820 7.28 41.8 12.6
Rubicon Project16 1967 7.86 27.96 15.9
Spot X Change 2178 10.87 36.73 14.6
Lotame1718 3131 12.52 29.59 15.2
Neustar 5952 23.80 31.41 14.5
12For Acxiom the Live Ramp policy was used.
13Cloudflare now has advertisement-oriented services: “Cloudflare’s Firebolt benefits publishers,
advertisers, and end users by improving an ad network’s ability to serve ads faster, over a secure
connection.”
14For Yandex, the English policy was used.
15For comScore used Scorecard policy.
16For Rubicon used full policy for “ADVERTISING TECHNOLOGY PRIVACY POLICY”
17Lotame calls itself a DMP (Data Management Platform), which can power both advertiser
and publisher needs, but ultimately this is an ad revenue service, so I am classifying under AdTech.
18Lotame does not accept DNT from IE: “If Lotame receives a “Do Not Track” signal from any
browser other than Internet Explorer, Lotame will implement an opt-out”
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Company Words Minutes to Read Reading Ease FK Grade
OpenX19 3380 13.52 27.96 15.9
Turn 4438 17.75 32.53 14.1
PubMatic 4369 17.47 19.94 18.9
IPONWEB 951 3.80 40.58 13.1
Table 4.4: Length and Readability of Policies
In terms of overall reading difficulty, the easiest advertiser policy was for App-
Nexus, which has a reading ease score in the “Fairly Difficult” range at 50.77 and
a grade level score corresponding to a high school junior. The most difficult pol-
icy was for Yandex, which corresponds to two years of graduate school and has a
reading ease score in the “Difficult” range. According to research cited by the U.S.
Library of Congress, 50% of U.S. adults cannot read at an eighth grade level,20
meaning that half of the population cannot understand any of the privacy policies
to which they are frequently subject.
It can be said without further qualification that this analysis of policies reveals a
gross failure of effective notice both in terms of the burden on user time and the fact
that at least half of the population is unable to understand the policies. Given the
19OpenX DNT policy is oddly specific, “To opt out of OpenX’s use of local storage or the
browser cache to provide its services, please (1) use any tools provided by your browser to clear




difficulties in accessing the policies in the first place, the “notice” aspect of “notice
and choice” is a clear failure. The “choice” aspect fairs no better.
Respect for User Choices
As noted earlier, following cues from the FTC, the OBA industry has largely reduced
the full spectrum of FIPPs norms to two: “notice” and “choice”. As the above
findings have made amply clear, the prospects for a user being properly notified
of data transfer are minimal. However, it is possible that users could signal their
“choice” not to be tracked in such a way that the user would not need to be aware
of the data collection in the first place. This can be done by including data in
the body of each HTTP request which tells entities receiving the request what the
user has chosen. While industry offers a myriad of “opt-out” mechanisms, they
are inconsistent, often rely on cookies and therefore are not permanent, and largely
require the user to be notified that such options exist in the first place.
While industry failed to develop a universal opt-out mechanism, privacy re-
searchers have done so, and the mechanism, “Do Not Track” (DNT), has been im-
plemented in all major web browsers. According to the technical document, DNT
provides a “means of allowing users to express their preferences about tracking,
including to opt out of tracking some or all of the time” (Mayer and Narayanan,
2011). A user who does not consent to having her or his web browsing history
stored by third parties (known as “tracking”) may simply turn on the DNT setting.
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DNT is a universal setting, it is consistent across browsers, it is reliable in that it
requires no cookies, and it does not require the user to be aware of, or notified of,
third-party data transfers. The only thing DNT does not do is provide a technical
means to force data recipients to respect the user’s choice; that is voluntary.
In essence, DNT appears to be the perfect solution for the industry: companies
do not even have to worry about notice, explain unique “opt-out” mechanisms,
or maintain the significant internal programming infrastructure need to manage
bespoke “opt-out” cookies. For users, it is easy to set the option and forget about
it. Indeed, the FTC has been highly supportive of the standard for these very
reasons.
Prior to delving into the specifics of each data collector’s stances on DNT, it
is instructive to see how widespread mention of the standard is in the policies of
the population of websites. While the standard is relatively new, it is already
mentioned in 6.27% of site policies examined. Given the complexity of parsing
natural language, it was not possible in this study to determine how many of these
mentions are commitments to respect DNT rather than acknowledgements it will
be ignored. Future work may address this challenge. Nonetheless, this is a fairly
encouraging signal which deserves to be monitored in the future. Less encouraging
is the industry response.
If industry is in fact committed to user “choice”, and is acting in good faith,
then all of the companies receiving user data would clearly mention DNT and their
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respect for user choice in their privacy policies. However, only 7 of 25 company
policies mention DNT at all. Of those 7, only Twitter unambiguously commits to
respecting the setting, stating that “We honor the Do Not Track browser option to
give you control over how your website visits are used to personalize your Twitter
experience and ads”. It is worth noting that even this statement focuses on data
use rather than data collection. Oddly, Lotame offers qualified support for DNT:
“If Lotame receives a ‘Do Not Track’ signal from any browser other than Internet
Explorer, Lotame will implement an opt-out”. The reason for Lotame’s approach is
likely that Internet Explorer at one time had DNT turned on by default, effectively
making tracking an “opt-in” rather than “opt-out” signal. Aol’s statement on DNT,
“Aol currently does not take action in response to these signals”, is representative
of the 5 companies who mention, but do not respect, DNT.
Company % Pages DNT Mention DNT Honor
All Site Policies - 6.27% -
Google 82.35 N N
Facebook 33.71 N N
Amazon 17.15 N N
Twitter 13.96 Y Y
AppNexus 12.92 N N
Aol 12.17 Y N
Oracle 11.00 Y N
Adobe 10.62 N N
The Trade Desk 10.35 Y N
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Company % Pages DNT Mention DNT Honor
Yahoo 10.34 N N
StackPath 9.63 N N
Acxiom 9.03 N N
Cloudflare 7.46 N N
MediaMath 7.23 N N
Yandex 7.07 N N
Automattic 6.89 N N
comScore 6.88 Y N
Rubicon Project 6.86 N N
Spot X Change 6.83 N N
Lotame 6.62 Y Y*
Neustar 6.37 N N
OpenX 6.1 N N
Turn 6.69 N N
PubMatic 5.58 Y N
IPONWEB 5.33 N N
Table 4.5: Respect for Do Not Track
Some commentators have claimed that DNT has failed to protect user privacy.21
Such talk is premature as any perceived failure is not in the standard, which is
technically sound and supported in all major browsers. Rather, the failure is the
21One of many examples may be found here: http://www.zdnet.com/article/why-do-not-track-
is-worse-than-a-miserable-failure/
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behavior of industry entities who are refusing to respect, or even mention, the
standard. The example of Twitter, and to a lesser degree Lotame, shows that
it is not an undue burden to respect the user choices embodied in the standard.
Aol and others claim that “There is no standard that governs what, if anything,
websites should do when they receive [DNT] signals”, so they refuse to follow it.
This is clearly disingenuous as Aol’s policy links to a Digital Advertising Alliance
page which requires third-party cookie acceptance to facilitate an opt-out, which is
simply a vastly less effective and more cumbersome means of signaling choice.
It is clear that there is no real commitment to “choice” by the OBA industry at
large. The fact that so few companies mention the DNT standard in the first place
suggests they feel the mere mention of it threatens the status quo which has proven
immensely lucrative. The history of FIPPs suggests that the “choice” paradigm
itself represents an erosion of the normative foundations of widely embraced data
protection guidelines. The failure of industry to respect DNT is therefore a stunning
example of putting profit before principle. However, mere negligence also erodes
user privacy in the OBA space.
Security Practices
The security of personal data is a core component of nearly all interpretations of
FIPPs. The original HEW principles state that “Any organization creating, main-
taining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable personal data must assure
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the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take reasonable precau-
tions to prevent misuse of the data”. Likewise, the 2009 FTC OBA guidelines
assert that “Any company that collects and/or stores consumer data for behavioral
advertising should provide reasonable security for that data”. Finally, the industry-
sponsored “Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising” contains
the following passage: “Entities should maintain appropriate physical, electronic,
and administrative safeguards to protect the data collected and used for Online Be-
havioral Advertising purposes”. While there may be agreement on little else, there
is a general commitment to data security in all these versions of FIPPs.
In the context of OBA there are two main technical factors involved in protecting
user data: transport encryption and storage encryption. Simply put, encryption is
a means of securing data so that only the entity possessing the “key” may read it;
those who do not possess the key will only be able to access random data which
reveals nothing.
Transport encryption applies to the way data is encoded when it moves from one
computer to another over a network in order to prevent eavesdroppers from reading
the data, be they coffee-shop hackers or government spies. For example, when a user
visits the New York Times website and downloads an advertisement from a Google
server, the user’s connection to Google may be encrypted so that other parties may
not see the contents of the connection. Likewise, storage encryption refers to how
the data is stored once it gets to the Google server and protects the data if an
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unauthorized entity were to gain physical or remote access to Google’s databases at
any time after the data has been received or subsequently processed. With today’s
computing power it is simple to implement transport and storage encryption; not
doing so constitutes negligence.
From the outside it is impossible to verify if entities collecting user data through
OBA are employing sufficient storage encryption without an independent auditing
body. While guidelines exist, there are no central trusted regulators who audit the
data storage practices of the OBA industry. However, it is possible to determine if
transport encryption is being used by examining the network traffic generated when
loading a page in order to determine if connections are made utilizing standard
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) connections.
When webXray is used to scan the sites for this study, the non-secure “HTTP”
address of all pages is requested. In 19.13% of cases, webXray is redirected to a
secure version of the home page. While pages transmitted over SSL should only
have elements which are requested with SSL (failure to do so results in a warning),
pages without SSL may have elements which may or may not have SSL. In order to
be compliant with both cases, 51.54% of third-party elements use SSL. However, this
relatively high number is undercut by the fact that only 1.15% of third-party cookies
use the secure flag which requires SSL, meaning that third-parties generally facilitate
the least amount of security possible rather than enforcing higher standards. Thus,
the security of third-party elements is independent from the security of the main
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site, and largely in the control of the advertising networks who provide the code.22
Company % SSL
All Site Home Pages 19.13
All 1P Requests 18.43



















22Advertisers may give web masters the “option” of utilizing encrypted connections, but a true
commitment to security means no such option is given.
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Company % SSL







Top 25 average 44.65
Table 4.6: Transport Security
Table 4.6 details the percentage of requests which were secured for each of the top
25 companies receiving user data. Given that even a single unencrypted request can
expose sensitive user data to unauthorized parties, if all companies were compliant
with both broader FIPPs norms as well as self-regulatory guidelines, the rate of
encryption would be 100%. However, the highest rate of encryption, by Facebook, is
only 88.68%. The worst encryption rate, by Turn, makes Facebook look remarkably
good by comparison with only 13.26% of requests secured. On average, the top 25
recipients of third-party HTTP requests only encrypt 44.65% of requests. Once
again, we see that industry practice falls far short of even the modest demands of
self-regulatory bodies. Although it is impossible to audit the storage encryption




Starting from the promise of Fair Information Practice Principles grounded in nor-
mative values of individual respect and ending in the compromised state of privacy
in the age of Online Behavioral Advertising, the past several decades have produced
a gradual and profound erosion of privacy protections for citizens. One contributing
factor to this situation is that the true spirit and values embedded in FIPPs were
successfully co-opted by industry with the assistance of hapless regulators more in-
terested in facilitating trade than protecting individual rights. However, even an
adherence to the weakened version of FIPPs advocated by industry would be better
than what exists today.
Simply put, the OBA industry fails to live up to a reasonable interpretation of
either the concepts of “notice” or “choice”. The web is rife with companies which
siphon user data, and it is nearly impossible to use the web without having one’s
activities tracked. The majority of companies receiving user data are not known to
users, their existence is not disclosed in the policies of most websites, their policies
are both time consuming and difficult to read, they ignore simple choice mechanisms,
and their security practices fail to protect users from malicious parties.
The current state of self-regulation fails to meet FIPPs, and provides scant
benefits to users. The major beneficiary of self-regulation is the OBA industry,
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who have co-opted and ignored FIPPs in order to deliver billion dollar profits to
shareholders. Essential norms regarding fairness in the processing of personal data
have been sacrificed for profit.
Thus, privacy on the web is barely regulated in theory and virtually unregulated
in practice. This results in fundamental harms to basic privacy rights which have
been adopted around the world. Such rights, however, tend to operate in the
abstract. Due to the fact that the web so throughly dominates modern life, there
are many ways by which the direct harms of OBA can be tied to specific contexts.
The following chapters will further delve into how the failure of privacy regulation
on the web results in harms to larger social institutions and values. The final chapter
in this volume will return to the issue of regulation in order to determine if “notice
and choice” can work, and if not, what could.
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Chapter 5
Privacy Implications of Health
Information Seeking on the Web
Health information has been regarded as sensitive since the time of the ancient
Greeks. In the 5th century B.C., physicians taking the Hippocratic Oath were re-
quired to swear that: Whatever I see or hear in the lives of my patients...I will keep
secret, as considering all such things to be private (National Institutes of Health,
History of Medicine Division, 2002). This oath is still in use today, and the impor-
tance of health privacy remains universally recognized. However, as health informa-
tion seeking has moved online, the privacy of a doctor’s office has been traded in for
the silent intrusion of behavioral tracking. This tracking provides a valuable van-
tage point from which to observe how established cultural norms and technological
innovations are at odds.
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When new technological practices impact established norms researchers should
determine the exact nature of the impacts, and if they are malevolent, they should
provide guidance on how such practices may be rectified (Nissenbaum, 2004). The
norms of privacy in the medical context are well established, rooted in specific forms
of harm, and are largely premised on the assumption that medical professionals
are the source of medical information. However, the Pew Research Center has
determined that 72% of adult Internet users in the U.S. now go online to learn about
medical conditions in addition to speaking with trusted medical professionals (Fox
and Duggan, 2013). Thus, from a normative perspective, this chapter endeavors to
determine how traditional values of medical privacy fare when applied to the new
reality of online information seeking.
The first section of this chapter, Health Information Norms, reviews established
norms in the health context. These norms are designed to defend against two
forms of harm: public disclosure of personal information and the tertiary use of
medical data for discrimination against the ill. Individuals concerned about these
harms may withhold medical information, resulting in inadequate treatment and
the spread of disease. To combat these risks, professional guidelines and laws have
been codified to protect doctor-patient confidentiality.
To understand how the shift to online information seeking has impacted health
norms, the second section, Research Findings and Impact, uses the webXray software
platform to evaluate a population of 80,142 pages related to health information
122
seeking. Pages are evaluated to determine the degree to which data flows expose
private health information to private corporations, and how this may result in both
public disclosure and tertiary commercial discrimination.
The third section, Application of Extant Norms to New Practices, takes a fresh
look at established norms and legal guidelines in order to determine if new infor-
mation practices are being sufficiently regulated by the extant strictures. In areas
where there are gaps between norms and new practices, suggestions for resolution
are made in the concluding section.
Overall, the chapter establishes that health norms are well defined, they are
being violated to an astounding degree by online tracking, and extant protections
fail to protect patient confidentiality online.
Health Information Norms
Across all areas of record-keeping, norms and laws regarding health information
are among the oldest, most firmly defined, and well-enforced. The reason for this is
that there are clear harms which come from improper health information disclosure,
professional organizations have long-standing prohibitions on the abuse of patient
data, and legal frameworks governing data use are well-defined.
According to Allen, medical confidentiality is valued as it prevents the harms
associated with “shame and violations of modesty” and “frees individuals from
the burdens of stigma, inequality and discrimination” (Allen, 2008). Indeed, the
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harms of the inappropriate disclosure of medical information generally fall under
the rubrics of public disclosure of personal information and the tertiary use of
medical information for discriminatory purposes. The ultimate impact of these two
harms is that the possibility of negative privacy outcomes will disuade individuals
from revealing pertinent information to caregivers, thus harming individual and
community health.
Medical information does not exist in a vacuum and it is often indicative of
one’s broader activities and habits. Thus, medical records may in fact be viewed as
revealing numerous aspects of one’s life, many of which would be embarrassing or
harmful to reputation if disclosed.
Rindflesich observes that medical records may contain information on “fertility
and abortions, emotional problems and psychiatric care, sexual behaviors, sexually
transmitted diseases, HIV status, substance abuse, physical abuse problems, genetic
predispositions to diseases, and so on” (Rindfleisch, 1997). Considering that stress
is a factor in many medical conditions, it logically follows that the topics which
cause the most mental anguish are also those which may be implicated in medical
diagnosis and treatment.
Given both the intrinsic sensitivity of health conditions as well as the constel-
lation of associated factors listed above, the release of medical information “can
harm us...by causing social embarrassment or prejudice” (Rindfleisch, 1997). Fur-
thermore, “individuals may experience...humiliation, shame, anxiety, and depres-
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sion if their health secrets are revealed” (Rothstein and Talbott, 2006). Tragically,
disclosure of one’s anxiety and depression would likely greatly exacerbate such con-
ditions. While shame and embarrassment may be viewed as harms which occur in
the recesses of one’s mind, the disclosure and tertiary use of health information may
have external outcomes as well.
The second primary harm associated with the disclosure of medical informa-
tion is that it may be repurposed for tertiary uses in order to discriminate against
the ill who may be viewed as less reliable employees, financial risks, or otherwise
undesirable.
While patients have an expectation that medical information “will be used only
in the context of providing effective care”, data may end up being used for “other
purposes not envisioned in patient consent forms” such as data mining (Rindfleisch,
1997). Such tertiary use can “result in the inability to obtain insurance or employ-
ment” (Rothstein and Talbott, 2006). An additional factor is that due to the “com-
mingling of the insurance and employment functions in the United States” some
employers may have access to their employees’ heath records and may seriously
abuse “confidential medical information” (Starr, 1999). This risk is reflected in a
survey which found that “52 percent of respondents said they were ‘very concerned’
or ‘somewhat concerned’ that insurance claims information might be used by an
employer to limit their job opportunities” (Bishop et al., 2005).
Beyond discrimination in insurance or the workplace, commercial discrimination
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may occur as a result of personal heath information being used for “marketing and
other purposes” (Starr, 1999). Such discrimination is often overlooked as “the
harm to the individual is ambiguous or relatively small” (Starr, 1999), yet these
uses “conflict deeply with the confidentiality understandings most patients have
when they sign consent forms” (Rindfleisch, 1997). Finally, due to the ubiquity of
health record-keeping systems, “individuals may not be able to withhold sensitive
health information from other unknown third parties if they want to be considered
for employment, other essential life activities, or insurance” (Rothstein and Talbott,
2006).
According to Rindfleisch, there exists a paradox in the fact that “our medical
records contain information about us that is of the utmost sensitivity, yet this in-
formation is only useful to us when it is shared with the medical providers and
system under which we get our care” (Rindfleisch, 1997). Indeed, withholding in-
formation from caregivers may result in the unchecked spread of disease, increased
costs of treatment, and even death. However, Allen observes that those “concerned
about discrimination, shame or stigma have an interest in controlling the flow of
information about their health” and may therefore have an interest in withholding
information, even if it is ultimately harmful to their well-being (Allen, 2008).
Rothstein and Talbott note that “the mere possibility” that personal health
information could be leaked “may lead individuals to forgo some potentially ben-
eficial medical tests and procedures or even medical care altogether” (Rothstein
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and Talbott, 2006). This problem is particularly troublesome among “vulnerable
patients (e.g., minors) and individuals with potentially stigmatizing medical con-
ditions (e.g., HIV infection, substance abuse, and mental illness)” (Rothstein and
Talbott, 2006). Socially marginalized patients “may be even more likely to forgo
care that is essential for their own health and the health of the public” (Rothstein
and Talbott, 2006).
The risks are far from theoretical. One survey found that “one out of eight
consumers has put their health at risk by engaging in such behaviors as: avoiding
their regular doctor, asking their doctor to fudge a diagnosis, paying for a test be-
cause they didn’t want to submit a claim, or avoiding a test altogether” (Bishop
et al., 2005). At-risk groups such as the “chronically ill, younger, and racial and
ethnic” minorities “are more likely than average to practice one or more” meth-
ods of withholding important medical information from caregivers (Bishop et al.,
2005). Attempts at obfuscating medical information for fear of disclosure was “most
common among those diagnosed with a disease”, 15% of whom had withheld infor-
mation (Bishop et al., 2005). Indeed, those “with a diagnosed disease are twice as
likely as healthy consumers to ask a physician to obfuscate their diagnosis” (Bishop
et al., 2005).
As the above has made clear, the twin specters of public disclosure and tertiary
discrimination lead many to withhold information which may result in less effective
medical treatment. Such withholding may harm both the patient and the wider
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community. For this reason, strong professional guidelines and legal restrictions
have been put in place to protect medical confidentiality.
The “foundational principle of medical ethics” is doctor-patient confidentiality
(Rothstein and Talbott, 2006). This principle is represented in several long-standing
professional norms. As noted above, the Hippocratic Oath has been in use since
the 5th century B.C. and is still used today. Similar provisions were established
in the “American Medical Association’s first Code of Ethics in 1847” (Rothstein
and Talbott, 2006). Likewise,the “American Psychological Association’s ethical
code requires that ‘Psychologists respect . . . the rights of individuals to privacy,
confidentiality, and self-determination’” (Allen, 2008). Similar confidentiality oaths
exist for “nurses, dentists, and other health professionals” (Rothstein and Talbott,
2006).
While professional codes of ethics both indoctrinate and guide medical care-
givers, they alone are not sufficient to protect patient privacy. For this reason,
numerous legal statutes provide both enunciation of norms and define consequences
for those who contravene them.
In the same way that the personal benefit of medical treatment is limited by
the degree to which an individual discloses informative to a caregiver, the degree
to which medical institutions may fulfill their purpose is limited by the trust put
in them by patients. Thus, regulators “must not only protect privacy, health, and
other legitimate interests” but they must also “produce public trust in institutions”
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(Starr, 1999). Laws regarding health information are designed to protect not only
individuals, but the very legitimacy of the medical establishment.
In the United States, “public concern about medical confidentiality is reflected in
privacy rules promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act (HIPAA)” (Allen, 2008). Pursuant to HIPAA, the U.S. Health and Human
Services Department created the “Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifi-
able Health Information” which is also known as “The Privacy Rule” (Rothstein
and Talbott, 2006). This rule governs how “3 classes of ‘covered entities’ (health
providers, health plans, and health clearinghouses)” must protect patient health
data (Rothstein and Talbott, 2006). Generally speaking, HIPAA provides numer-
ous restrictions on how medical information may be shared, while still facilitating
medical care, billing, and related tasks.
While HIPAA is fairly well-known, it is not the final word in medical privacy in
the U.S.. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, regulates “the flow of health
information to employers so that individuals with disabilities may be considered for
employment based on their abilities before an employer may consider an individ-
ual’s actual or perceived limitations” (Rothstein and Talbott, 2006). Furthermore,
federal medical privacy law does not “preempt more rigorous state patient privacy
protections” of which there are many (Terry, 2003). For example, most “states
have laws restricting the disclosure of HIV/AIDS information without individual
consent” (Rothstein and Talbott, 2006).
129
Research Findings and Impact
The norms and restrictions described above trace their roots to antiquity, but the
myriad changes brought about by the Internet represent essential challenges to the
continued functioning of established guidelines. As detailed in the introductory
chapter, when users visit a given website their browsing data may be transmitted
to a range of unseen actors, many of which are collecting data in order to target
advertisements to the user. In order to determine how these new data flows im-
pact established norms we must select a population of health-related web pages,
determine the scope of data flows, the recipients of data, the medical information
being transmitted, and determine if the traditionally recognized harms of public
identification and tertiary discrimination are to be found.
Population Selection
Establishing a population of websites which reflects the normative basis of the
inquiry is essential for this research task. In this case, the objects of study are the
websites’ users searching for health information are most likely to visit. The Pew
Internet and American Life Project found that “77% of online health seekers say
they began at a search engine such as Google, Bing, or Yahoo” (Fox and Duggan,
2013) as opposed to a health portal like WebMD.com, thus a search-based approach
to population construction is best.
In order to model the pages a user would visit after receiving a medical diagnosis,
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a list of 1,986 diseases and conditions was compiled based on data from the Centers
for Disease Control, the Mayo Clinic, and Wikipedia. Next, the Bing search API
was used to find the top 50 search results for each term.1 Once duplicates and binary
files (pdf, doc, xls) were filtered out, a set of 80,142 unique web pages remained.
The pages collected reflect the diversity of sources for medical information in-
cluding online support groups, newspaper articles, hospitals, and medical non-
profits. A major contribution of this study to prior work is the fact that this
analysis is focused on the pages which users seeking medical information are most
likely to visit, irrespective of if the site is health-centric.
Data Collection
In April 2014, the 80,142 web pages described above were loaded with the webXray
software in order to reveal top-level data on the flow of user data, the entities
receiving data, and the degree to which specific health information was disclosed.
Top-Level Data Flows
Within the population studied, the flow of personal browsing data to third parties
is pervasive across a number of measures. Based on information gleaned from the
top level domains used by pages, five broad categories of pages have been inves-
tigated: all pages, commercial pages (.com), non-profit pages (.org), government
1Search results were localized to US/English.
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pages (.gov), and education-related pages (.edu). Table 5.1 provides a break-down
of findings across these five groups.
Of all pages examined, 91% leak data to a third party, 86% download and
execute third party Javascript, and 71% utilize third party cookies. Unsurprisingly,
commercial pages were above the global mean and had the most third party requests
(93%), Javascript (91%), and cookies (82%). Education pages had the least third
party HTTP requests (76%) and Javascript (73%), with a full quarter of pages free
of data leakage. Government pages stood out for relatively low prevalence of third
party cookies, with only 21% of pages storing user data in this way.
Table 5.1: Aggregate Trends
TLD N % w/Request w/JS w/Cookie
* 80,142 91 86 70
com 49,174 93 91 84
org 16,072 93 76 60
gov 7,991 88 86 19
edu 3,444 75 74 40
Recipients of Data Flows
While security and privacy research has often focused on how user privacy is vi-
olated, insufficient attention has been given to who is collecting user information.
The simple answer is that a variety of advertising companies have developed a mas-
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sive data collection infrastructure which is designed not only to avoid detection, but
also ignore, counteract, or evade user attempts at limiting collection. Despite the
wide range of entities collecting user data online, a handful of American advertising
firms dominate the landscape.
78% of pages analyzed included elements which were owned by Google. Such ele-
ments represent a number of hosted services and use a variety of domain names: they
range from traffic analytics (google-analytics.com), advertisements (doubleclick.net),
hosted Javascript (googleapis.com), to videos (youtube.com). Regardless of type of
services provided, in some way all of these HTTP requests funnel information back
to Google. This means that a single company has the ability to record the web ac-
tivity of a huge number of individuals seeking sensitive health-related information
without their knowledge or consent.
While Google is the dominant actor, it is far from alone. Table 5.2 details the
top 10 companies found as part of this analysis along with the rankings of two data
brokers. In second place is comScore who are found on 38% of pages, followed by
Facebook with 31%. It is striking that these two companies combined are still have
less reach than Google.
Additionally, companies were categorized according to their type of revenue
model. 80% of the top ten companies are advertisers who use web browsing data
for behavioral targeting. The only exceptions to this rule are Adobe and Amazon.
Adobe offers a mix of software and services, including traffic analytics. Amazon is in
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Table 5.2: Corporate Ownership and Risk Assessment (N=80,142)
Rank % Pages Company Revenue Identification Discrimination
1 78 Google Advertising X X
2 38 comScore Advertising – X
3 31 Facebook Advertising X X
4 22 AppNexus Advertising – X
5 18 Add This Advertising – X
6 18 Twitter Advertising – X
7 16 Quantcast Advertising – X
8 16 Amazon Retail & Hosting – X
9 11 Adobe Software & Services – X
10 11 Yahoo! Advertising – X
... – – – – –
31 5 Experian Data Broker X –
... – – – – –
47 3 Acxiom Data Broker X –
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the business of both consumer-retail sales as well as web hosting with the Amazon
Web Services (AWS) division. At present it is unclear if AWS data is integrated
into Amazon product recommendations or deals, but the possibility exists.
While advertisers dominate online tracking, two major data brokers were also
detected: Experian (5% of pages), and Acxiom (3% of pages). The main business
model of data brokers is to collect information about individuals and households
in order to sell it to financial institutions, employers, marketers, and other entities
with such interest. “Credit scores” provided by Experian help determine if a given
individual qualifies for a loan, and if so, at what interest rate. Given that a 2007
study revealed that “62.1% of all bankruptcies...were medical” (Himmelstein et al.,
2009), it is possible that some data brokers not only know when a given person
suffered a medical-related bankruptcy, but perhaps even when they first searched
for information on the ailment which caused their financial troubles.
Health Information Leakage
The HTTP 1.1 protocol specification warns that “the source of a link [URI] might
be private information or might reveal an otherwise private information source” and
advises that “[c]lients SHOULD NOT include a Referer header field in a (non-secure)
HTTP request if the referring page was transferred with a secure protocol” (Fielding
et al., 1999). In simpler terms, web pages that include third party elements, but do
not use secure HTTP requests, risk leaking sensitive data via the “Referer” field.
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Of the pages analyzed, only 3.24% used secure HTTP, the rest used non-encrypted
HTTP connections and thereby potentially transmitted sensitive information to
third parties. Unsurprisingly, a significant amount of sensitive information was
included in URI strings.
Based on a random sample of 500 URIs taken from the population of pages
analyzed (N=80,142), 70% contained information related to a specific symptom,
treatment, or disease. An example of an URI containing specific symptom informa-
tion is:
http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/breast-lump/[...]
a URI containing no such information is:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21722252
Given that the former type of URI was by far the most prevalent, it may be
seen that third-parties are being sent a large volume of sensitive URI strings which
may be analyzed for the presence of specific diseases, symptoms, and treatments.
This type of leakage is a clear risk for those who wish to keep this information out
of the hands of third-parties who may use it for unknown ends.
Impact of Tracking on Established Harms
As noted above, the release of personal health information carries with it a risk of
two interrelated harms. The first is public disclosure of personal information, where
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an individual’s name is publicly associated with their medical history. The second
is tertiary use and discrimination, where an individual’s name is not necessarily
revealed to the public, but they may be discriminated against based on perceived
medical conditions.
While many people may consider details of their health lives to be of little
interest or value to others, such details form the basis of a lucrative industry. In
2013, the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation released
a highly critical review of the current state of the so-called “data broker” industry.
Data brokers collect, package, and sell information about specific individuals and
households with virtually no oversight. This data includes demographic information
(ages, names and addresses), financial records, social media activity, as well as
information on those who may be suffering from “particular ailments, including
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, anxiety, depression...among others” (Staff
of Chairman Rockefeller, 2013). One company, Medbase200, was reported as using
“proprietary models” to generate and sell lists with classifications such as “rape
sufferers”, “domestic abuse victims”, and “HIV/AIDS patients” (Dwoskin, 2013).
It should also be noted that such models are not always accurate. For example,
individuals looking for information on the condition of a loved one may be falsely
tagged as having the condition themselves. This expands the scope of risk beyond
the patient to include family and friends. In other cases, an individual may be
searching for health information out of general interest and end up on a data broker’s
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list of “sufferers” or “patients”. Common clerical and software errors may also tag
individuals with conditions they do not have. The high potential for such errors
also highlights the need for privacy protections.
Furthermore, poorly protected health information may be publicly leaked by
criminals. The retailer Target has used data-mining techniques to analyze cus-
tomers’ purchase history in order to predict which women may be pregnant in
order to offer them special discounts on infant-related products (Duhigg, 2012).
Even if shoppers and surfers are comfortable with companies collecting this data,
that is no guarantee it is safe from thieves. In 2013, 40 million credit and debit
card numbers were stolen from Target (Krebs, 2013). While a stolen credit card
may be reissued, if Target’s health-related data were leaked online, it could have
a devastating impact on millions of people. Merely storing personally identifiable
information on health conditions raises the potential for loss, theft, and abuse.
Advertisers regularly promise that their methods are wholly anonymous and
therefore benign, yet identification is not always required for discriminatory be-
havior to occur. In 2013, Latanya Sweeney investigated the placement of online
advertisements which implied a given name was associated with a criminal record
(Sweeney, 2013). She found that the presence of such ads were not the result of
particular names being those of criminals, but appeared based on the racial asso-
ciations of the name, with “black names” more often resulting in an implication of
criminal record. In this way extant societal injustices may be replicated through
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advertising mechanisms online. Discrimination against the ill may also be replicated
through the collection and use of browsing behavior.
Data mining techniques often rely on an eclectic approach to data analysis. In
the same way that a stew is the result of many varied ingredients being mixed in the
same pot, behavioral advertising is the result of many types of browsing behaviors
being mixed together in order to detect trends. As with ingredients in a stew, no
single piece of data has an overly deterministic impact on the outcome, but each
has some impact. Adding a visit to a weather site in the data stew will have an
outcome on the offers an user receives, but not in a particularly nefarious way.
However, once health information is added to the mix, it becomes inevitable that it
will have some impact on the outcome. As medical expenses leave many with less
to spend on non-essential items, these users may be segregated into “data silos” of
undesirables who are then excluded from favorable offers and prices (Turow, 2012).
This forms a subtle, but real, form of discrimination against those perceived to be
ill.
Having collected data on how much tracking is taking place, how it occurs, and
who is doing it, it is possible to evaluate the impact this has on users. Table 5.2
shows a breakdown of how data collection by twelve companies (top ten and data
brokers) impacts the risks of both public disclosure and tertiary discrimination.
The two data brokers most obviously entail a personal identification risk as their
entire business model is devoted to selling personal information. It is unlikely they
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are selling raw web tracking data directly, but it may be used as part of aggregate
measures which are sold.
Despite the fact that Google does not sell user data, they do possess enough
“anonymous” data to identify many users by name. Google offers a number of
services which collect detailed personal information such as a user’s personal email
(Gmail), work email (Apps for Business), and physical location (Google Maps).
For those who use Google’s social media offering, Google+, a real name is forcefully
encouraged. By combining the many types of information held by Google services,
it would be fairly trivial for the company to match real identities to “anonymous”
medical-related web browsing data. Likewise, Facebook requires the use of real
names for users, and as noted before, collects data on 31% of pages; therefore,
Facebook’s collection of browsing data may also result in personal identification. In
contrast, Twitter allows for pseudonyms as well as opting-out of tracking occurring
off-site.
The potential for tertiary discrimination is most pronounced among advertisers.
As noted above, online advertisers use complex data models which combine many
pieces of unrelated information to draw conclusions about “anonymous” individuals.
Any advertiser who is collecting and processing health browsing data will use it in
some way unless it is filtered and disposed of.
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Application of Extant Norms to New Practices
Having established what the norms and laws are, and what the online practices are,
it follows that we must determine if extant protections guard against new harms.
Unfortunately, they often fall far short of what is needed.
As noted above, HIPAA is the best known health privacy law in the United
States. However, HIPAA is not a panacea and is closely tailored to overseeing those
providing health-specific services such as doctors, hospitals, and insurance claims
processors. According to Terry, while “the HIPAA privacy regulations do protect
patients in many of their interactions with bricks-and-mortar providers”, “the same
cannot be said for most consumer interactions with online providers” (Terry, 2003).
Put another way, HIPAA stops at the door of the doctor’s office.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has established a “Health
Breach Notification Rule” which requires entities holding personally identifiable
health records to notify users if such records have been stolen (US Federal Trade
Commission, 2010a). However, merely providing health information (rather than
storing doctor’s notes or prescription records) does not place a business under the
jurisdiction of HIPAA or associated rules. Many businesses that handle health
information are subject to virtually no oversight and the main source of policy re-
garding the use of health information online comes in the form of self-regulation
by the parties which stand to benefit the most from capturing user data: online
advertisers.
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In the same way that professional norms in the medical profession govern how
doctors respect patient confidentiality, in theory industry self-regulations could pro-
vide similar protection. However, self-regulation in the online advertising space has
proven wholly insufficient to produce normatively acceptable medical privacy out-
comes. The FTC determined that “industry efforts to address privacy through
self-regulation have been too slow, and up to now have failed to provide adequate
and meaningful protection” (US Federal Trade Commission, 2010b).
A close reading of industry guidelines shows that there are no serious sanctions
for violating the rules which advertisers draw up among themselves. The Network
Advertising Initiative (NAI) has produced a “Code of Conduct” which requires opt-
in consent for advertisers to use “precise information” about health conditions such
as cancer and mental-health (Network Advertising Initiative, 2011). Yet the same
policy also states that “member companies may seek to target users on the basis of
such general health categories as headaches” (Network Advertising Initiative, 2011).
Given that the range of ailments between cancer and a headache is incredibly broad,
this directive provides virtually no oversight.
Likewise, the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA) provides rules which also ap-
pear to protect health information, but legal scholars have determined that “an
Internet user searching for information about or discussing a specific medical con-
dition may still be tracked under the DAA’s principles” (Hoofnagle et al., 2012).
Overall, while the harms remain the same, the normative frameworks which
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have previously controlled medical information simply do not exist in the online
context. Once again it is clear that self-regulation is not a replacement for more
robust forms of regulation.
Conclusion
At this point it should be clear that the transition to web-based medical informa-
tion seeking has had deleterious effects on medical privacy. This transition has
introduced a range of harms to patient privacy without the protections offered by
professional medical guidelines or most laws. The final chapter of the dissertation
will present an overview of approaches to regulation which could bring the current
practices of online medical information seeking in harmony ancient norms of medi-




Privacy, Trust, and Security
Implications of Behavioral
Advertising on News Websites
1
The first case-study firmly established that the current state of self-regulation
of online behavioral advertising (OBA) is failing to meet both broader social and
legal norms related to automated information processing, as well as the minimum
guidelines related to the “notice and choice” framework advocated by industry. The
second case-study demonstrated the ways in which the lack of regulation in OBA
has led to deep personal and societal harms in the realm of medical privacy. The
1Thanks to Bo Mai for inspiration for the chapter title.
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third and final case study focuses on the ways in which OBA harms the body politic
by undermining the ability of the press to fulfill its democratic purpose.
Prior research has noted that news websites contain vastly more behavioral
tracking mechanisms than other types of sites (Englehardt and Narayanan, 2016;
Budak et al., 2016). The main reason for this discrepancy is that news production
in the U.S. has long been a predominately commercial enterprise which is funded by
a mix of advertising and subscription revenue (Pickard, 2014). In the move to online
publishing, traditional sources of subscription and advertising revenue have rapidly
evaluated, leading to a search for new forms of revenue. One of the most prominent
new forms of revenue for online publications has come from the dominant business
model of the web: online behavioral advertising (OBA) (Mitchell and Rosenstiel,
2015). It is therefore fairly clear why news websites have more tracking, what is
unclear is how the shift to OBA has impacted the relationship between citizens and
the press.
Beyond entertainment and sports, the press provides citizens with vital infor-
mation on the functioning of government. For this reason, the U.S. Constitution
provides for broad press freedoms and the press is viewed as a core component of the
democratic system of governance, often called the “fourth estate”. There are three
primary ways in which the press serves a democratic purpose which are pertinent
to the topic of OBA. First, as an independent social institution the press functions
best when it is free from undue influence and serves the interests of citizens above
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all else. Second, the press is ideally devoted to upholding values of transparency
and accuracy in order than citizens may place trust in news media. Third, and most
important, the press provides the mechanism for facilitating public deliberation on
matters of governance. The ultimate check on power is exercised by citizens in
the voting booth, and the press is the means by which citizens are able to make
democratic choices and restrain tyranny.
Online behavioral advertising compromises the above functions in several ways.
First, while press outlets require independence to operate without influence, OBA
fosters a centralization of both revenue and content-delivery infrastructure, which
gives a handful of OBA firms massive unseen leverage over the press. Second,
the press is unable to function without the trust of citizens. However, the essential
nature of OBA is premised on extracting user data in covert ways which may expose
users to criminal malware, neither of which inspires trust. Finally, the free and
open airing of facts and ideas which the press fosters is threatened by OBA as
OBA provides a means for the government to surveil citizens, which may result
in a chilling effect whereby citizens are unable to freely participate in democratic
functions.
To determine if OBA is in fact undermining the social-normative function of
the press, a population of nearly 250,000 pages drawn from over 5,000 U.S.-based
news websites is analyzed across several dimensions. First, in order to establish
the extent of OBA in the sector, a broad census of tracking mechanisms and base-
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line privacy impacts is conducted. Second, in order to explore the independence
of the press, an analysis of underlying data flows is conducted to determine if
publishers operate independently or are reliant on centralized revenue and hosting
infrastructures. Third, to determine if OBA undermines the trustworthiness of
news websites, privacy policies are evaluated to determine if they are written in
an easily understandableway and if they fully disclose the companies which harvest
user information from a given site. Additionally, web pages are checked to see if they
further undermine user trust by partnering with advertising networks which have
hosted malware. Finally, using public disclosures of government mass-surveillance
as a starting point, the extent to which the government may surveil visitors to news
websites and chill deliberation is explored.
The analyses conducted in this chapter demonstrate that the high concentration
of OBA mechanisms on news websites is not a mere curiosity or artifact of commerce,
it is a threat to the foundation of democracy. The press cannot put the needs of
citizens first if they are beholden to a handful of OBA companies which provide
nearly all revenue and content delivery infrastructure. The press cannot maintain
the trust of citizens if it engages in unsavory and deceptive advertising practices.
Finally, the press cannot act as a check on power if its embrace of OBA gives
government agencies a means to surveil the reading habits of citizens.
This chapter will begin with a background of the pertinent normative concerns
related to the press. Second, ways in which OBA may negatively impact these values
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will be detailed. Third, a description of the construction of the page population
used for the study as well as particulars related to methodological choices which
are unique for this chapter is provided. Fourth, research findings across several
dimensions are presented. Finally, the conclusion will provide brief reflections on
how OBA negatively impacts the press.
Normative Background
It is widely recognized that a free press is an essential component of a democratic
society. There are many factors which account for both the ways in which a free
press contributes to a democratic society as well as the means by which it may be
successful in these tasks. Three are particularly relevant to the effects of online
behavioral advertising (OBA) on news websites. First, the press must be viewed
as independent and representing the interests of citizens above all else. Second,
citizens must view the press as being truthful and accurate in order to create a
foundation of trust. Third, the press’s primary democratic function is to facilitate
public deliberation on matters of governance. However, this deliberative function
may be negatively impacted by the “chilling effects” of surveillance.
It is widely recognized that the press must be independent of outside control
in order to function as a check on power. According to Kovach and Rosenstiel
the “first loyalty” of the press it to citizens, therefore journalists “must maintain
an independence from those they cover” and “serve as an independent monitor of
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power” (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2007). Likewise, Deuze states that “editorial inde-
pendence” is a core “ideological value” of the press (Deuze, 2005). This viewpoint is
echoed by Bennett who states that the concept of press independence is “central to
the organization, make-up, working practices and output of media systems across
the globe” (Bennett et al., 2015). Karppinen and Moe summarize the dominant
perspectives when they state that independence is a “central normative principle
in media policy and journalism” (Karppinen and Moe, 2016)
The concept of press independence is often premised on freedom from external
forms of control on reporting and publishing. Bennet observes that “media indepen-
dence has come to mean working with freedom: from state control or interference,
from monopoly, from market forces, as well as freedom to report, comment, create
and document without fear of persecution” (Bennett et al., 2015). Deuze states that
independence is a value held closely by “reporters across the globe [who] feel that
their work can only thrive and flourish in a society that protects its media from cen-
sorship; in a company that saves its journalists from the marketers” (Deuze, 2005).
Freedom from commercial influence is however put at risk by “native advertising
and other practices online that blur the line between journalism and sponsored
content” and threaten “the fundamentals of journalistic independence” (Karppinen
and Moe, 2016). Overall, the true value of independence is it allows journalists to
put the needs of citizens first and pursue the truth.
Beyond being seen as independent, it is self-evident that citizens must trust
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news media outlets if journalism is to fulfill a positive democratic function. In
The Elements of Journalism, Kovach and Rosenstiel state that journalism’s “first
obligation is to the truth” and that the “essence” of journalism “is a discipline of
verification” (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2007). This adherence to truth is often por-
trayed as “objectivity”. Deuze notes that scholars “have identified objectivity as
a key element of the professional self-perception of journalists” and an “ideologi-
cal cornerstone of journalism” (Deuze, 2005). This notion has a long history, and
Boudana notes that the concept of objectivity was “first used by journalists in the
United States and Britain within the framework of the promotion of professional-
ism” and “surfaced as a norm in the 19th-century” (Boudana, 2011). Furthermore,
the underlying democratic purpose of truthful reporting is clearly spelled out in a
handbook from the Society of Professional Journalists which states that “accuracy
and fairness speak to the obligation of providing meaningful information to citizens
who depend on quality, authenticity, and lack of bias to understand issues and to
make important decisions” (Black et al., 1999). Thus, accurate information may
lead to productive discussions on governance by citizens.
The ultimate democratic purpose of the press “is to provide citizens with the
information they need to be free and self-governing” and to “provide a forum for
public criticism and compromise” (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2007). This forum is
often referred to as the “public sphere” and the process of “criticism and compro-
mise” is often referred to as “deliberative democracy”. Habermas states that this
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“deliberative paradigm...is supposed to generate legitimacy through a procedure
of opinion and will formation that grants (a) publicity and transparency for the
deliberative process, (b) inclusion and equal opportunity for participation, and (c)
a justified presumption for reasonable outcomes (mainly in view of the impact of
arguments on rational changes in preference)” (Habermas, 2006) Christians puts
this sentiment in simpler terms, stating that the news media have a “facilitative”
role in which they “support and strengthen participation in civil society outside the
state and market” in order to “promote dialogue” among citizens which leads to the
formation of public opinion (Christians, 2009). However, journalists and citizens
must feel free to engage in deliberation for this function to be effective.
The deliberative function of the press is under constant threat from what is
known as chilling effects. Chilling effects refers to a broad theory that state surveil-
lance “may chill or deter people from exercising their freedoms or engaging in legal
activities” (Penney, 2016). Chilling effects can impact the deliberative function of
the press both by restricting the activities of journalists as well as impacting the
ability of the public to freely seek information and discuss controversial topics.
An extensive study by the PEN America Center conducted in response to rev-
elations of mass spying by the N.S.A. (details of which are discussed later) found
that 93% of journalists were very concerned over government efforts to unmask jour-
nalistic sources. The report concluded that government “surveillance will damage
the ability of the press to report on the important issues of our time if journalists
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refrain from contacting sources for fear that their sources will be found out and
harmed, or if sources conclude that they cannot safely speak to journalists and thus
stay silent” (America, 2013). Thus surveillance may limit the ability of the press
to present controversial topics to the public.
There is also strong evidence of surveillance-linked chilling effects in the realm of
information seeking and public deliberation. One study investigated if fear of N.S.A.
surveillance would negatively impact citizens’ willingness to seek out controversial
materials online. Based on examination of search trends before and after revelations
of N.S.A surveillance it was found that “there is a chilling effect on search behavior
from government surveillance on the Internet” (Marthews and Tucker, 2015). Even
if citizens do come across controversial material, experimental research has found
that when Internet users are exposed to a fictional news story on U.S. military
action and are primed to be cognizant of “government surveillance”, the “likeli-
hood of speaking out” on the topic was “significantly reduced” (Stoycheff, 2016).
Thus, while the press fosters deliberation, both the production and consumption of
journalism may be impacted by chilling effects linked to surveillance.
Research Questions
Based on the normative values associated with journalism detailed above, there are
three attendant areas where the practices of online behavioral advertising (OBA)
may have a negative effect on the efficacy of the press. First, by centralizing both the
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basis for revenue generation and content hosting in a handful of companies, the press
may lose significant autonomy and independence. Second, the opaque nature of
OBA combined with its facilitation of criminal malware schemes may contravene the
basis for trust in press outlets. Third, due to the fact that government intelligence
agencies may leverage OBA tools to conduct mass surveillance, the role of the press
as a facilitator of public deliberation may be undermined.
The internet has been characterized as a decentralized network which distributes
media power away from legacy intermediaries and into the hands of the public writ
large. However, the rise of a handful of giants in search (Google) and social media
(Facebook, Twitter), shows that instead of removing intermediaries, the Internet
has simply produced new ones whose power dwarfs that of former intermediaries.
When it comes to the role of the press, a move to the web does not necessarily
equate with increased independence, rather the dominance of OBA may in fact
reduce the underlying independence publishers have enjoyed for centuries.
Publisher independence may be undermined if a small group of organizations
controls the underlying revenue generation function of the press or if a small group
controls the publishing infrastructure which is now composed of servers and data
centers rather than printing presses. If such centralization exists, the press has little
leverage to dictate policies related to the processing of user data, and they will end
up beholden to powerful entities in a way which has the potential to impact the
journalistic mission.
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Two research questions may therefore by pursued: first, “How centralized, or
distributed, are revenue generating mechanisms on news websites?”, second, “How
centralized, or distributed, is the hosting of content on news websites?”.
More than ink and paper, the press has always relied on the trust of readers in
order to thrive. Reader trust is first and foremost grounded in the degree to which
news organizations provide full and fair accountings of relevant events. However, the
technical underpinnings of OBA rely on covert surveillance of users’ web browsing
habits and as was seen in Chapter Four, full and fair accounting of web tracking
practices is seldom found. Furthermore, the adoption of OBA puts users at risk of
criminal attacks using so-called “malvertising” schemes, further undermining the
basis for trust.
In order to determine if the shift to OBA has altered the normative basis for
trust in news media, two additional research questions may be asked: first, “Are
the privacy policies of news websites easy to understand and do they clearly and
accurately disclose data flows to third-parties?”, and two, “Should readers trust
news websites to keep them safe from cyber attacks?”
As noted above, the normative and social value of the press is rooted in its
ability to foster public deliberation on matters of governance. Likewise, the means
by which the press acts on a check on power is that a “watchdog” press may expose
government wrongdoing to citizens who may punish corrupt government authorities
in the voting booth. However, OBA may undermine this role.
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OBA techniques are by nature designed to centralize the collection of reader
habits into corporate-controlled databases. Such corporations may be exploited or
coerced into giving access to web browsing data to government intelligence agencies.
Likewise, these companies are free to sell the information as they see fit, be it to
marketers or the F.B.I. If news consumers feel they are being monitored they may
be less likely to read controversial materials, visit news websites which offer an
adversarial take on the actions of the government, or discuss controversial matters
with other citizens. The final research question is therefore, “How may OBA chill
deliberation and hinder the ability of the press to act as a check on, as opposed to
a facilitator of, state power?”.
Prior research has noted that news websites tend to have more tracking mech-
anisms that other websites (Englehardt and Narayanan, 2016; Budak et al., 2016).
In order to add to existing knowledge on the topic, and to highlight the findings of
this study, the frequency of tracking mechanisms on news websites is compared to
a reference population in order that another research question may be addressed:
“Are the privacy practices of news websites demonstrably worse than those of other
websites?”.
Methods and Population Design
This chapter uses both webXray and policyXray in order to collect and analyze
data, details of which are found in Chapter Three. Considerations regarding the
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design of the news website population, a reference population, the privacy policy
corpus, as well as measures for malware exposure, are further explicated below.
The goal of this analysis is to provide an overview of the online news industry in
the United States. To do so, creating a population of pages with two features was
necessary: first, the population must have as large a number of distinct news web-
sites as possible, and second, for each site, many pages must be analyzed to capture
the greatest possible number of tracking elements. Both factors were successfully
accomplished through a two-stage process of collection and expansion.
To build the initial population of sites, both the DMOZ and Alexa popular lists
were consulted.2 However, these lists proved both out-of-date and poorly organized.
Instead, the website USNPL.com (U.S. News Paper List) was found to provide a well
organized and up-to-date list of not only newspapers, but news-related magazines,
television, and radio stations. Using the USNPL site resulted in a set of roughly
9,600 links to news-related websites.
To create a population of pages drawn from the above sites that were specific
to news content, the Bing Search API was used to select 50 pages from each site
containing the term “news”. Not all of the sites identified from the USNPL produced
50 results as desired. Among a variety of factors accounting for this was that many
of the pages hosted PDF versions of entire issues of papers rather than distinct
pages for articles, some of the sites were no longer operational (potential victims of
2See Chapter Three for details on DMOZ and Alexa.
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small-town newspapers closing), and some of the magazines listed were not news-
oriented. Nevertheless, over 5,000 of the sites generated 50 pages with the term
“news”, generating a total population of 250,000 pages which were analyzed by
webXray.
The computer used to collect data was based at the University of Pennsylvania,
and data collection was performed between the dates of December 31, 2016 and
January 15, 2017. The relatively long collection period is a reflection of a conscious
choice to crawl the sites more slowly in order to reduce load on the analyzed sites
and to not be flagged as a “bot”.3
In addition to measuring the impacts of OBA on news websites, it was also
necessary to establish a reference population so that it could be determined if news
websites represented a greater risk to privacy than other popular websites. As
discussed in Chapter Three, the top 100,000 Alexa sites are chosen as a reference
population in order to compare news findings to what is normal for other popular
websites. Again, using a computer based at the University of Pennsylvania, results
were collected during the period of January 19, 2017 through January 20, 2017,
providing a snapshot taken within days of the news sample, thereby establishing a
sufficiently comparable set of pages.4
Once the webXray analysis was complete, policyXray was used to collect and
3Such an approach is generally viewed as being “polite” as well.
4The far more rapid rate of collection was due to each page belonging to a distinct site, thus
there were no issues in regards to the “politeness” factor.
157
analyze privacy policies for the population of news pages and reference pages. As
noted in Chapter Three, during page collection, webXray searches for the first link
containing the English-language string “privacy policy”, and falls back to the string
“privacy”. policyXray then takes these links and attempts to load, parse, and
analyze the privacy policy.
For the population of U.S. news websites, 2,881 privacy policies corresponding
to 140,340 pages were successfully extracted. These policies cover 3,125 of 5,095
distinct sites meaning that nearly 40% of news pages did not have a clear machine-
readable English-language link to a privacy policy. For the reference population,
24,478 privacy policies corresponding to 26,758 sites were successfully extracted
(28.48% of the total). The lower rate of success for the reference population may
be partially attributed to the fact that the Alexa list contain non-English web-
sites. Both corpuses are significantly larger than have ever been studied before and
represent a significant scholarly contribution.
As detailed in Chapter Three, it is possible to extend webXray findings by query-
ing outside data sources such as VirusTotal. In order to provide additional depth




Across all dimensions examined, online behavioral advertising (OBA) on news web-
sites has a negative impact on established social norms related to journalism. Fur-
thermore, when compared to a reference population, news websites often have sig-
nificantly worse effects than other popular websites.
Prevalence of OBA and Top-Level Privacy Impacts
Simply put, the OBA model enjoys wide adoption by online news websites and
readers may expect to have their privacy compromised to an astounding degree.
Fewer than five percent of news pages are encrypted, compared to nearly a quarter
of non-news pages. Nearly all news pages examined transmitted user information
to third-parties in the form of HTTP requests, nearly nine in ten contained a third-
party cookie which may be used for tracking user behavior, and over nine in ten
pages contained third-party Javascript code which may be used for advanced fin-
gerprinting techniques.5
Table 6.1: Top-Level Privacy Findings
Population N= % Encrypted % w/3P Request % w/3P Cookie % w/3P Javascript
News 244,293 4.45 97.88 89.33 96.06
Reference 93,926 24.28 92.62 77.83 89.15
5See Chapter Two for references to papers which discuss Javascript-based tracking.
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In comparison to the reference population, the percentage of sites containing
third-party requests, cookies, and Javascript on news websites is higher, but not
overwhelming so as OBA is widespread across the web. However, these top-level
metrics only indicate if data leakage is occurring at all, as opposed to how many
requests are being made per-page (e.g. a page with 20 third-party requests and a
page with one such request will be weighted the same in the above measures).
When accounting for the number of requests and cookies per-page, news sites
are considerably worse than the reference population. News sites contact over twice
as many third-party domains on average (41.43 vs. 17.92), and the mode of domains
requested is a full order of magnitude greater (20 vs. 2). Likewise, the number of
third-party cookies set is considerably greater: 27.33 on average for news compared
to 11.14 for non-news. Thus, while both news and non-news sites practice OBA,
visitors to news websites are exposed to vastly more tracking.
Table 6.2: Number of Distinct Third-Party Domains Requested and Cookies per
Page
Population Domains Requested Mean Domains Requested Mode Cookies Mean
News 41.43 20 27.33
Reference 17.92 2 11.14
It should be pointed out that the reference population only looks good in com-
parison to news websites. The findings across the reference sites indicate wide-
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spread and deep privacy issues, not a “best practice” scenario. The fact that news
sites under-perform the reference population to such a degree underscores just how
exceptionally troublesome news websites are from a privacy perspective. In either
case, the outlook for user privacy is poor, but from a perspective of independence
of news media, the outlook is even more grim.
Centralization of Revenue and Content Delivery Infrastruc-
ture
Ownership consolidation in the news media industry is not a new phenomena. The
days when local newspapers maintained private lists of subscribers, worked directly
with local businesses to field advertisements, and owned printing presses are long
gone, if they ever truly existed. Yet on a spectrum of possibility, such a distributed
system represents one extreme where subscriber privacy and publisher independence
are highest. One the other extreme, a small cartel could have records of all sub-
scribers, broker all advertisements, and operate a handful of printing presses which
would publish all papers. In the first extreme, independence would be highest, in
the second newspapers would have so little independence that they would be de-
moted to content providers. By examining the centralization of data flows, revenue,
and hosting, this study demonstrates that the truth is closer to the second extreme,
and the spread of OBA is eroding the independence of the press in a way which has
not been previously quantified.
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Table 6.3 shows the top ten companies which receive user data on both news
and reference web pages. The most remarkable finding is that while pages from
over 5,000 distinct news outlets were studied, one company, Google, has the ability
to monitor readers on nearly 95% of pages. Facebook, a company increasingly
positioning itself as a news source, collects user data on 60.45% of pages. Beyond
Google and Facebook, two other companies have the ability to monitor over half
of pages: Oracle (55.06%) and Amazon (51.39%).6 Furthermore, there are a total
of 31 companies which collect data on over 25% of news pages. These findings
demonstrate that a handful of companies have tremendous power to monitor the
visitors of a wide spectrum of news websites.
The concentration of data flows is a feature which is more pronounced in the
news population than on other popular web sites. In the reference population, only
Google receives data on more than half of sites and only three companies receive
data on more than a quarter. The upshot of this finding is that while Google
has tremendous power on popular sites in general, the other companies’ power is
significantly more concentrated in the news sector.
6It should be noted that for Amazon, only 15.16% of pages use Amazon’s advertising system, the
majority of Amazon-directed requests are for possibly non-advertising content hosted on Amazon
Web Services.
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Table 6.3: Top Ten Data Recipients
News Reference
Company Percent of Pages Company Percent of Pages
Google 94.99 Google 83.35
Facebook 60.45 Facebook 39.48
Oracle 55.04 Amazon 27.32
Amazon 51.39 AppNexus 21.57
comScore 48.67 Aol 20.09
The Trade Desk 46.06 Twitter 16.93
AppNexus 45.17 Yahoo 16.72
Acxiom 43.92 Adobe 15.74
Lotame 42.05 Oracle 15.18
Twitter 40.02 The Trade Desk 14.46
News websites likely have a high centralization of data flows for two reasons:
first, the embrace of OBA results in unchecked flows of user data, and second,
publishers have outsourced the hosting of their content to outside parties. In re-
gards to revenue, Pew’s 2015 State of News Report revealed that Google, Facebook,
Microsoft, Yahoo and Aol were responsible for “61% of total domestic digital ad
revenue in 2014, $30.9 billion out of a total $50.7 billion”, with Google alone ac-
counting for 38% of digital revenue (Mitchell and Rosenstiel, 2015). It is therefore
no surprise that Google is found on 95% of sites. Furthermore, Pew found that
digital advertising on news websites is dominated by “display ads such as banners
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or video” as opposed to “search ads” (Mitchell and Rosenstiel, 2015). These types
of ads rely on behavioral data for targeting, which is only possible when data is
collected from a large range of sites. Thus, an independent publisher is simply un-
able to provide targeting on par with the large OBA companies. The inability to
compete with massive OBA companies makes publishers dependent on large firms
for their very survival.
In addition to revenue, news websites also rely on third-parties to deliver website
content. Using webXray, it is possible to explore the dynamics of content hosting
by analyzing the literal volume of data transferred on a per-company basis. Simply
put, each HTML file, image, and piece of Javascript code is embodied in a variable
length of ones and zeros which must be transferred across the Internet. Transferring
this data takes physical material resources (e.g. electricity, computer hardware, air
conditioning, server racks, etc.) which are comparable to what was formerly needed
to deliver physical newspapers (e.g. paper, printing presses, delivery persons, news
kiosks, etc.). Rather than host independent data centers, most publishers now
outsource the hosting of advertisements and page content to a handful outside
parties.
As with the flows of data to companies, the volume of data by company reveals a
much more centralized system than many could imagine. In both the news and ref-
erence populations Google is responsible for hosting and transferring roughly 1/5th
of all web traffic (21.77% for news, 18.42% for reference). This means that not only
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does Google surreptitiously collect information on users and control revenue, they
support so much of the hosting infrastructure that if they were to stop providing
service, most websites would cease to be fully functional due to missing page com-
ponents. This gives Google a tremendous amount of hidden power over the web
which goes far beyond search dominance - even if publishers were to reject a new
Google policy and decide to end their relationship, they would be hard-pressed to
host the requisite page content themselves. Not only can Google de-list a website
from search results at will, they may also be able effectively pull the plug on a
website if they wish.
Beyond Google being fairly even between news and reference sites, news websites
exhibit greater centralization of data flows across the top ten companies as seen
in Table 6.4. Furthermore, 83.41% of all data on news websites comes from a
third-party server, compared to to 57.81% for reference sites, which indicates that
news websites have lower capacity than average to independently host their own
content. This is partially explained by the larger volume of advertisement which
are frequently delivered from OBA companies rather than publishers.
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Table 6.4: Volume of Data Transfer by Company
News Reference
Company Percent of All Data Company Percent of All Data
Google 21.77 Google 18.42
Facebook 7.55 Facebook 5.81
TownNews 4.68 Amazon 2.29
Twitter 2.44 Twitter 2.14
Amazon 2.44 Oracle 0.95
Taboola 2.39 Automattic 0.77
Oracle 2.33 Yahoo 0.65
Tout 1.79 Alibaba 0.46
Inform 1.67 Taboola 0.37
Krux Digital 1.38 StackPath 0.37
An additional risk to publisher independence is that reliance on OBA makes
their web pages more expensive to view and slower to load than other websites.
In regards to expense, users on metered data plans (such as mobile) must pay
their Internet service providers for the data they download, and larger pages cost
more money to view. On average, news websites are 3.95 megabytes in total size
compared to 1.57 megabytes for a page in the reference population, a nearly 40%
difference.7 On a limited data plan, a user may view fewer news websites than other
types of sites for the same money. Furthermore, when considering the time needed
7Note these measures exclude Flash video content which would further skew the numbers.
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to download a page, it is found that news websites take 12.89 seconds on average to
download compared to 9.23 seconds for reference web sites, meaning that readers
of news sites must wait 30% longer to get content even if they have unlimited plans
and are unconcerned about cost.
The threat to publisher independence from large and slow web pages is not that
users will stop being interested in news, it is that other companies will take pub-
lisher’s articles and deliver them in a streamlined environment. In fact, the two
biggest collectors of data on news websites, Google and Facebook, offer services by
which news articles are delivered quickly in an aggregated format. This gives these
companies control of what articles get presented to users, eliminating the indepen-
dence of news editors, and reduces the likelihood users will browse many pages
from a single media outlet. The great irony is that OBA degrades the experience
on news websites while simultaneously siphoning user data in a way that allows
OBA companies like Google and Facebook to steal visitors from publishers.
While it is clear that OBA represents a diminishment of publisher independence
on the web, independence could be regained by adopting new revenue and hosting
models. However, a much greater risk to the viability of news outlets is the loss of
public trust, which is difficult, if not possible to regain.
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Trust: Analysis of Policy Disclosure and Readability
As noted above, journalistic trust is deeply rooted in full and fair reporting of the
facts. When it comes to data flows on newspaper websites such “reporting” happens
in the privacy policy. In order to determine if a given web pages’ privacy policies are
both accurate and clear they have been analyzed across two dimensions: accuracy
and clarity. In terms of accuracy, for each page with a privacy policy the entities
receiving data on the page are searched for in the body of the policy text using
policyXray in order to verify disclosure. In regards to clarity, widely accepted
readability metrics are used to determine if policies are written in such a way as
they may be understood by an educated reader.
In order for a news website to be fully transparent with users about how their
data is collected and used all of the companies which collect user data must at
least be mentioned in the policy text. However, policies for news websites fail to
disclosure the vast majority of data flows taking place and may be considered at
best incomplete, and at worst intentionally misleading. Only 3.58% of data flows
are disclosed on the 140,340 news pages with a corresponding privacy policy. In
the reference population, 6.03% of data flows are disclosed across 26,758 sites which
had policies. Once again, both news websites and reference sites fare poorly, with
news websites continuing to engage in practices which are worse than the norm.
Although the rate of disclosure is universally incomplete across pages, it is not
uniformly incomplete across the various companies which have been detected. Many
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companies are never mentioned in any privacy policies, meaning even users who
make the effort to read policies will remain ignorant of data flows. In the news
population, 126 companies were found collecting data, of these 87 (69.04%) are
never mentioned. In the reference population, 169 companies were found collecting
data, of these 61 (36.09%) were never mentioned. Those who read privacy policies
of news websites are therefore nearly twice as likely to be tracked by a company
whom they have no means of discovering.
Table 6.5: Disclosure for Top Ten Data Recipients (News)











While many companies are never mentioned, those that are disclosed are done so
at vastly different rates. Table 6.5 demonstrates that among the companies which
receive the greatest percentage of user data on news websites, disclosure ranges from
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Facebook being disclosed roughly one-third of times down to Amazon and Lotame
who are mentioned in fewer than 1% of applicable policies.
Table 6.6 contains a ranking of the top ten companies according to their rates
of disclosure in news website policies. Of these companies, only Facebook, DataXu,
and Google are mentioned in more than a quarter of cases. By ninth place disclosure
rates hit the single digits (6.04% for Adobe) and the distribution of disclosure follows
a “long tail” where the majority of companies have rates of disclosure which are
slightly above zero (for example, the company Centro is disclosed in 0.01% of cases).
Table 6.6: Top Disclosures of Tracking











An additional facet of disclosure is if the privacy policy specifies the site’s re-
sponse to the “Do Not Track” standard. As noted in Chapter Four, “Do Not Track”
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is a setting available in all major web browsers which tells websites and embedded
elements the user does not wish to be tracked. There is no enforcement mechanism
and it is up to the party receiving the request to honor it and to be clear with
users what the policy is. In the news population only 15.93% of policies mention
the standard, which is actually better than the reference population where 10.41%
mention DNT. It should be noted that merely mentioning the standard does not
mean it is respected by the site or the trackers on the pages, and this is a very low
bar for disclosure.
From the above it is clear that the policies are far from accurate and demonstra-
bly incomplete. Despite this, it is still possible they would contain other valuable
information about the data retention policies of the news outlet. Yet for such infor-
mation to be useful, it would need to be clearly stated. Unfortunately for potential
news site privacy policy readers, the average reading difficultly score for all 2,881
news policies is in the college-level difficulty range (38.43 on the Flesch Reading-Ease
scale and a 13.87 Flesch-Kinkaid grade level score). Similar findings were evident
in the reference population where policies were also in the college-level difficulty
range (38.52 on the Flesch Reading-Ease scale and a 13.57 Flesch-Kinkaid grade
level score). While a non-trivial portion of users may have college degrees, privacy
policies are incredibly difficult to read, indicating that in the realm of journalistic
clarity and truthfulness, they fall short of established norms.
The impact of low disclosure rates for data flows is that even if users make the
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significant effort to read privacy policies, they are highly unlikely to learn about the
companies which receive their data. If editors and reporters decided to leave out key
facts from news stories they would quickly lose the trust of readers, if they failed to
report 97% of relevant facts they would quickly go out of business. Viewed from a
perspective of transparency and trustworthiness, rates of disclosure of data transfers
clearly shows how the spread of OBA undermines journalistic norms. Beyond not
trusting news websites to disclosure data flows, users should not trust them to keep
their computers safe from criminals either.
Trust: Analysis of Malware Exposure
In addition to a lack of accurate disclosure in privacy policies being a reason not to
fully trust a news website, the degree to which a given site is associated with fraud-
ulent and criminal malware schemes provides an even stronger indication. OBA al-
lows advertisers to send Javascript code to web browsers of those viewing ads. This
code is poorly vetted and criminals have discovered that buying advertisements is
a profitable and effective means of delivering malicious software in what has been
termed “malvertising” schemes. Most troubling of all, criminals may target users
for infection in the same way advertisers target them for discounts.
The results of the webXray analyses for both the news and reference populations
are augmented with data from the VirusTotal malware database. The VirusTotal
database is a free service provided by Google, and is an aggregation of “different
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antivirus engines, website scanners, file and URL analysis tools and user contri-
butions”. 8 The VirusTotal API queries roughly 60 anti-virus sources in order
to report if a specified domain has been marked as hosting malware. In order to
provide a strong basis to draw conclusions, only domains that are marked by more
than one source as malware are considered to be harmful.
For both the news and reference populations, two measures were taken: first, the
number of pages that themselves had been previously marked as malware hosts, and
second, the number of pages which initiate HTTP requests to third-party domains
which have previously been identified as a malware host. As can be seen in Table 6.7,
2.8% of news and 6.77% of reference sites have been themselves marked as hosting
malware. In this case of news sites the greatest likelihood for this happening is the
site having been compromised (or “hacked”), in the case of the reference population,
the greatest reason for this happening is the Alexa list may include malware sites.
Regardless of cause, it is alarming that several hundred news websites have been
marked as delivering malware.
Table 6.7: Domain Reputation and Malware Exposure





Providing an insight into the problem of malvertising are the rates at which pages
include requests to domains which have previously hosted malware. Table 6.7 con-
tains the results of checking 6,018 third-party domains in the news population and
40,556 domains in the reference population for hosting malware with the VirusTo-
tal API. 80.82% of pages in the news population link users to domains which have
previously hosted malware, while 67.87% of pages in the reference population have.
Once again, news websites present fewer reasons for users to trust them - in this
case by exposing them to criminals due to their embrace of OBA.
On a darkly ironic note, 53 of the domains linked to malware found on news web-
sites contained the word “safe” in them. Examples are “updatestogetforfeesafe.space”,
“internetssafety.com”, and “24online5678safesystems.site”. Such domains may fool
many users, but for the professionals responsible for coding and maintaining web-
sites, they should represent red flags which demand intervention. The failure to spot
such obvious scam domains is clear negligence, and represents yet another reasons
not to trust news websites.
While VirusTotal provides an excellent means to scan large numbers of domains,
it does not mark any of Google’s advertising domains as malware. This is despite the
fact that in March 2015, security firm Malwarebytes published research demonstrat-
ing that the websites of MSN, The New York Times, The BBC, Aol, and others were
delivering malware payloads to visitors over advertisements delivered by domains
owned by Google, AppNexus, Aol, and Rubicon. As noted above, Google alone is
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found on 95% of sites, indicating the problem of malvertising may be even worse
than VirusTotal data suggests. Not only does the use of OBA make news websites
poor guardians of user privacy, it helps expose users to criminals in such a way that
any sense of trustworthiness is eliminated entirely. However, when it comes to the
deliberative function of the press, malware is among the least concerning aspects of
OBA.
Chilling Effects and Potential Exposure to State Surveillance
As noted above, one of the primary roles of the press is to facilitate democratic
deliberation by citizens. One of the means by which such deliberation may be
compromised is through the “chilling effects” of surveillance. Thus, if news websites
facilitate state surveillance they ultimately put their ability to promote deliberation
at stake. This study reveals that OBA opens many avenues for state surveillance.
Behavioral tracking on news websites potentially exposes users to two forms of
unwarranted state surveillance. In the first, major Internet companies may either be
compromised or forced to disclose users’ web browsing information to authorities.
In the second, companies which sell data directly to the government may decide to
sell web browsing information collected from news media websites.
In 2013, former U.S. National Security Agency (N.S.A.) contractor Edward
Snowden leaked a massive trove of internal documents to the Guardian and The
Washington Post (both of whom won Pulitzer prizes for reporting on the contents
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of the leaks).9 One of the first reports to emerge from the Snowden leaks revolved
around a project named “PRISM” (Lee, 2013). According to an internal presenta-
tion, PRISM allowed the N.S.A. to collect information “directly from the servers”
of Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, Aol, Skype, YouTube, and Apple
(Ball, 2013). The companies, however, denied these allegations and several years
later the exact nature of PRISM remains a mystery. Regardless of details, it is un-
deniable that if one were to gain access the databases of the companies mentioned
in the PRISM slides a virtual treasure trove of web browsing information would be
found.
By using OBA, news websites funnel user data to the very databases most sought
after by intelligence agencies. Based on corporate data flow findings from the above
section, it is possible to determine if PRISM-linked companies Google, Facebook,
Aol, Yahoo!, and Microsoft may monitor a given web page. It is found that not
only do these companies all collect data from the websites of news organizations,
they do so at far higher rates than seen in the reference population (see Table 6.8).
This finding further underscores how the loss of independence by publishers results
in user data being centralized under the authority of entities outside the control of











While the PRISM slides raised more questions than answers, other slides Snow-
den leaked contained far more concrete details on how the N.S.A. has used data
from online behavioral advertising for spying purposes. In a 2013 article, “NSA uses
Google cookies to pinpoint targets for hacking”, The Washington Post detailed how
the N.S.A. was repurposing Google cookies for their own ends. According to former
Deputy U.S. Chief Technology Officer Ed Felten, the slides demonstrate “a link be-
tween the sort of tracking that’s done by Web sites for analytics and advertising and
NSA exploitation activities” (Soltani et al., 2013). Another article in The Guardian
revealed a specific Google cookie, “Doubleclick ID”, was used in efforts to spy on
users of the Tor anonymity service (National Security Agency, 2013).
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Table 6.9: Exposure to Google Cookies
Population Any Google Cookie Doubleclick ID
News 76.01 62.85
Reference 49.94 35.71
An investigation of the cookies set when loading the news and reference websites
shows that 76.01% of news and 49.94% of reference pages include a Google cookie
of some sort. In regards to the specific “Doubleclick ID” cookie, 62.85% of news
and 35.71% of reference sites utilize cookies known to be leveraged by the N.S.A.
As with the findings above, news sites consistently demonstrate significantly greater
threats to privacy than the reference population.
Beyond data found in the Snowden archives, prior research and reporting has
documented how so-called “data brokers” may sell personal information to military
and law enforcement organizations. Per Table 6.3, one of the largest data brokers,
Acxiom, was found on 43.92% of news media pages analyzed. According to an inter-
nal email regarding the now-defunct U.S. Department of Defense “Total Information
Awareness” project, a military official discussed obtaining Acxiom’s data with the
company’s Chief Privacy Officer over a decade ago (Hoofnagle, 2003). While Total
Information Awareness was formally disbanded, the internal emails made it quite
clear the military had a strong interest in Acxiom’s data.
Several years after Total Information Awareness was shuttered, a 2009 Wired
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report revealed that the FBI’s National Security Branch Analysis Center (NSAC)
possessed “nearly 200 million records transferred from private data brokers such
Accurint, Acxiom and Choicepoint” (Singel, 2008). Based solely on the findings
of the research presented herein, it is impossible to determine if the data sold by
Acxiom to the F.B.I. includes web browsing histories. However, it is quite clear
there is certainly data to be sold.
Another company receiving large volumes of user data from news websites is
Oracle whose “AddThis” subsidiary captures user data on 55.04% of pages. Ad-
dThis’ main product is a social media sharing tool (widget) which generates no
direct revenue for publishers and provides functionality which is trivial to imple-
ment. Despite the relative uselessness of the AddThis widget for users, significant
volumes of their data are harvest by the widget. The data itself is quite valuable
and explains why Oracle paid $200M to acquire AddThis in 2016.10 According
to Oracle’s press release, the AddThis acquisition gives the company the ability
to collect online behavioral data in order to “enable[s] understanding of consumer
behavior across all media channels”.11
Of particular importance to the subject of chilling effects, Oracle has deep ties
to the U.S. government. According to an article in The Guardian, CEO Larry El-




“Oracle”.12 Furthermore, among Oracle’s many clients are those of the “Public
Sector for Defense” division which “delivers a comprehensive set of applications
and commercial off-the-shelf solutions that help military organizations improve effi-
ciency, mission preparation, and execution”.13 Likewise, Oracle’s “Immigration and
Border Control” services assist with “managing the tracking of individuals within
national boundaries”.14 It is not possible to determine if the data AddThis col-
lects from news websites is made available to Oracle’s government clients, but an
evaluation of AddThis’ privacy policy also reveals there are no guarantees it is not
shared.
The nature of chilling effects is that the mere impression of surveillance may
limit debate and inquiry, which are the core functions of the press in a democratic
society. The above links between OBA and state surveillance are not definitive proof
that the N.S.A., F.B.I., U.S. military, or other such entities spy on visitors to news
websites by leveraging mechanisms and data collected by OBA firms. However,
the possibility this may happen is strong, and the possibility alone is enough to
chill speech. The case of AddThis, which provides scant benefit to publishers,
but significant risks for personal privacy, underscore the degree to which publisher
ignorance may be driving the trend. Furthermore, it is precisely the move to OBA






Through an in-depth investigation of how online behavioral advertising (OBA) func-
tions on news websites, this chapter has demonstrated that OBA is in many way
anathema to core democratic norms represented by a free, independent, and trust-
worthy press which stands as a bulwark of freedom. OBA is rapidly transforming
publishers who once had the power and independence to keep government in check
into branded content providers who help create audiences which are auctioned off
by OBA companies. Likewise, the embrace of the unsavory and inherently deceptive
aspects of OBA has undermined the trustworthiness of the press, putting them in
league with both unethical businesses and criminals. Finally, by facilitating state
surveillance, OBA places a potential chill on the ability of the press to facilitate
public deliberation. In sum, OBA weakens the democratic potential of the press,
undermines essential social norms, and centralizes power into fewer hands where it
may be abused.
In the previous chapters on fair information practices and medical privacy, the
failure of regulators was clear, but they were at least visible in the debates. When it
comes to the ways in which OBA undermines press freedoms, regulators are nowhere
in sight. Users, however, are taking protection into their own hands, and punishing
news outlets for their use of OBA. This punishment comes in the form of using
software tools to disrupt the functioning of OBA, and deny publishers advertising
revenue.
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According to multi-nation study by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Jour-
nalism at Oxford University, in some countries as many as 38% of users are now
using ad-blocking software to keep intrusive and harmful advertisements off of their
computers (Newman et al., 2016). Blocking ads denies publishers revenue and the
“vast majority of those who have ever downloaded a blocker are using them reg-
ularly, suggesting that once downloaded people rarely go back” (Newman et al.,
2016). In the majority of countries surveyed over half of users of ad-blockers re-
ported doing so due to a dislike of OBA-specific “ads that follow [users] around
from one site to another” (Newman et al., 2016).
Due to the fact that there is a long history of newspapers competing with each
other for “scoops” and advertisers, news media outlets have failed to recognize that
their true competitors are not other media outlets, but the OBA industry. From
a revenue standpoint, companies like Facebook and Google do not need to worry
if an advertisement is run on the page of a reputable news outlet which provides
a meaningful contribution to society, or a scam webpage peddling falsehoods: click
revenue is made either way.
However, what does matter is the speed by which additional ads may be shown
to users, thus the goal for these companies is to speed up delivery of content by
taking full control of the editorial and hosting functions of websites in order to
manipulate users to keep clicking on articles and advertisements. Facebook and
Google may claim to value the press, but from a business standpoint news outlets
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are merely another form of media to be “disrupted” and subsumed into a centralized
revenue system which exploits users for commercial gain.
To the degree that there has been industry coordination on the topic of OBA, it
has been woefully misguided. Initiatives such as “The Coalition for Better Ads”15,
which is supported by the trade group “News Media Alliance”, are seeking to de-
velop standards that “that reflect consumer advertising preferences”.16 However,
these standards are mostly aimed towards user-interface concerns such as annoy-
ing full-screen ads. Privacy concerns are barely mentioned, acknowledgement of
malvertising is nowhere to be found, and topics such as chilling effects are miles
away from industry concerns. However, if the online news media industry wishes
to continuing fulfilling a democratic function, they need to quickly realize that the
problem is much bigger than users being annoyed.
A free and independent press is the ultimate defender of democratic freedoms.
Online news websites, however, appear unable to defend themselves from the preda-
tory practices of the OBA industry. Thus, it is up to regulators to step in and
bring fundamental changes which cannot only improve user privacy, but save the
news media from being demoted to content providers for the likes of Facebook and
Google. The final chapter of this dissertation proposes a radically new approach to





Conclusion: Surveillance as a
Regulatory Model
The methods and normative frameworks used in this dissertation have revealed a
picture of a powerful online behavioral advertising industry pursuing goals which
are at sharp odds with the public interest. The technological systems deployed
by this industry have created a ubiquitous system of surveillance which implicates
nearly all facets of social life and empowers the state to conduct mass surveillance of
citizens. These are legitimate causes for serious concern, and given the extent of the
problems, some may adopt a stance of resignation and abandon the idea of privacy
as a foundational social value. However, there are still avenues available which may
produce regulatory outcomes which ensure respect for established privacy norms
and promote social justice.
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This concluding chapter of the dissertation revisits and summarizes the ways
in which the current self-regulatory paradigm is failing to protect essential privacy
norms on the web as well as why purely technical controls have been insufficient to
protect privacy. Finally, a radical new approach to regulating online data flows will
be proposed: mass surveillance of the companies which track users’ behavior.
Current Approaches to Controlling OBA Do Not
Work
The current regulatory approach to online tracking in the United States relies on
industry self-regulatory guidelines which are largely focused on the paradigm of
“notice and choice”. This paradigm is a conceptually flawed interpretation of the
rights-based Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), is practiced in a manner
which undermines social norms related to health and the democratic function of
the press, and if “notice and choice” were to be practiced in a meaningful way, it
would make the web unusable.
As noted in Chapter Four, the FIPPs were developed in 1973 as a normatively-
grounded “bill of rights” designed to protect “private individuals (data subjects)
against large government and private sector institutional actors” (Nissenbaum,
2004). The FIPPs were originally constituted by five broad principles aimed at
governing procedures for data processing in a way which embodied specific “norma-
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tive political views” (Rotenberg, 2001). These views were grounded in a philosophy
which regarded privacy as an essential human right. At the time of their writing,
the FIPPs represented a prescient view on emerging challenges to privacy in the
age of digitization, and proved to be highly influential. FIPPs were broadened over
time to include additional principles, and for the past forty years FIPPs have formed
the basis for privacy regulations around the globe. The wide adoption of FIPPs in
national data regulations provides strong evidence that a rights-based approach to
privacy has near-universal support.
However, in the realm of online privacy, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
eschewed the broad rights-based consensus on FIPPs in favor of the “notice and
choice” self-regulatory paradigm. This paradigm reduces the essential rights ap-
proach embodied in FIPPs to a system where data subjects are framed as consumers
rather than citizens or natural persons. The impact of this seemingly minor change
in framing is that it transfers “the protection of privacy from the legal realm, and
from an emphasis on the articulation of rights and responsibilities, to the market-
place, where consumers [are] forced to pay for what the law could otherwise provide”
(Rotenberg, 2001). Rather than a system designed to protect privacy, notice and
choice is a “creation of the U.S. marketing industry” which promotes consumerism
and profit (Rotenberg, 2001). Most egregious, the “choice” offered by the online
behavioral advertising industry is not a choice in regards to data collection, it is a
choice to see “tailored ads” instead of generic ads. Thus, the actual self-regulatory
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policies followed by industry today hold that users have no choice to control
data collection. The elimination of the right to control data collection has broad
social consequences.
Ubiquitous non-consensual data collection on the web leads to harms in several
areas of social life, two of which are medical privacy and the role of the press in
a democratic society. In regards to the former, there is a long history of medical
privacy norms which continues to this day. Patient information is protected by pro-
fessional guidelines and numerous laws because the exposure of patient information
may lead to shame and discrimination. Likewise, if one is concerned about these
harms, she or he may avoid seeking medical care which may increase medical costs,
foster the spread of disease, and raise mortality rates. Chapter Five demonstrated
that these norms are greatly undermined by the large amount of tracking happening
on medical-related websites. Such tracking is not limited to commercial websites
and includes non-profit and government websites which employ information-leaking
social media and traffic analytics code. Despite the huge volume of tracking taking
place on medical websites, the practice is virtually unregulated in the United States
and self-regulatory guidelines offer scant, if any, protection for users.
In order to fulfill its democratic purpose, the press needs to be independent,
trusted by citizens, and able to facilitate public deliberation on matters of gov-
ernance. However, OBA undermines all of these functions. The emergence of
a handful of powerful advertising networks has centralized the flow of user data,
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and by extension, the mechanisms for revenue generation and content delivery.
These trends have begun to transform independent media outlets into mere content
providers for companies like Facebook and Google. Furthermore, the lack of trans-
parency in data collection practices and risks brought about by malvertising serve
as a basis to seriously undermine the trust citizens may place in the press. Finally,
the ubiquitous surveillance carried out by online advertising networks has provided
law enforcement and intelligence agencies with the ability to monitor citizens as
they read the news. The mechanisms of OBA invert the role of the press from a
protector of freedoms into a facilitator of state power. The most profound impact of
OBA on the press is that it may chill speech, and reduce the ability of the press to
foster democratic deliberation. While the connections between OBA and the social
utility of the press are subtle, the impact is profound.
Assuming that the normative issues detailed above are of concern to the OBA
industry (and there is scant evidence they are), it may be argued that refinements to
the “notice and choice” system could be made. However, considering the volume of
tracking, it is utterly infeasible to give users sufficient notification of all of the data
transfers taking place. For example, the EU requires notifications from webpages
using cookies. Such notices often take up a portion of the top of the page and annoy
users by requiring them to click a button which expresses consent. Despite this,
the notices are usually vague and fail to disclose the entities receiving user data.
If EU-stye cookie notices were to actually include relevant details for each cookie,
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the contents of a given page would be obscured by numerous notifications. For the
Alexa top one million sites, eleven cookie notices would be required on average, and
on news websites twenty-seven notifications would be required. Assuming a user
clicks one notification per second, it would take nearly half a minute to consent to
viewing a given page. Even worse, these examples include only cookies. If users
were also notified of each third-party domain receiving their data, it would take
well over a minute of clicking consent buttons to view a page on an average news
website. It is amply clear that the volume of tracking makes meaningful notification
impossible without destroying the usability of the web.
On both theoretical and practical levels, it is clear that self-regulation in the
OBA sector is failing to respect and protect vital social norms. Due to this failure,
advocates of user privacy have developed a range of technical mechanisms to protect
privacy. Unfortunately, this approach is flawed as well.
As the issues raised by OBA are of a technical nature, at first glance they in-
vite technical solutions. Indeed, privacy-protective technologies such as browser
“add-ons” have proven effective at preventing certain types of behavioral track-
ing (Mayer and Mitchell, 2012; Roesner et al., 2012), and are enjoying increased
adoption (Newman et al., 2016). However, there are several limitations of purely
technical ad-blocking approaches: they foster a cat-and-mouse dynamic between
researchers and OBA firms, technical measures often unduly place the burden of
employing privacy protections on users, and blocking ads may deprive already-
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vulnerable publications of sorely needed revenue.
A major reason that purely technical solutions have not been broadly effective
is that whenever an effective anti-tracking methodology is demonstrated by re-
searchers it is swiftly met with technical counter-measures by industry which keep
user data flowing. This has produced an adversarial dynamic between companies
and researchers in which the protection of user data has become a high-stakes game.
For example, the rise of cookie-blocking resulted in the adoption of fingerprinting.
The use of ad-blockers has led to an emergence of ad-blocker-blockers which prevent
users from viewing content. Apple’s efforts at limiting tracking in the Safari browser
led Google to pursue deceptive means to overcome the mechanism, resulting in a
$17 million FTC settlement (Fung, 2013). Despite the threat of fines, industry
players with deep pockets continue to hire top-tier computer scientists to develop
new ways of tracking users and evading control. Researchers acting in the public
interest simply do not have the resources needed to keep up with their adversaries.
Although there should be a continued effort to develop technical counter-measures,
the game being played is unending and has not slowed the growth of OBA to any
meaningful extent.
Furthermore, purely technical solutions are problematic as they require a rela-
tively high level of knowledge and technical expertise on the part of the user. The
user must first understand the complex nature of information flows online in or-
der to seek out technical remedies. Next, the user must be proficient enough to
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install and configure the appropriate browser add-ons. This may seem trivial for
the well-educated, but many who use the Internet have little education or training
in computing. Furthermore, users are spending increasing time in mobile browsers,
where it is significantly more difficult, if not impossible, to install browser add-ons.
Ultimately, technical counter-measures have the unintended side-effect of shifting
responsibility for privacy protection from companies and regulators to the subjects
of behavioral tracking. The shift of responsibility to users is the same flaw which
undermines the essential legitimacy of the “notice and choice” framework in the
first place, ad-blocking simply reinforces this dynamic.
Finally, technical countermeasures often result in the elimination of advertising
revenue which disproportionally affects online publishers who are “almost entirely
display ad supported” (Budak et al., 2016). Google, Facebook, and other compa-
nies make billions of dollars in online advertising and have diverse product portfolios
which span search, social media, mobile communications platforms, and web display
advertising. This diversity means that while a specific revenue line may be tem-
porarily threatened by a new blocking technique, large companies are structurally
resilient to such attacks. For these companies, short-term financial losses due to
blocking are not mortal wounds. In contrast, small-time publishers may rely solely
on display advertising and operate on incredibly tight margins. Losing a small
amount of revenue to ad-blocking may put such publishers out of business. The
impact of this trend is that users will get even more of their content from Facebook
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and Google as independent outlets disappear. In a sadly ironic twist, ad-blocking
may strengthen the giants of OBA rather than hurting them.
Purely technological fixes to online privacy issues are insufficient as they are
at-best temporal in the face of industry counter-moves, place an undue burden on
users, and harm publishers. However, technological approaches may be leveraged
to provide assistance to regulators rather than users.
Surveillance as a Regulatory Model
Bruce Schneier has noted that “surveillance is the business model of the internet”
(Schneier, 2013). Given that the current self-regulatory approach to online privacy
on the web is failing, it is necessary to ask what approach can control surveillance-
based businesses? The answer is counter-intuitive, but addresses the underlying
information asymmetry which empowers online behavioral advertisers at the ex-
pense of users. In the same way users live under the gaze of the OBA industry,
regulators should engage in constant and ubiquitous surveillance of the practices of
the OBA sector. I terms this approach “surveillance as a regulatory model”.
Using the tools developed for this dissertation (webXray and policyXray), it is
now possible to constantly monitor the activities of companies tracking users on the
web and provide regulators with daily and historical reports on the state of track-
ing. Such an approach has several benefits: first, it streamlines the current process
for documenting and punishing privacy infractions in specific contexts; second, au-
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tomated code review systems may detect new deceptive practices as they emerge
and raise alarms; third, historical records may facilitate retroactive punishments;
fourth, automation makes it feasible to monitor large numbers of companies simul-
taneously; and finally, surveillance as a regulatory model may produce a form of
chilling effects by which website operators and OBA companies become significantly
more cautious in their approach to user tracking.
When companies get fined for privacy violations on the web it is often through
a convoluted and inefficient process which combines academic research, publicity,
and regulator action. Quite often, academic researchers will discover a new tracking
technique in the wild and either publish findings online or at academic computer
science conferences. These findings often get publicized in popular media as they
tend to impact the majority of web users, raise issues of legitimate public concern,
and feed into extant negative opinions of behavioral advertisers held by the public.
Publicity often results in public deliberation which places pressure on regulators to
levy fines against the most powerful companies in order to set an example to the
wider industry. This process is not a universal formula, but it is a familiar pattern
and demonstrates a reactive rather than proactive approach to regulation.
A much better approach is to separate research findings from the academic
publishing cycle and allow regulators to continually monitor websites in order to
issue fines quickly. Given the maturity and stability of webXray and related tools,
regulatory agencies around the world should devote modest budgets for either the
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operation of web privacy measurement systems or the licensing of centrally collected
data (e.g. via a API or reporting framework). Large scale scans of data flows may
be continually performed on popular websites, websites located in or serving specific
geographic jurisdictions, websites related to special social contexts such as health
or sexuality, and specific types of content such as news. The same economic forces
which facilitate companies monitoring users, affordable cloud computing and cheap
data storage, likewise make mass surveillance of companies engaged in behavioral
tracking entirely feasible. Rather than reading about new privacy violations on
the web in newspapers, regulators may instead generate positive publicity for their
agencies and win public accolades by catching companies when they launch new
tracking mechanisms.
Currently, the primary area of innovation in regards to tracking users is in the
use of constantly evolving Javascript fingerprinting techniques. To determine if,
and when, such techniques violate regulations such as deceptive trade practices,
all Javascript deployed by companies in the OBA sector may be downloaded and
stored. This code could then be analyzed in order to determine if it uses previously
known deceptive fingerprinting techniques or exhibits characteristics such as specific
function calls which indicate fingerprinting. In cases where an automated approach
surfaces code of potential consequence, it may be evaluated by experts. If this
process confirms an objectionable practice, companies should be contacted, fines
may be levied, and the public should be informed.
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While an alerting system may reveal new practices in short order, it should not
be assumed that they will always be detected. Academic research will continue to
proceed independently of regulatory actions and discover new tracking methods.
Thus, in cases where outside researchers find new practices which have been in
use for a significant period of time, regulators may consult their comprehensive
historical records in order to determine when such practices began. Fines then may
be levied for both current and prior violations, as well as multiplied by the number
of sites and users affected. This approach would ensure that bad behavior does not
go unpunished even if it happened in the past.
While Google and Facebook are well known companies, control huge portions
of the online advertising industry, and are the public face of industry wrongdoing
and fines, they are far from alone. Prior chapters in this dissertation have revealed
nearly two hundred companies collecting user data on the web, and many more
exist beyond those currently identified by webXray. Oftentimes the actions of small
companies are under-researched or ignored by the press, yet they may collect data
on many millions of users. By surveilling large numbers of companies with tools
like webXray, it may be possible to catalogue and identify a huge range of actors
and provide regulators with a number of targets for enforcement actions. Likewise,
with many companies under surveillance, it may be possible to evaluate the broader
context of a particular tracking technique and select the company which is most
vulnerable to legal pressure from a jurisdictional or social-contextual perspective.
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Such an approach gives regulators a hand in picking the cases most likely to succeed,
and sends a message to all companies that they are also being watched.
How will website operators and the OBA industry react to regulatory surveil-
lance? One obvious way is they will begin to feel the type of chilling effects which
limit speech in the public sphere, but instead of limiting the expression of contro-
versial opinions they will limit the use of controversial code. This type of coding
chilling effect would affect website operators and the OBA industry in distinct ways.
Ultimately, OBA companies cannot force website operators to use their code,
and it is the responsibility of web masters to audit the code they include from third-
parties. However, it is currently common practice for a developer to add code to a
website without any oversight from compliance or regulatory staff, even in sectors
such as medicine where the risks to user privacy are most pronounced. Given that
they too are at risk of being fined by ever-watchful regulators, website operators
would have a strong incentive to caution staff to review code before it is deployed. In
order to catch mistakes or potential bad behavior by trusted third-parties, website
operators could surveil their own websites in order to identify mistakes before reg-
ulators do, and, when appropriate, notify regulators if trust placed in a third-party
is proven unfounded.
Online behavioral advertisers, having the most to lose, would quickly learn to
conduct thorough reviews before deploying new tracking techniques. They would
have an incentive to keep careful inventory of the content featured on the sites
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they track lest they become entangled in sector-specific regulation related to health
or other topics. The knowledge that all security practices were being monitored
and recorded may result in an immediate and full embrace of transport encryption.
Ubiquitous surveillance, paired with the threat of fines, has the potential to put
a deep chill on the enthusiasm of industry for developing new and more invasive
forms of tracking.
Most importantly, surveillance as a regulatory model has the potential to resolve
the information asymmetry which at the core of the problem: private companies
know far more about the lives of the public than the public know of company
activities. Regulators equipped with comprehensive knowledge of all tracking taking
place on the web may seek out areas where key social norms are violated and levy
the appropriate fines to rein in objectionable behavior. Ultimately, regulators act
on behalf of the public and the unique tools I developed for this dissertation may
prove to be powerful weapons in the fight for privacy.
Future Work
There are a number of areas where academic research into the social effects of Online
Behavioral Advertising (OBA) may be continued. First, the effects of “algorithmic”
discrimination may be researched using experimental methods (see Sweeney (2013)
for one of the best studies in this area). Second, qualitative research may investigate
the perspectives of the software engineers who build OBA systems and whose voices
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are currently missing in extant scholarship. Third, additional sectors and social
contexts may investigate web privacy issues affecting individuals’ sexual interests,
financial concerns, and online political activities. Fourth, although policyXray is
currently only used for a basic analysis of privacy policy content, more advanced
natural language processing techniques could be used to draw findings from the
same data. Fifth, the various economic incentives which drive OBA should receive
more attention from researchers, particularly in regards to how services such as
Google Analytics are used by non-profit websites. Finally, by using large volumes
of longitudinal data, machine learning and predictive approaches may be used to
generate new insights into the scope and evolution of OBA.
In addition to academic research, policy work must continue as well. Given the
failure in the United States by regulators and congress to protect privacy, consumer
groups may lobby lawmakers on behalf of the public as well as establish their own
institutions for auditing and policing online privacy. Civil society groups may also
put pressure on companies to adhere to accepted human rights norms related to
privacy. Likewise, there are areas for consumer and human rights groups to work
together, as is the case with the new partnership between Consumer Reports and
the Ranking Digital Rights project. Furthermore, despite the fact that federal leg-
islators have been negligent in their duties to protect privacy on the web, individual
states have significant leverage in instituting new laws which would place additional
limits on the industry, as is already seen in the realms of medical privacy and data
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breach notifications. Finally, in the same way that professional groups spell out
ethics guidelines for practitioners of law and medicine, the same groups could set
standards for websites used in the profession. There is no single regulatory or policy
approach which will “fix” privacy online, but a number of approaches pursued in
tandem may have significant impact.
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